andrew_gelman_stats andrew_gelman_stats-2012 andrew_gelman_stats-2012-1181 knowledge-graph by maker-knowledge-mining
Source: html
Introduction: Larry Brownstein writes: I read your article on induction and deduction and your comments on Deborah Mayo’s approach and thought you might find the following useful in this discussion. It is Wesley Salmon’s Reality and Rationality (2005). Here he argues that Bayesian inferential procedures can replace the hypothetical-deductive method aka the Hempel-Oppenheim theory of explanation. He is concerned about the subjectivity problem, so takes a frequentist approach to the use of Bayes in this context. Hardly anyone agrees that the H-D approach accounts for scientific explanation. The problem has been to find a replacement. Salmon thought he had found it. I don’t know this book—but that’s no surprise since I know just about none of the philosophy of science literature that came after Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos. That’s why I collaborated with Cosma Shalizi. He’s the one who connected me to Deborah Mayo and who put in the recent philosophy references in our articles. Anyway, I’m pa
sentIndex sentText sentNum sentScore
1 Larry Brownstein writes: I read your article on induction and deduction and your comments on Deborah Mayo’s approach and thought you might find the following useful in this discussion. [sent-1, score-0.841]
2 Here he argues that Bayesian inferential procedures can replace the hypothetical-deductive method aka the Hempel-Oppenheim theory of explanation. [sent-3, score-0.808]
3 He is concerned about the subjectivity problem, so takes a frequentist approach to the use of Bayes in this context. [sent-4, score-0.689]
4 Hardly anyone agrees that the H-D approach accounts for scientific explanation. [sent-5, score-0.647]
5 I don’t know this book—but that’s no surprise since I know just about none of the philosophy of science literature that came after Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos. [sent-8, score-0.839]
6 He’s the one who connected me to Deborah Mayo and who put in the recent philosophy references in our articles. [sent-10, score-0.463]
7 Anyway, I’m passing on the above pointer for the benefit of those of you out there who know about these things. [sent-11, score-0.527]
wordName wordTfidf (topN-words)
[('salmon', 0.281), ('deborah', 0.278), ('mayo', 0.278), ('philosophy', 0.222), ('approach', 0.201), ('wesley', 0.183), ('pointer', 0.183), ('collaborated', 0.177), ('kuhn', 0.165), ('subjectivity', 0.162), ('aka', 0.162), ('deduction', 0.15), ('induction', 0.15), ('agrees', 0.148), ('accounts', 0.147), ('passing', 0.143), ('popper', 0.14), ('cosma', 0.138), ('inferential', 0.138), ('rationality', 0.136), ('connected', 0.127), ('replace', 0.124), ('argues', 0.121), ('concerned', 0.118), ('larry', 0.118), ('frequentist', 0.118), ('hardly', 0.115), ('procedures', 0.115), ('references', 0.114), ('reality', 0.113), ('surprise', 0.109), ('thought', 0.104), ('none', 0.102), ('find', 0.102), ('know', 0.101), ('benefit', 0.1), ('bayes', 0.093), ('problem', 0.092), ('takes', 0.09), ('anyway', 0.086), ('anyone', 0.081), ('literature', 0.078), ('method', 0.077), ('theory', 0.071), ('scientific', 0.07), ('useful', 0.067), ('comments', 0.067), ('came', 0.066), ('since', 0.06), ('found', 0.057)]
simIndex simValue blogId blogTitle
same-blog 1 1.0000001 1181 andrew gelman stats-2012-02-23-Philosophy: Pointer to Salmon
Introduction: Larry Brownstein writes: I read your article on induction and deduction and your comments on Deborah Mayo’s approach and thought you might find the following useful in this discussion. It is Wesley Salmon’s Reality and Rationality (2005). Here he argues that Bayesian inferential procedures can replace the hypothetical-deductive method aka the Hempel-Oppenheim theory of explanation. He is concerned about the subjectivity problem, so takes a frequentist approach to the use of Bayes in this context. Hardly anyone agrees that the H-D approach accounts for scientific explanation. The problem has been to find a replacement. Salmon thought he had found it. I don’t know this book—but that’s no surprise since I know just about none of the philosophy of science literature that came after Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos. That’s why I collaborated with Cosma Shalizi. He’s the one who connected me to Deborah Mayo and who put in the recent philosophy references in our articles. Anyway, I’m pa
2 0.29485467 932 andrew gelman stats-2011-09-30-Articles on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics by Cox, Mayo, Senn, and others!
