andrew_gelman_stats andrew_gelman_stats-2011 andrew_gelman_stats-2011-932 knowledge-graph by maker-knowledge-mining
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Introduction: Deborah Mayo, Aris Spanos, and Kent Staley edited a special issue on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics for the journal Rationality, Markets and Morals. Here are the contents : David Cox and Deborah G. Mayo, “Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation” Deborah G. Mayo, “Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do/Should They Meet in 2011 (and Beyond)?” Stephen Senn, “You May Believe You Are a Bayesian But You Are Probably Wrong” Andrew Gelman, “ Induction and Deduction in Bayesian Data Analysis “ Jan Sprenger, “The Renegade Subjectivist: Jose Bernardo’s Objective Bayesianism” Aris Spanos. “Foundational Issues in Statistical Modeling: Statistical Model Specification and Validation” David F. Hendry, “Empirical Economic Model Discovery and Theory Evaluation” Larry Wasserman, “Low Assumptions, High Dimensions” For some reason, not all the articles are yet online, but it says they’re coming soon. In the meantime, you ca
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1 Deborah Mayo, Aris Spanos, and Kent Staley edited a special issue on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics for the journal Rationality, Markets and Morals. [sent-1, score-0.35]
2 Here are the contents : David Cox and Deborah G. [sent-2, score-0.13]
3 Hendry, “Empirical Economic Model Discovery and Theory Evaluation” Larry Wasserman, “Low Assumptions, High Dimensions” For some reason, not all the articles are yet online, but it says they’re coming soon. [sent-7, score-0.18]
4 In the meantime, you can check out what Senn and I have to say. [sent-8, score-0.064]
5 Once all the articles are up, I’ll read them and write something in response. [sent-9, score-0.12]
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same-blog 1 1.0000001 932 andrew gelman stats-2011-09-30-Articles on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics by Cox, Mayo, Senn, and others!
Introduction: Deborah Mayo, Aris Spanos, and Kent Staley edited a special issue on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics for the journal Rationality, Markets and Morals. Here are the contents : David Cox and Deborah G. Mayo, “Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation” Deborah G. Mayo, “Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do/Should They Meet in 2011 (and Beyond)?” Stephen Senn, “You May Believe You Are a Bayesian But You Are Probably Wrong” Andrew Gelman, “ Induction and Deduction in Bayesian Data Analysis “ Jan Sprenger, “The Renegade Subjectivist: Jose Bernardo’s Objective Bayesianism” Aris Spanos. “Foundational Issues in Statistical Modeling: Statistical Model Specification and Validation” David F. Hendry, “Empirical Economic Model Discovery and Theory Evaluation” Larry Wasserman, “Low Assumptions, High Dimensions” For some reason, not all the articles are yet online, but it says they’re coming soon. In the meantime, you ca
2 0.29602611 2034 andrew gelman stats-2013-09-23-My talk Tues 24 Sept at 12h30 at Université de Technologie de Compiègne
Introduction: Philosophie et practique de la statistique bayésienne . I’ll try to update the slides a bit since a few years ago , to add some thoughts I’ve had recently about problems with noninformative priors, even in simple settings. The location of the talk will not be convenient for most of you, but anyone who comes to the trouble of showing up will have the opportunity to laugh at my accent. P.S. For those of you who are interested in the topic but can’t make it to the talk, I recommend these two papers on my non-inductive Bayesian philosophy: [2013] Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics (with discussion). {\em British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology} {\bf 66}, 8–18. (Andrew Gelman and Cosma Shalizi) [2013] Rejoinder to discussion. (Andrew Gelman and Cosma Shalizi) [2011] Induction and deduction in Bayesian data analysis. {\em Rationality, Markets and Morals}, special topic issue “Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do (Should)
3 0.29485467 1181 andrew gelman stats-2012-02-23-Philosophy: Pointer to Salmon
Introduction: Larry Brownstein writes: I read your article on induction and deduction and your comments on Deborah Mayo’s approach and thought you might find the following useful in this discussion. It is Wesley Salmon’s Reality and Rationality (2005). Here he argues that Bayesian inferential procedures can replace the hypothetical-deductive method aka the Hempel-Oppenheim theory of explanation. He is concerned about the subjectivity problem, so takes a frequentist approach to the use of Bayes in this context. Hardly anyone agrees that the H-D approach accounts for scientific explanation. The problem has been to find a replacement. Salmon thought he had found it. I don’t know this book—but that’s no surprise since I know just about none of the philosophy of science literature that came after Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos. That’s why I collaborated with Cosma Shalizi. He’s the one who connected me to Deborah Mayo and who put in the recent philosophy references in our articles. Anyway, I’m pa
4 0.26504123 1151 andrew gelman stats-2012-02-03-Philosophy of Bayesian statistics: my reactions to Senn
