nips nips2005 nips2005-156 knowledge-graph by maker-knowledge-mining
Source: pdf
Author: Mark Steyvers, Scott Brown
Abstract: We measure the ability of human observers to predict the next datum in a sequence that is generated by a simple statistical process undergoing change at random points in time. Accurate performance in this task requires the identification of changepoints. We assess individual differences between observers both empirically, and using two kinds of models: a Bayesian approach for change detection and a family of cognitively plausible fast and frugal models. Some individuals detect too many changes and hence perform sub-optimally due to excess variability. Other individuals do not detect enough changes, and perform sub-optimally because they fail to notice short-term temporal trends. 1 Intr oduction Decision-making often requires a rapid response to change. For example, stock analysts need to quickly detect changes in the market in order to adjust investment strategies. Coaches need to track changes in a player’s performance in order to adjust strategy. When tracking changes, there are costs involved when either more or less changes are observed than actually occurred. For example, when using an overly conservative change detection criterion, a stock analyst might miss important short-term trends and interpret them as random fluctuations instead. On the other hand, a change may also be detected too readily. For example, in basketball, a player who makes a series of consecutive baskets is often identified as a “hot hand” player whose underlying ability is perceived to have suddenly increased [1,2]. This might lead to sub-optimal passing strategies, based on random fluctuations. We are interested in explaining individual differences in a sequential prediction task. Observers are shown stimuli generated from a simple statistical process with the task of predicting the next datum in the sequence. The latent parameters of the statistical process change discretely at random points in time. Performance in this task depends on the accurate detection of those changepoints, as well as inference about future outcomes based on the outcomes that followed the most recent inferred changepoint. There is much prior research in statistics on the problem of identifying changepoints [3,4,5]. In this paper, we adopt a Bayesian approach to the changepoint identification problem and develop a simple inference procedure to predict the next datum in a sequence. The Bayesian model serves as an ideal observer model and is useful to characterize the ways in which individuals deviate from optimality. The plan of the paper is as follows. We first introduce the sequential prediction task and discuss a Bayesian analysis of this prediction problem. We then discuss the results from a few individuals in this prediction task and show how the Bayesian approach can capture individual differences with a single “twitchiness” parameter that describes how readily changes are perceived in random sequences. We will show that some individuals are too twitchy: their performance is too variable because they base their predictions on too little of the recent data. Other individuals are not twitchy enough, and they fail to capture fast changes in the data. We also show how behavior can be explained with a set of fast and frugal models [6]. These are cognitively realistic models that operate under plausible computational constraints. 2 A pr ediction task wit h m ult iple c hange points In the prediction task, stimuli are presented sequentially and the task is to predict the next stimulus in the sequence. After t trials, the observer has been presented with stimuli y1, y2, …, yt and the task is to make a prediction about yt+1. After the prediction is made, the actual outcome yt+1 is revealed and the next trial proceeds to the prediction of yt+2. This procedure starts with y1 and is repeated for T trials. The observations yt are D-dimensional vectors with elements sampled from binomial distributions. The parameters of those distributions change discretely at random points in time such that the mean increases or decreases after a change point. This generates a sequence of observation vectors, y1, y2, …, yT, where each yt = {yt,1 … yt,D}. Each of the yt,d is sampled from a binomial distribution Bin(θt,d,K), so 0 ≤ yt,d ≤ K. The parameter vector θt ={θt,1 … θt,D} changes depending on the locations of the changepoints. At each time step, xt is a binary indicator for the occurrence of a changepoint occurring at time t+1. The parameter α determines the probability of a change occurring in the sequence. The generative model is specified by the following algorithm: 1. For d=1..D sample θ1,d from a Uniform(0,1) distribution 2. For t=2..T, (a) Sample xt-1 from a Bernoulli(α) distribution (b) If xt-1=0, then θt=θt-1, else for d=1..D sample θt,d from a Uniform(0,1) distribution (c) for d=1..D, sample yt from a Bin(θt,d,K) distribution Table 1 shows some data generated from the changepoint model with T=20, α=.1,and D=1. In the prediction task, y will be observed, but x and θ are not. Table 1: Example data t x θ y 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 .68 .68 .68 .68 .48 .48 .48 .74 .74 .74 .74 .74 .74 .19 .19 .87 .87 .87 .87 .87 9 7 8 7 4 4 4 9 8 3 6 7 8 2 1 8 9 9 8 8 3 A Bayesian pr ediction m ode l In both our Bayesian and fast-and-frugal analyses, the prediction task is decomposed into two inference procedures. First, the changepoint locations are identified. This is followed by predictive inference for the next outcome based on the most recent changepoint locations. Several Bayesian approaches have been developed for changepoint problems involving single or multiple changepoints [3,5]. We apply a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) analysis to approximate the joint posterior distribution over changepoint assignments x while integrating out θ. Gibbs sampling will be used to sample from this posterior marginal distribution. The samples can then be used to predict the next outcome in the sequence. 3.1 I n f e r e nc e f o r c h a n g e p o i n t a s s i g n m e n t s . To apply Gibbs sampling, we evaluate the conditional probability of assigning a changepoint at time i, given all other changepoint assignments and the current α value. By integrating out θ, the conditional probability is P ( xi | x−i , y, α ) = ∫ P ( xi ,θ , α | x− i , y ) (1) θ where x− i represents all switch point assignments except xi. This can be simplified by considering the location of the most recent changepoint preceding and following time i and the outcomes occurring between these locations. Let niL be the number of time steps from the last changepoint up to and including the current time step i such that xi − nL =1 and xi − nL + j =0 for 0 < niL . Similarly, let niR be the number of time steps that i i follow time step i up to the next changepoint such that xi + n R =1 and xi + nR − j =0 for i R i 0 < n . Let y = L i ∑ i − niL < k ≤ i i yk and y = ∑ k < k ≤i + n R yk . The update equation for the R i i changepoint assignment can then be simplified to P ( xi = m | x−i ) ∝ ( ) ( ( ) D Γ 1 + y L + y R Γ 1 + Kn L + Kn R − y L − y R ⎧ i, j i, j i i i, j i, j ⎪ (1 − α ) ∏ L R Γ 2 + Kni + Kni ⎪ j =1 ⎪ ⎨ L L L R R R ⎪ D Γ 1 + yi, j Γ 1 + Kni − yi, j Γ 1 + yi, j Γ 1 + Kni − yi, j α∏ ⎪ Γ 2 + KniL Γ 2 + KniR ⎪ j =1 ⎩ ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ) m=0 ) (2) m =1 We initialize the Gibbs sampler by sampling each xt from a Bernoulli(α) distribution. All changepoint assignments are then updated sequentially by the Gibbs sampling equation above. The sampler is run for M iterations after which one set of changepoint assignments is saved. The Gibbs sampler is then restarted multiple times until S samples have been collected. Although we could have included an update equation for α, in this analysis we treat α as a known constant. This will be useful when characterizing the differences between human observers in terms of differences in α. 3.2 P r e d i c ti v e i n f er e n ce The next latent parameter value θt+1 and outcome yt+1 can be predicted on the basis of observed outcomes that occurred after the last inferred changepoint: θ t+1, j = t ∑ i =t* +1 yt+1, j = round (θt +1, j K ) yi, j / K , (3) where t* is the location of the most recent change point. By considering multiple Gibbs samples, we get a distribution over outcomes yt+1. We base the model predictions on the mean of this distribution. 3.3 I l l u s t r a t i o n o f m o d e l p er f o r m a n c e Figure 1 illustrates the performance of the model on a one dimensional sequence (D=1) generated from the changepoint model with T=160, α=0.05, and K=10. The Gibbs sampler was run for M=30 iterations and S=200 samples were collected. The top panel shows the actual changepoints (triangles) and the distribution of changepoint assignments averaged over samples. The bottom panel shows the observed data y (thin lines) as well as the θ values in the generative model (rescaled between 0 and 10). At locations with large changes between observations, the marginal changepoint probability is quite high. At other locations, the true change in the mean is very small, and the model is less likely to put in a changepoint. The lower right panel shows the distribution over predicted θt+1 values. xt 1 0.5 0 yt 10 1 5 θt+1 0.5 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 0 Figure 1. Results of model simulation. 4 Prediction experiment We tested performance of 9 human observers in the prediction task. The observers included the authors, a visitor, and one student who were aware of the statistical nature of the task as well as naïve students. The observers were seated in front of an LCD touch screen displaying a two-dimensional grid of 11 x 11 buttons. The changepoint model was used to generate a sequence of T=1500 stimuli for two binomial variables y1 and y2 (D=2, K=10). The change probability α was set to 0.1. The two variables y1 and y2 specified the two-dimensional button location. The same sequence was used for all observers. On each trial, the observer touched a button on the grid displayed on the touch screen. Following each button press, the button corresponding to the next {y1,y2} outcome in the sequence was highlighted. Observers were instructed to press the button that best predicted the next location of the highlighted button. The 1500 trials were divided into three blocks of 500 trials. Breaks were allowed between blocks. The whole experiment lasted between 15 and 30 minutes. Figure 2 shows the first 50 trials from the third block of the experiment. The top and bottom panels show the actual outcomes for the y1 and y2 button grid coordinates as well as the predictions for two observers (SB and MY). The figure shows that at trial 15, the y1 and y2 coordinates show a large shift followed by an immediate shift in observer’s MY predictions (on trial 16). Observer SB waits until trial 17 to make a shift. 