Introduction: Deborah Mayo, Aris Spanos, and Kent Staley edited a special issue on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics for the journal Rationality, Markets and Morals. Here are the contents : David Cox and Deborah G. Mayo, “Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation” Deborah G. Mayo, “Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do/Should They Meet in 2011 (and Beyond)?” Stephen Senn, “You May Believe You Are a Bayesian But You Are Probably Wrong” Andrew Gelman, “ Induction and Deduction in Bayesian Data Analysis “ Jan Sprenger, “The Renegade Subjectivist: Jose Bernardo’s Objective Bayesianism” Aris Spanos. “Foundational Issues in Statistical Modeling: Statistical Model Specification and Validation” David F. Hendry, “Empirical Economic Model Discovery and Theory Evaluation” Larry Wasserman, “Low Assumptions, High Dimensions” For some reason, not all the articles are yet online, but it says they’re coming soon. In the meantime, you ca
3 0.22781497 291 andrew gelman stats-2010-09-22-Philosophy of Bayes and non-Bayes: A dialogue with Deborah Mayo
Introduction: I sent Deborah Mayo a link to my paper with Cosma Shalizi on the philosophy of statistics, and she sent me the link to this conference which unfortunately already occurred. (It’s too bad, because I’d have liked to have been there.) I summarized my philosophy as follows: I am highly sympathetic to the approach of Lakatos (or of Popper, if you consider Lakatos’s “Popper_2″ to be a reasonable simulation of the true Popperism), in that (a) I view statistical models as being built within theoretical structures, and (b) I see the checking and refutation of models to be a key part of scientific progress. A big problem I have with mainstream Bayesianism is its “inductivist” view that science can operate completely smoothly with posterior updates: the idea that new data causes us to increase the posterior probability of good models and decrease the posterior probability of bad models. I don’t buy that: I see models as ever-changing entities that are flexible and can be patched and ex
4 0.21372508 890 andrew gelman stats-2011-09-05-Error statistics
Introduction: New blog from the philosopher Deborah Mayo who I think agrees with me about many statistical issues although from a non-Bayesian perspective. But I disagree with her when she writes that certain criticisms of frequentist statistical methods “keep popping up (verbatim) in every Bayesian textbook and article on philosophical foundations.” I’ve written a couple of Bayesian textbooks and some articles on philosophical foundations, and I don’t think I do this! That said, I think Mayo has a lot to say, so I wouldn’t judge her whole blog (let alone her published work) based on that one intemperate statement.
5 0.18753181 110 andrew gelman stats-2010-06-26-Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics
Introduction: Here’s an article that I believe is flat-out entertaining to read. It’s about philosophy, so it’s supposed to be entertaining, in any case. Here’s the abstract: A substantial school in the philosophy of science identifies Bayesian inference with inductive inference and even rationality as such, and seems to be strengthened by the rise and practical success of Bayesian statistics. We argue that the most successful forms of Bayesian statistics do not actually support that particular philosophy but rather accord much better with sophisticated forms of hypothetico-deductivism. We examine the actual role played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian confirmation theory. We draw on the literature on the consistency of Bayesian updating and also on our experience of applied work in social science. Clarity about these matters should benefit not just philosophy of science, but
6 0.1829005 1205 andrew gelman stats-2012-03-09-Coming to agreement on philosophy of statistics
7 0.17509332 1652 andrew gelman stats-2013-01-03-“The Case for Inductive Theory Building”
8 0.17350926 614 andrew gelman stats-2011-03-15-Induction within a model, deductive inference for model evaluation
9 0.16782267 644 andrew gelman stats-2011-04-03-The saber saw, the ashtray, and other stories of misbehaving profs
10 0.16448919 1719 andrew gelman stats-2013-02-11-Why waste time philosophizing?
11 0.16292778 746 andrew gelman stats-2011-06-05-An unexpected benefit of Arrow’s other theorem
12 0.16096006 1779 andrew gelman stats-2013-03-27-“Two Dogmas of Strong Objective Bayesianism”
13 0.1596871 1712 andrew gelman stats-2013-02-07-Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics (with all the discussions!)
14 0.15876427 2034 andrew gelman stats-2013-09-23-My talk Tues 24 Sept at 12h30 at Université de Technologie de Compiègne
15 0.15564215 1433 andrew gelman stats-2012-07-28-LOL without the CATS
16 0.13765484 921 andrew gelman stats-2011-09-23-That odd couple, “subjectivity” and “rationality”
18 0.1116247 1438 andrew gelman stats-2012-07-31-What is a Bayesian?
