andrew_gelman_stats andrew_gelman_stats-2010 andrew_gelman_stats-2010-83 knowledge-graph by maker-knowledge-mining

83 andrew gelman stats-2010-06-13-Silly Sas lays out old-fashioned statistical thinking


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Introduction: People keep telling me that Sas isn’t as bad as everybody says, but then I see (from Christian Robert ) this listing from the Sas website of “disadvantages in using Bayesian analysis”: There is no correct way to choose a prior. Bayesian inferences require skills to translate prior beliefs into a mathematically formulated prior. If you do not proceed with caution, you can generate misleading results. . . . From a practical point of view, it might sometimes be difficult to convince subject matter experts who do not agree with the validity of the chosen prior. That is so tacky! As if least squares, logistic regressions, Cox models, and all those other likelihoods mentioned in the Sas documentation are so automatically convincing to subject matter experts. P.S. For some more serious objections to Bayesian statistics, see here and here . P.P.S. In case you’re wondering why I’m commenting on month-old blog entries . . . I have a monthlong backlog of entries, and I’m spooling


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2 Bayesian inferences require skills to translate prior beliefs into a mathematically formulated prior. [sent-2, score-0.826]

3 If you do not proceed with caution, you can generate misleading results. [sent-3, score-0.35]

4 From a practical point of view, it might sometimes be difficult to convince subject matter experts who do not agree with the validity of the chosen prior. [sent-7, score-0.928]

5 As if least squares, logistic regressions, Cox models, and all those other likelihoods mentioned in the Sas documentation are so automatically convincing to subject matter experts. [sent-9, score-1.019]

6 For some more serious objections to Bayesian statistics, see here and here . [sent-12, score-0.233]

7 In case you’re wondering why I’m commenting on month-old blog entries . [sent-16, score-0.459]

8 I have a monthlong backlog of entries, and I’m spooling them out day by day. [sent-19, score-0.345]


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