10 5 0 outcomes SB predictions MY predictions 10 5 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 Trial 30 35 40 45 50 Figure 2. Trial by trial predictions from two observers. 4.1 T a s k er r o r We assessed prediction performance by comparing the prediction with the actual outcome in the sequence. Task error was measured by normalized city-block distance T 1 (4) task error= ∑ yt ,1 − ytO,1 + yt ,2 − ytO,2 (T − 1) t =2 where yO represents the observer’s prediction. Note that the very first trial is excluded from this calculation. Even though more suitable probabilistic measures for prediction error could have been adopted, we wanted to allow comparison of observer’s performance with both probabilistic and non-probabilistic models. Task error ranged from 2.8 (for participant MY) to 3.3 (for ML). We also assessed the performance of five models – their task errors ranged from 2.78 to 3.20. The Bayesian models (Section 3) had the lowest task errors, just below 2.8. This fits with our definition of the Bayesian models as “ideal observer” models – their task error is lower than any other model’s and any human observer’s task error. The fast and frugal models (Section 5) had task errors ranging from 2.85 to 3.20. 5 Modeling R esults We will refer to the models with the following letter codes: B=Bayesian Model, LB=limited Bayesian model, FF1..3=fast and frugal models 1..3. We assessed model fit by comparing the model’s prediction against the human observers’ predictions, again using a normalized city-block distance model error= T 1 ∑ ytM − ytO,1 + ytM − ytO,2 ,1 ,2 (T − 1) t=2 (5) where yM represents the model’s prediction. The model error for each individual observer is shown in Figure 3. It is important to note that because each model is associated with a set of free parameters, the parameters optimized for task error and model error are different. For Figure 3, the parameters were optimized to minimize Equation (5) for each individual observer, showing the extent to which these models can capture the performance of individual observers, not necessarily providing the best task performance. B LB FF1 FF2 MY MS MM EJ FF3 Model Error 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 PH NP DN SB ML 1 Figure 3. Model error for each individual observer. 5.1 B ay e s i a n p re d i ct i o n m o d e l s At each trial t, the model was provided with the sequence of all previous outcomes. The Gibbs sampling and inference procedures from Eq. (2) and (3) were applied with M=30 iterations and S=200 samples. The change probability α was a free parameter. In the full Bayesian model, the whole sequence of observations up to the current trial is available for prediction, leading to a memory requirement of up to T=1500 trials – a psychologically unreasonable assumption. We therefore also simulated a limited Bayesian model (LB) where the observed sequence was truncated to the last 10 outcomes. The LB model showed almost no decrement in task performance compared to the full Bayesian model. Figure 3 also shows that it fit human data quite well. 5.2 I n d i v i d u a l D i f f er e nc e s The right-hand panel of Figure 4 plots each observer’s task error as a function of the mean city-block distance between their subsequent button presses. This shows a clear U-shaped function. Observers with very variable predictions (e.g., ML and DN) had large average changes between successive button pushes, and also had large task error: These observers were too “twitchy”. Observers with very small average button changes (e.g., SB and NP) were not twitchy enough, and also had large task error. Observers in the middle had the lowest task error (e.g., MS and MY). The left-hand panel of Figure 4 shows the same data, but with the x-axis based on the Bayesian model fits. Instead of using mean button change distance to index twitchiness (as in 1 Error bars indicate bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. the right-hand panel), the left-hand panel uses the estimated α parameters from the Bayesian model. A similar U-shaped pattern is observed: individuals with too large or too small α estimates have large task errors. 3.3 DN 3.2 Task Error ML SB 3.2 NP 3.1 Task Error 3.3 PH EJ 3 MM MS MY 2.9 2.8 10 -4 10 -3 10 -2 DN NP 3.1 3 PH EJ MM MS 2.9 B ML SB MY 2.8 10 -1 10 0 0.5 1 α 1.5 2 Mean Button Change 2.5 3 Figure 4. Task error vs. “twitchiness”. Left-hand panel indexes twitchiness using estimated α parameters from Bayesian model fits. Right-hand panel uses mean distance between successive predictions. 