19 0.10768174 811 andrew gelman stats-2011-07-20-Kind of Bayesian
20 0.10515523 1149 andrew gelman stats-2012-02-01-Philosophy of Bayesian statistics: my reactions to Cox and Mayo
topicId topicWeight
[(0, 0.129), (1, 0.063), (2, -0.095), (3, 0.033), (4, -0.128), (5, -0.004), (6, -0.033), (7, 0.055), (8, 0.087), (9, -0.061), (10, 0.021), (11, -0.077), (12, 0.005), (13, 0.064), (14, 0.038), (15, 0.047), (16, 0.018), (17, 0.035), (18, -0.022), (19, 0.029), (20, -0.024), (21, 0.007), (22, -0.026), (23, 0.017), (24, 0.014), (25, -0.057), (26, 0.056), (27, 0.054), (28, -0.019), (29, -0.001), (30, 0.016), (31, 0.033), (32, 0.041), (33, -0.032), (34, -0.01), (35, 0.007), (36, 0.007), (37, 0.069), (38, 0.028), (39, -0.034), (40, 0.046), (41, -0.03), (42, 0.065), (43, 0.014), (44, -0.011), (45, 0.038), (46, 0.002), (47, 0.003), (48, -0.028), (49, -0.03)]
simIndex simValue blogId blogTitle
same-blog 1 0.96186733 1181 andrew gelman stats-2012-02-23-Philosophy: Pointer to Salmon
Introduction: Larry Brownstein writes: I read your article on induction and deduction and your comments on Deborah Mayo’s approach and thought you might find the following useful in this discussion. It is Wesley Salmon’s Reality and Rationality (2005). Here he argues that Bayesian inferential procedures can replace the hypothetical-deductive method aka the Hempel-Oppenheim theory of explanation. He is concerned about the subjectivity problem, so takes a frequentist approach to the use of Bayes in this context. Hardly anyone agrees that the H-D approach accounts for scientific explanation. The problem has been to find a replacement. Salmon thought he had found it. I don’t know this book—but that’s no surprise since I know just about none of the philosophy of science literature that came after Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos. That’s why I collaborated with Cosma Shalizi. He’s the one who connected me to Deborah Mayo and who put in the recent philosophy references in our articles. Anyway, I’m pa
2 0.78731686 890 andrew gelman stats-2011-09-05-Error statistics
Introduction: New blog from the philosopher Deborah Mayo who I think agrees with me about many statistical issues although from a non-Bayesian perspective. But I disagree with her when she writes that certain criticisms of frequentist statistical methods “keep popping up (verbatim) in every Bayesian textbook and article on philosophical foundations.” I’ve written a couple of Bayesian textbooks and some articles on philosophical foundations, and I don’t think I do this! That said, I think Mayo has a lot to say, so I wouldn’t judge her whole blog (let alone her published work) based on that one intemperate statement.
3 0.76668257 114 andrew gelman stats-2010-06-28-More on Bayesian deduction-induction
Introduction: Kevin Bryan wrote: I read your new article on deduction/induction under Bayes. There are a couple interesting papers from economic decision theory which are related that you might find interesting. Samuelson et al have a (very) recent paper about what happens when you have some Bayesian and some non-Bayesian hypotheses. (I mentioned this one on my blog earlier this year.) Essentially, the Bayesian hypotheses are forced to “make predictions” in every future period (“if the unemployment rate is x%, the president is reelected with pr=x), whereas other forms of reasoning (say, analogies: “If the unemployment rate is above 10%, the president will not be reelected”). Imagine you have some prior over, say, the economy and elections, with 99.9% of the hypotheses being Bayesian and the rest being analogies as above. Then 100 years from now, because the analogies are so hard to refute, using deduction will push the proportion of Bayesian hypotheses toward zero. There is a
4 0.76378036 117 andrew gelman stats-2010-06-29-Ya don’t know Bayes, Jack
Introduction: I came across this article on the philosophy of statistics by University of Michigan economist John DiNardo. I don’t have much to say about the substance of the article because most of it is an argument against something called “Bayesian methods” that doesn’t have much in common with the Bayesian data analysis that I do. If an quantitative, empirically-minded economist at a top university doesn’t know about modern Bayesian methods, then it’s a pretty good guess that confusion holds in many other quarters as well, so I thought I’d try to clear a couple of things up. (See also here .) In the short term, I know I have some readers at the University of Michigan, so maybe a couple of you could go over to Prof. DiNardo’s office and discuss this with him? For the rest of you, please spread the word. My point here is not to claim that DiNardo should be using Bayesian methods or to claim that he’s doing anything wrong in his applied work. It’s just that he’s fighting against a bu
