andrew_gelman_stats andrew_gelman_stats-2010 andrew_gelman_stats-2010-117 knowledge-graph by maker-knowledge-mining
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Introduction: I came across this article on the philosophy of statistics by University of Michigan economist John DiNardo. I don’t have much to say about the substance of the article because most of it is an argument against something called “Bayesian methods” that doesn’t have much in common with the Bayesian data analysis that I do. If an quantitative, empirically-minded economist at a top university doesn’t know about modern Bayesian methods, then it’s a pretty good guess that confusion holds in many other quarters as well, so I thought I’d try to clear a couple of things up. (See also here .) In the short term, I know I have some readers at the University of Michigan, so maybe a couple of you could go over to Prof. DiNardo’s office and discuss this with him? For the rest of you, please spread the word. My point here is not to claim that DiNardo should be using Bayesian methods or to claim that he’s doing anything wrong in his applied work. It’s just that he’s fighting against a bu
sentIndex sentText sentNum sentScore
1 I came across this article on the philosophy of statistics by University of Michigan economist John DiNardo. [sent-1, score-0.213]
2 If an quantitative, empirically-minded economist at a top university doesn’t know about modern Bayesian methods, then it’s a pretty good guess that confusion holds in many other quarters as well, so I thought I’d try to clear a couple of things up. [sent-3, score-0.268]
3 My point here is not to claim that DiNardo should be using Bayesian methods or to claim that he’s doing anything wrong in his applied work. [sent-8, score-0.243]
4 It’s all well and good to shoot at arguments that are already dead, but I think it’s also a good idea to be aware of the best and most current work in a field that you’re criticizing. [sent-10, score-0.173]
5 DiNardo thinks that Bayesians believe that the data generating mechanism is irrelevant to inference. [sent-12, score-0.385]
6 To which I reply, (a) I’m a Bayesian and I believe that the data generating is relevant to inference, and (b) We discuss this in detail in chapter 7 of BDA. [sent-13, score-0.163]
7 DiNardo thinks that stopping rules are irrelevant to Bayesians. [sent-15, score-0.265]
8 DiNardo thinks that Bayesians think that the problem of “how to reason” has been solved. [sent-19, score-0.165]
9 DiNardo thinks that Bayesians think that “usual (non-Bayesian) practice is very badly wrong. [sent-26, score-0.165]
10 DiNardo thinks that Bayesians think that “randomization rarely makes sense in those contexts where it is most often employed. [sent-32, score-0.165]
11 DiNardo thinks that Bayesians think that “probability does not exist. [sent-38, score-0.165]
12 The paradox of philosphizing DiNardo remarks, perhaps accurately, that the literature on the philosophy of statistics is dominated by Bayesians with extreme and often nutty views. [sent-41, score-0.222]
13 When we wrote Bayesian Data Analysis, we were careful not to include the usual philosophical arguments that were at that time considered standard in any Bayesian presentation. [sent-44, score-0.202]
14 If we had put 50 or 100 pages of philosophy into BDA (rather than discussing model checking, randomization, the limited range of applicability of the likelihood principle, etc. [sent-48, score-0.213]
15 Many people find philosophical arguments to be irritating and irrelevant to practice. [sent-50, score-0.302]
16 Thus, to get to the point, it can be a good idea to avoid the philosophical discussions. [sent-51, score-0.179]
17 But, as the saying goes, if philosophy is outlawed, only outlaws will do philosophy . [sent-52, score-0.375]
18 I hope this blog will wake him up and make him see the philosophy that is all around him every day. [sent-54, score-0.206]
19 If he were to compare the applied relevance of, say, BDA and ARM, to the applied relevance of a classical text such as that of LeCam, I think he’d be seeing quite a different picture in terms of relative usefulness of the Bayesian and non-Bayesian approach. [sent-71, score-0.35]
20 What I suspect–any readers who know DiNardo can ask him directly–is that he is simply unaware of the modern approach to Bayesian data analysis which is based on modeling and active model checking (“severe testing,” to use the phrase of Deborah Mayo). [sent-72, score-0.207]
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