Introduction: Continuing with my discussion of the articles in the special issue of the journal Rationality, Markets and Morals on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics: Stephen Senn, “You May Believe You Are a Bayesian But You Are Probably Wrong”: I agree with Senn’s comments on the impossibility of the de Finetti subjective Bayesian approach. As I wrote in 2008, if you could really construct a subjective prior you believe in, why not just look at the data and write down your subjective posterior. The immense practical difficulties with any serious system of inference render it absurd to think that it would be possible to just write down a probability distribution to represent uncertainty. I wish, however, that Senn would recognize my Bayesian approach (which is also that of John Carlin, Hal Stern, Don Rubin, and, I believe, others). De Finetti is no longer around, but we are! I have to admit that my own Bayesian views and practices have changed. In particular, I resonate wit
5 0.25418529 890 andrew gelman stats-2011-09-05-Error statistics
Introduction: New blog from the philosopher Deborah Mayo who I think agrees with me about many statistical issues although from a non-Bayesian perspective. But I disagree with her when she writes that certain criticisms of frequentist statistical methods “keep popping up (verbatim) in every Bayesian textbook and article on philosophical foundations.” I’ve written a couple of Bayesian textbooks and some articles on philosophical foundations, and I don’t think I do this! That said, I think Mayo has a lot to say, so I wouldn’t judge her whole blog (let alone her published work) based on that one intemperate statement.
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20 0.11163197 958 andrew gelman stats-2011-10-14-The General Social Survey is a great resource
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same-blog 1 0.96309268 932 andrew gelman stats-2011-09-30-Articles on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics by Cox, Mayo, Senn, and others!
Introduction: Deborah Mayo, Aris Spanos, and Kent Staley edited a special issue on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics for the journal Rationality, Markets and Morals. Here are the contents : David Cox and Deborah G. Mayo, “Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation” Deborah G. Mayo, “Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do/Should They Meet in 2011 (and Beyond)?” Stephen Senn, “You May Believe You Are a Bayesian But You Are Probably Wrong” Andrew Gelman, “ Induction and Deduction in Bayesian Data Analysis “ Jan Sprenger, “The Renegade Subjectivist: Jose Bernardo’s Objective Bayesianism” Aris Spanos. “Foundational Issues in Statistical Modeling: Statistical Model Specification and Validation” David F. Hendry, “Empirical Economic Model Discovery and Theory Evaluation” Larry Wasserman, “Low Assumptions, High Dimensions” For some reason, not all the articles are yet online, but it says they’re coming soon. In the meantime, you ca
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Introduction: Philosophie et practique de la statistique bayésienne . I’ll try to update the slides a bit since a few years ago , to add some thoughts I’ve had recently about problems with noninformative priors, even in simple settings. The location of the talk will not be convenient for most of you, but anyone who comes to the trouble of showing up will have the opportunity to laugh at my accent. P.S. For those of you who are interested in the topic but can’t make it to the talk, I recommend these two papers on my non-inductive Bayesian philosophy: [2013] Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics (with discussion). {\em British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology} {\bf 66}, 8–18. (Andrew Gelman and Cosma Shalizi) [2013] Rejoinder to discussion. (Andrew Gelman and Cosma Shalizi) [2011] Induction and deduction in Bayesian data analysis. {\em Rationality, Markets and Morals}, special topic issue “Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do (Should)
Introduction: My article with Cosma Shalizi has appeared in the British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology. I’m so glad this paper has come out. I’d been thinking about writing such a paper for almost 20 years. What got me to actually do it was an invitation a few years ago to write a chapter on Bayesian statistics for a volume on the philosophy of social sciences. Once I started doing that, I realized I had enough for a journal article. I contacted Cosma because he, unlike me, was familiar with the post-1970 philosophy literature (my knowledge went only up to Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos). We submitted it to a couple statistics journals that didn’t want it (for reasons that weren’t always clear ), but ultimately I think it ended up in the right place, as psychologists have been as serious as anyone in thinking about statistical foundations in recent years. Here’s the issue of the journal , which also includes an introduction, several discussions, and a rejoinder: Prior app
4 0.80759323 746 andrew gelman stats-2011-06-05-An unexpected benefit of Arrow’s other theorem
Introduction: In my remarks on Arrow’s theorem (the weak form of Arrow’s Theorem is that any result can be published no more than five times. The strong form is that every result will be published five times), I meant no criticism of Bruno Frey, the author of the articles in question: I agree that it can be a contribution to publish in multiple places. Regarding the evaluation of contributions, it should be possible to evaluate research contributions and also evaluate communication. One problem is that communication is both under- and over-counted. It’s undercounted in that we mostly get credit for original ideas not for exposition; it’s overcounted in that we need communication skills to publish in the top journals. But I don’t think these two biases cancel out. The real reason I’m bringing this up, though, is because Arrow’s theorem happened to me recently and in interesting way. Here’s the story. Two years ago I was contacted by Harold Kincaid to write a chapter on Bayesian statistics
5 0.80043858 1719 andrew gelman stats-2013-02-11-Why waste time philosophizing?