5 0.76062816 921 andrew gelman stats-2011-09-23-That odd couple, “subjectivity” and “rationality”
Introduction: Nowadays “Bayesian” is often taken to be a synonym for rationality, and I can see how this can irritate thoughtful philosophers and statisticians alike: To start with, lots of rational thinking—even lots of rational statistical inference—does not occur within the Bayesian formalism. And, to look at it from the other direction, lots of self-proclaimed Bayesian inference hardly seems rational at all. And in what way is “subjective probability” a model for rational scientific inquiry? On the contrary, subjectivity and rationality are in many ways opposites! [emphasis added] The goal of this paper is to break the link between Bayesian modeling (good, in my opinion) and subjectivity (bad). From this perspective, the irritation of falsificationists regarding exaggerated claims of Bayesian rationality are my ally. . . . See here for the full article, to appear in the journal Rationality, Markets and Morals.
6 0.75596398 110 andrew gelman stats-2010-06-26-Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics
7 0.75007361 1438 andrew gelman stats-2012-07-31-What is a Bayesian?
8 0.74964476 932 andrew gelman stats-2011-09-30-Articles on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics by Cox, Mayo, Senn, and others!
10 0.74427748 746 andrew gelman stats-2011-06-05-An unexpected benefit of Arrow’s other theorem
11 0.73614824 1781 andrew gelman stats-2013-03-29-Another Feller theory
12 0.73548186 1205 andrew gelman stats-2012-03-09-Coming to agreement on philosophy of statistics
13 0.73535109 1259 andrew gelman stats-2012-04-11-How things sound to us, versus how they sound to others
14 0.72836405 453 andrew gelman stats-2010-12-07-Biostatistics via Pragmatic and Perceptive Bayes.
15 0.7169323 291 andrew gelman stats-2010-09-22-Philosophy of Bayes and non-Bayes: A dialogue with Deborah Mayo
16 0.71470159 1779 andrew gelman stats-2013-03-27-“Two Dogmas of Strong Objective Bayesianism”
17 0.71246374 1719 andrew gelman stats-2013-02-11-Why waste time philosophizing?
18 0.7107361 2000 andrew gelman stats-2013-08-28-Why during the 1950-1960′s did Jerry Cornfield become a Bayesian?
19 0.70740932 1151 andrew gelman stats-2012-02-03-Philosophy of Bayesian statistics: my reactions to Senn
20 0.70479816 1712 andrew gelman stats-2013-02-07-Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics (with all the discussions!)
topicId topicWeight
[(15, 0.016), (16, 0.114), (21, 0.017), (24, 0.108), (63, 0.042), (84, 0.314), (86, 0.046), (98, 0.024), (99, 0.206)]
simIndex simValue blogId blogTitle
same-blog 1 0.91508412 1181 andrew gelman stats-2012-02-23-Philosophy: Pointer to Salmon
Introduction: Larry Brownstein writes: I read your article on induction and deduction and your comments on Deborah Mayo’s approach and thought you might find the following useful in this discussion. It is Wesley Salmon’s Reality and Rationality (2005). Here he argues that Bayesian inferential procedures can replace the hypothetical-deductive method aka the Hempel-Oppenheim theory of explanation. He is concerned about the subjectivity problem, so takes a frequentist approach to the use of Bayes in this context. Hardly anyone agrees that the H-D approach accounts for scientific explanation. The problem has been to find a replacement. Salmon thought he had found it. I don’t know this book—but that’s no surprise since I know just about none of the philosophy of science literature that came after Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos. That’s why I collaborated with Cosma Shalizi. He’s the one who connected me to Deborah Mayo and who put in the recent philosophy references in our articles. Anyway, I’m pa
2 0.90672594 323 andrew gelman stats-2010-10-06-Sociotropic Voting and the Media