5.3 F a s t - a n d - F r u g a l ( F F ) p r e d ic t i o n m o d e l s These models perform the prediction task using simple heuristics that are cognitively plausible. The FF models keep a short memory of previous stimulus values and make predictions using the same two-step process as the Bayesian model. First, a decision is made as to whether the latent parameter θ has changed. Second, remembered stimulus values that occurred after the most recently detected changepoint are used to generate the next prediction. A simple heuristic is used to detect changepoints: If the distance between the most recent observation and prediction is greater than some threshold amount, a change is inferred. We defined the distance between a prediction (p) and an observation (y) as the difference between the log-likelihoods of y assuming θ=p and θ=y. Thus, if fB(.|θ, K) is the binomial density with parameters θ and K, the distance between observation y and prediction p is defined as d(y,p)=log(fB(y|y,K))-log(fB(y|p,K)). A changepoint on time step t+1 is inferred whenever d(yt,pt)>C. The parameter C governs the twitchiness of the model predictions. If C is large, only very dramatic changepoints will be detected, and the model will be too conservative. If C is small, the model will be too twitchy, and will detect changepoints on the basis of small random fluctuations. Predictions are based on the most recent M observations, which are kept in memory, unless a changepoint has been detected in which case only those observations occurring after the changepoint are used for prediction. The prediction for time step t+1 is simply the mean of these observations, say p. Human observers were reticent to make predictions very close to the boundaries. This was modeled by allowing the FF model to change its prediction for the next time step, yt+1, towards the mean prediction (0.5). This change reflects a two-way bet. If the probability of a change occurring is α, the best guess will be 0.5 if that change occurs, or the mean p if the change does not occur. Thus, the prediction made is actually yt+1=1/2 α+(1-α)p. Note that we do not allow perfect knowledge of the probability of a changepoint, α. Instead, an estimated value of α is used based on the number of changepoints detected in the data series up to time t. The FF model nests two simpler FF models that are psychologically interesting. If the twitchiness threshold parameter C becomes arbitrarily large, the model never detects a change and instead becomes a continuous running average model. Predictions from this model are simply a boxcar smooth of the data. Alternatively, if we assume no memory the model must based each prediction on only the previous stimulus (i.e., M=1). Above, in Figure 3, we labeled the complete FF model as FF1, the boxcar model as FF2 and the memoryless model FF3. Figure 3 showed that the complete FF model (FF1) fit the data from all observers significantly better than either the boxcar model (FF2) or the memoryless model (FF3). Exceptions were observers PH, DN and ML, for whom all three FF model fit equally well. This result suggests that our observers were (mostly) doing more than just keeping a running average of the data, or using only the most recent observation. The FF1 model fit the data about as well as the Bayesian models for all observers except MY and MS. Note that, in general, the FF1 and Bayesian model fits are very good: the average city block distance between the human data and the model prediction is around 0.75 (out of 10) buttons on both the x- and y-axes. 6 C onclusion We used an online prediction task to study changepoint detection. Human observers had to predict the next observation in stochastic sequences containing random changepoints. We showed that some observers are too “twitchy”: They perform poorly on the prediction task because they see changes where only random fluctuation exists. Other observers are not twitchy enough, and they perform poorly because they fail to see small changes. We developed a Bayesian changepoint detection model that performed the task optimally, and also provided a good fit to human data when sub-optimal parameter settings were used. Finally, we developed a fast-and-frugal model that showed how participants may be able to perform well at the task using minimal information and simple decision heuristics. Acknowledgments We thank Eric-Jan Wagenmakers and Mike Yi for useful discussions related to this work. This work was supported in part by a grant from the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR grant number FA9550-04-1-0317). R e f er e n ce s [1] Gilovich, T., Vallone, R. and Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: on the misperception of random sequences. Cognitive Psychology17, 295-314. [2] Albright, S.C. (1993a). A statistical analysis of hitting streaks in baseball. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88, 1175-1183. [3] Stephens, D.A. (1994). Bayesian retrospective multiple changepoint identification. Applied Statistics 43(1), 159-178. [4] Carlin, B.P., Gelfand, A.E., & Smith, A.F.M. (1992). Hierarchical Bayesian analysis of changepoint problems. Applied Statistics 41(2), 389-405. [5] Green, P.J. (1995). Reversible jump Markov chain Monte Carlo computation and Bayesian model determination. Biometrika 82(4), 711-732. [6] Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D.G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650-669.