Introduction: I’ll answer the above question after first sharing some background and history on the the philosophy of Bayesian statistics, which appeared at the end of our rejoinder to the discussion to which I linked the other day: When we were beginning our statistical educations, the word ‘Bayesian’ conveyed membership in an obscure cult. Statisticians who were outside the charmed circle could ignore the Bayesian subfield, while Bayesians themselves tended to be either apologetic or brazenly defiant. These two extremes manifested themselves in ever more elaborate proposals for non-informative priors, on the one hand, and declarations of the purity of subjective probability, on the other. Much has changed in the past 30 years. ‘Bayesian’ is now often used in casual scientific parlance as a synonym for ‘rational’, the anti-Bayesians have mostly disappeared, and non-Bayesian statisticians feel the need to keep up with developments in Bayesian modelling and computation. Bayesians themselves
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Introduction: Deborah Mayo, Aris Spanos, and Kent Staley edited a special issue on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics for the journal Rationality, Markets and Morals. Here are the contents : David Cox and Deborah G. Mayo, “Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation” Deborah G. Mayo, “Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do/Should They Meet in 2011 (and Beyond)?” Stephen Senn, “You May Believe You Are a Bayesian But You Are Probably Wrong” Andrew Gelman, “ Induction and Deduction in Bayesian Data Analysis “ Jan Sprenger, “The Renegade Subjectivist: Jose Bernardo’s Objective Bayesianism” Aris Spanos. “Foundational Issues in Statistical Modeling: Statistical Model Specification and Validation” David F. Hendry, “Empirical Economic Model Discovery and Theory Evaluation” Larry Wasserman, “Low Assumptions, High Dimensions” For some reason, not all the articles are yet online, but it says they’re coming soon. In the meantime, you ca
2 0.89214599 1505 andrew gelman stats-2012-09-20-“Joseph Anton”
Introduction: I only read the review , not the book. What puzzled me was not any lack of self-awareness but rather this bit: The title of Mr. Rushdie’s new memoir . . . comes from the alias he assumed when British police told him back in 1989 that he needed a pseudonym: the Joseph comes from Joseph Conrad, the Anton from Anton Chekhov. The protection officers issued to him by the British government soon took to calling him “Joe,” an abbreviation he says he detested. The thing that I don’t understand is why he detested the nickname. If I were in a comparable situation, I think I’d appreciate if my security detail gave me a friendly nickname. Then again, with the stress that Rushdie’s been under, I can imagine all sorts of personality transformations.
3 0.88163006 1581 andrew gelman stats-2012-11-17-Horrible but harmless?
Introduction: Basbøll writes: In re your recent post : Can you make sense of this ? My reply: This is not the kind of thing that I like at all. But for some reason it doesn’t bother me enough for me to want to mock it. Perhaps because I sense that the people who write this sort of thing have very little power or influence. Then again, a check of Wikipedia reveals that the author of the above article is “currently Professor and Bill Daniels Ethics Fellow, a past endowed Bank of America professor of management at New Mexico State University.” The connection between “Ethics Fellow” and “Bank of America professor of management,” that’s a bit creepy.
4 0.8702687 1198 andrew gelman stats-2012-03-05-A cloud with a silver lining
Introduction: For the past few weeks I’ve been in pain much of the time, some sort of spasms in my neck and shoulder. Things are mostly better now, but last night I woke up at 5am and my neck was killing me. On the upside, I’d just been having a dream about multiple imputation and in the dream I had a brilliant idea of how to reconcile conditional and joint model specifications. Amazingly enough, when I awoke, I remembered the idea from the dream, and, even more amazingly, it really was a good idea. And, I was in pain and couldn’t fall back asleep. That was good news because that meant I didn’t forget the idea. I mentioned it to Jingchen in our midday meeting today and he didn’t shoot it down. At this point, I don’t really know what will happen. Sometimes I have a sudden inspiration and is works out just as planned or even better than anticipated ; other times, what seems like a brilliant plan goes nowhere. For this new idea, the next step is the hard work of pushing it through and seei
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Introduction: Chris Wilson points me to this visualizatio n of three physical models of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Cool (and scary) stuff. Wilson writes: One of the major advantages is that the models are 3D and show the plumes and tails beneath the surface. One of the major disadvantages is that they’re still just models.
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