andrew_gelman_stats andrew_gelman_stats-2012 andrew_gelman_stats-2012-1336 knowledge-graph by maker-knowledge-mining
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Introduction: In response to my comments on his recent opinion article on the the human tendency to overvalue information presented as stories, Reid Hastie writes : Andrew (and Commenters) … I’d like to try to clarify some of the statements and implications in my Bloomberg article on “Our Gift for Good Stories …” The essay is what it is, but some of the implications that I intended to convey do not seem to have been communicated effectively. So, let me take a shot at clarification here. (Of course I am not assuming that, once clarified, my statements are necessarily correct or that you will agree with them.) 1. What I meant in the sections of the paper that claimed the brain is naturally good at visual and causal (narrative) thinking, is that that the brain was probably selected, through evolutionary processes to be adaptively successful at those capacities. I don’t have good evidence for this claim … but, we do a lot of those kinds of thinking, we’re distinctive as a species in the ways
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1 What I meant in the sections of the paper that claimed the brain is naturally good at visual and causal (narrative) thinking, is that that the brain was probably selected, through evolutionary processes to be adaptively successful at those capacities. [sent-5, score-0.603]
2 In contrast, I don’t believe that mathematical thinking has those properties. [sent-7, score-0.152]
3 (Here I mean stylized mathematical thinking that goes beyond counting – such as algebra or geometry and more elaborate forms of this capacity. [sent-8, score-0.37]
4 ) I also believe, from behavioural experiments, that we are not endowed (through natural selection) with the logical reasoning skills required to solve stylized logic problems like those that are presented in classroom logic courses. [sent-10, score-0.465]
5 Though we are pretty good at some elaborate forms of “natural deduction” that are best described as rule-based. [sent-11, score-0.199]
6 I agree that my assertion that Bayesian Causal Networks (really the principles behind that notation) provide a normative, rational model for causal reasoning is highly speculative. [sent-14, score-0.22]
7 , the principles for calculation on those networks proposed by Pearl, and many others) are more popular than any previous proposal for a normative model, and that approach seems to distill the truth from many of the most plausible prior accounts. [sent-17, score-0.541]
8 But, every so often you have to bet on a new theoretical development, and I’m placing a wager on Bayesian Causal Networks … I certainly have not won that bet yet. [sent-19, score-0.194]
9 (I also think Andrew is right that most realistic causal systems studied in the behavioural and biological sciences are defined by many small-influence causal relations and the current versions of Bayesian Causal Networks may not be a practically useful framework for modeling those phenomena. [sent-20, score-0.63]
10 I am not apologetic about my choice of the Tversky & Kahneman causal conjunction brainteaser: Which is more likely “A flood drowns 1,000 Californians” versus “An earthquake followed by a flood drowns 1,000 Californians”? [sent-22, score-0.786]
11 Andrew says he does not see how this example demonstrates a problem with logical thinking skills. [sent-28, score-0.214]
12 My answer is not subtle; I just buy the Tversky-Kahneman conclusion that there is an implied violation of logical set-superset membership relationships when we rate the probability of a conjunction higher than the probability of a component category. [sent-29, score-0.227]
13 If you don’t accept that interpretation, you can certainly argue the alternative (see my list of methodological weaknesses above, plus the fact that different samples of respondents made the ratings that I claim “violate the logical principle”). [sent-30, score-0.193]
14 I’m not sure how to respond to the criticism that my claim that many interpretations of the recent financial crises are examples of narrative fallacies is actually motivated by my desire to excuse specific individuals and institutions from responsibility for the crises. [sent-33, score-0.65]
15 I can say it was certainly not my intention to excuse bankers and others from responsibility when I included that example. [sent-34, score-0.351]
16 Again, I thought I was providing an illustration that typical Bloomberg readers could understand; and that I was warning them not to commit the fallacy in their professional roles – and especially to be more modest about their own abilities to forecast future events. [sent-35, score-0.224]
17 If I were to characterize my own views on responsibility for the recent financial events, I would say that many bankers, analysts, raters, regulators, and politicians should be punished, much more harshly than they have been (or will be). [sent-37, score-0.368]
18 ) In any case, the reaction to my citation of (some) discussions of the financial crisis as examples of the “narrative fallacy” was an unintended consequence and I’m grateful to the blog for pointing that out. [sent-40, score-0.252]
19 That too was unintended (though maybe that’s not very remarkable, who sets out to intentionally write an article that sounds smug – maybe the occasional humorist). [sent-43, score-0.15]
20 That’s probably a reason that many popular science writers get in trouble. [sent-46, score-0.149]
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Introduction: In response to my comments on his recent opinion article on the the human tendency to overvalue information presented as stories, Reid Hastie writes : Andrew (and Commenters) … I’d like to try to clarify some of the statements and implications in my Bloomberg article on “Our Gift for Good Stories …” The essay is what it is, but some of the implications that I intended to convey do not seem to have been communicated effectively. So, let me take a shot at clarification here. (Of course I am not assuming that, once clarified, my statements are necessarily correct or that you will agree with them.) 1. What I meant in the sections of the paper that claimed the brain is naturally good at visual and causal (narrative) thinking, is that that the brain was probably selected, through evolutionary processes to be adaptively successful at those capacities. I don’t have good evidence for this claim … but, we do a lot of those kinds of thinking, we’re distinctive as a species in the ways
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Introduction: Jonathan Cantor points me to an opinion piece by psychologist Reid Hastie, “Our Gift for Good Stories Blinds Us to the Truth.” I have mixed feelings about Hastie’s article. On one hand I do think his point is important. It’s not new to me, but presumably it’s new to many readers of bloomberg.com. I like Hastie’s book (with Robyn Dawes), Rational Choice in an Uncertain World, and I’m predisposed to like anything new that he writes. On the other hand, there’s something about Hastie’s article that bothered me. It seemed a bit smug, as if he thinks he understands the world and wants to just explain it to the rest of us. That could be fine—after all, Hastie is a distinguished psychology researcher—but I wasn’t so clear that he’s so clear on what he’s saying. For example: The human brain is designed to support two modes of thought: visual and narrative. These forms of thinking are universal across human societies throughout history, develop reliably early in individuals’ lives
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