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sentIndex sentText sentNum sentScore
1 edu University of California, Irvine Irvine, CA 92697 Abstract We measure the ability of human observers to predict the next datum in a sequence that is generated by a simple statistical process undergoing change at random points in time. [sent-3, score-0.578]
2 Accurate performance in this task requires the identification of changepoints. [sent-4, score-0.158]
3 We assess individual differences between observers both empirically, and using two kinds of models: a Bayesian approach for change detection and a family of cognitively plausible fast and frugal models. [sent-5, score-0.661]
4 Some individuals detect too many changes and hence perform sub-optimally due to excess variability. [sent-6, score-0.214]
5 Other individuals do not detect enough changes, and perform sub-optimally because they fail to notice short-term temporal trends. [sent-7, score-0.164]
6 For example, stock analysts need to quickly detect changes in the market in order to adjust investment strategies. [sent-9, score-0.187]
7 For example, when using an overly conservative change detection criterion, a stock analyst might miss important short-term trends and interpret them as random fluctuations instead. [sent-12, score-0.174]
8 We are interested in explaining individual differences in a sequential prediction task. [sent-16, score-0.205]
9 Observers are shown stimuli generated from a simple statistical process with the task of predicting the next datum in the sequence. [sent-17, score-0.222]
10 The latent parameters of the statistical process change discretely at random points in time. [sent-18, score-0.162]
11 Performance in this task depends on the accurate detection of those changepoints, as well as inference about future outcomes based on the outcomes that followed the most recent inferred changepoint. [sent-19, score-0.383]
12 There is much prior research in statistics on the problem of identifying changepoints [3,4,5]. [sent-20, score-0.179]
13 In this paper, we adopt a Bayesian approach to the changepoint identification problem and develop a simple inference procedure to predict the next datum in a sequence. [sent-21, score-0.821]
14 The Bayesian model serves as an ideal observer model and is useful to characterize the ways in which individuals deviate from optimality. [sent-22, score-0.337]
15 We first introduce the sequential prediction task and discuss a Bayesian analysis of this prediction problem. [sent-24, score-0.395]
16 We then discuss the results from a few individuals in this prediction task and show how the Bayesian approach can capture individual differences with a single “twitchiness” parameter that describes how readily changes are perceived in random sequences. [sent-25, score-0.523]
17 We will show that some individuals are too twitchy: their performance is too variable because they base their predictions on too little of the recent data. [sent-26, score-0.217]
18 Other individuals are not twitchy enough, and they fail to capture fast changes in the data. [sent-27, score-0.384]
19 2 A pr ediction task wit h m ult iple c hange points In the prediction task, stimuli are presented sequentially and the task is to predict the next stimulus in the sequence. [sent-30, score-0.562]
20 After t trials, the observer has been presented with stimuli y1, y2, …, yt and the task is to make a prediction about yt+1. [sent-31, score-0.589]
21 After the prediction is made, the actual outcome yt+1 is revealed and the next trial proceeds to the prediction of yt+2. [sent-32, score-0.48]
22 The observations yt are D-dimensional vectors with elements sampled from binomial distributions. [sent-34, score-0.227]
23 The parameters of those distributions change discretely at random points in time such that the mean increases or decreases after a change point. [sent-35, score-0.235]
24 This generates a sequence of observation vectors, y1, y2, …, yT, where each yt = {yt,1 … yt,D}. [sent-36, score-0.17]