Introduction: Stephen Ansolabehere, Marc Meredith, and Erik Snowberg write : The literature on economic voting notes that voters’ subjective evaluations of the overall state of the economy are correlated with vote choice, whereas personal economic experiences are not. Missing from this literature is a description of how voters acquire information about the general state of the economy, and how that information is used to form perceptions. In order to begin understanding this process, we [Ansolabehere, Meredith, and Snowberg] asked a series of questions on the 2006 ANES Pilot about respondents’ perceptions of the average price of gas and the unemployment rate in their home state. We find that questions about gas prices and unemployment show differences in the sources of information about these two economic variables. Information about unemployment rates come from media sources, and are systematically biased by partisan factors. Information about gas prices, in contrast, comes only from everyday
3 0.89054954 490 andrew gelman stats-2010-12-29-Brain Structure and the Big Five
Introduction: Many years ago, a research psychologist whose judgment I greatly respect told me that the characterization of personality by the so-called Big Five traits (extraversion, etc.) was old-fashioned. So I’m always surprised to see that the Big Five keeps cropping up. I guess not everyone agrees that it’s a bad idea. For example, Hamdan Azhar wrote to me: I was wondering if you’d seen this recent paper (De Young et al. 2010) that finds significant correlations between brain volume in selected regions and personality trait measures (from the Big Five). This is quite a ground-breaking finding and it was covered extensively in the mainstream media. I think readers of your blog would be interested in your thoughts, statistically speaking, on their methodology and findings. My reply: I’d be interested in my thoughts on this too! But I don’t know enough to say anything useful. From the abstract of the paper under discussion: Controlling for age, sex, and whole-brain volume
4 0.8841573 667 andrew gelman stats-2011-04-19-Free $5 gift certificate!
Introduction: I bought something online and got a gift certificate for $5 to use at BustedTees.com. The gift code is TP07zh4q5dc and it expires on 30 Apr. I don’t need a T-shirt so I’ll pass this on to you. I assume it only works once. So the first person who follows up on this gets the discount. Enjoy!
Introduction: Hadley Wickham sent me this , by Keith Baggerly and Kevin Coombes: In this report we [Baggerly and Coombes] examine several related papers purporting to use microarray-based signatures of drug sensitivity derived from cell lines to predict patient response. Patients in clinical trials are currently being allocated to treatment arms on the basis of these results. However, we show in five case studies that the results incorporate several simple errors that may be putting patients at risk. One theme that emerges is that the most common errors are simple (e.g., row or column offsets); conversely, it is our experience that the most simple errors are common. This is horrible! But, in a way, it’s not surprising. I make big mistakes in my applied work all the time. I mean, all the time. Sometimes I scramble the order of the 50 states, or I’m plotting a pure noise variable, or whatever. But usually I don’t drift too far from reality because I have a lot of cross-checks and I (or my
6 0.82513261 235 andrew gelman stats-2010-08-25-Term Limits for the Supreme Court?
7 0.7862339 1776 andrew gelman stats-2013-03-25-The harm done by tests of significance
8 0.78021657 2004 andrew gelman stats-2013-09-01-Post-publication peer review: How it (sometimes) really works
9 0.77219415 1817 andrew gelman stats-2013-04-21-More on Bayesian model selection in high-dimensional settings
10 0.76991606 1352 andrew gelman stats-2012-05-29-Question 19 of my final exam for Design and Analysis of Sample Surveys
11 0.76553547 1152 andrew gelman stats-2012-02-03-Web equation
12 0.76435673 1353 andrew gelman stats-2012-05-30-Question 20 of my final exam for Design and Analysis of Sample Surveys
13 0.75435841 1877 andrew gelman stats-2013-05-30-Infill asymptotics and sprawl asymptotics
14 0.75281745 2053 andrew gelman stats-2013-10-06-Ideas that spread fast and slow
15 0.74960911 184 andrew gelman stats-2010-08-04-That half-Cauchy prior
16 0.74221444 42 andrew gelman stats-2010-05-19-Updated solutions to Bayesian Data Analysis homeworks
17 0.71851623 1165 andrew gelman stats-2012-02-13-Philosophy of Bayesian statistics: my reactions to Wasserman
18 0.71649873 932 andrew gelman stats-2011-09-30-Articles on the philosophy of Bayesian statistics by Cox, Mayo, Senn, and others!
19 0.71619451 98 andrew gelman stats-2010-06-19-Further thoughts on happiness and life satisfaction research
20 0.71377933 186 andrew gelman stats-2010-08-04-“To find out what happens when you change something, it is necessary to change it.”