25 At each time step, xt is a binary indicator for the occurrence of a changepoint occurring at time t+1. [sent-39, score-0.709]
26 The parameter α determines the probability of a change occurring in the sequence. [sent-40, score-0.158]
27 D, sample yt from a Bin(θt,d,K) distribution Table 1 shows some data generated from the changepoint model with T=20, α=. [sent-51, score-0.825]
28 87 9 7 8 7 4 4 4 9 8 3 6 7 8 2 1 8 9 9 8 8 3 A Bayesian pr ediction m ode l In both our Bayesian and fast-and-frugal analyses, the prediction task is decomposed into two inference procedures. [sent-74, score-0.323]
29 This is followed by predictive inference for the next outcome based on the most recent changepoint locations. [sent-76, score-0.797]
30 Several Bayesian approaches have been developed for changepoint problems involving single or multiple changepoints [3,5]. [sent-77, score-0.828]
31 We apply a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) analysis to approximate the joint posterior distribution over changepoint assignments x while integrating out θ. [sent-78, score-0.715]
32 To apply Gibbs sampling, we evaluate the conditional probability of assigning a changepoint at time i, given all other changepoint assignments and the current α value. [sent-83, score-1.364]
33 This can be simplified by considering the location of the most recent changepoint preceding and following time i and the outcomes occurring between these locations. [sent-85, score-0.855]
34 Let niL be the number of time steps from the last changepoint up to and including the current time step i such that xi − nL =1 and xi − nL + j =0 for 0 < niL . [sent-86, score-0.693]
35 Similarly, let niR be the number of time steps that i i follow time step i up to the next changepoint such that xi + n R =1 and xi + nR − j =0 for i R i 0 < n . [sent-87, score-0.727]
36 All changepoint assignments are then updated sequentially by the Gibbs sampling equation above. [sent-90, score-0.763]
37 The sampler is run for M iterations after which one set of changepoint assignments is saved. [sent-91, score-0.768]
38 This will be useful when characterizing the differences between human observers in terms of differences in α. [sent-94, score-0.414]
39 3 I l l u s t r a t i o n o f m o d e l p er f o r m a n c e Figure 1 illustrates the performance of the model on a one dimensional sequence (D=1) generated from the changepoint model with T=160, α=0. [sent-100, score-0.785]
40 The top panel shows the actual changepoints (triangles) and the distribution of changepoint assignments averaged over samples. [sent-103, score-0.971]
41 At locations with large changes between observations, the marginal changepoint probability is quite high. [sent-105, score-0.753]
42 4 Prediction experiment We tested performance of 9 human observers in the prediction task. [sent-112, score-0.487]
43 The observers included the authors, a visitor, and one student who were aware of the statistical nature of the task as well as naïve students. [sent-113, score-0.405]
44 The observers were seated in front of an LCD touch screen displaying a two-dimensional grid of 11 x 11 buttons. [sent-114, score-0.365]
45 The changepoint model was used to generate a sequence of T=1500 stimuli for two binomial variables y1 and y2 (D=2, K=10). [sent-115, score-0.808]
46 The two variables y1 and y2 specified the two-dimensional button location. [sent-118, score-0.221]
47 On each trial, the observer touched a button on the grid displayed on the touch screen. [sent-120, score-0.419]
48 Following each button press, the button corresponding to the next {y1,y2} outcome in the sequence was highlighted. [sent-121, score-0.488]
49 Observers were instructed to press the button that best predicted the next location of the highlighted button. [sent-122, score-0.216]
50 The top and bottom panels show the actual outcomes for the y1 and y2 button grid coordinates as well as the predictions for two observers (SB and MY). [sent-127, score-0.668]
51 The figure shows that at trial 15, the y1 and y2 coordinates show a large shift followed by an immediate shift in observer’s MY predictions (on trial 16). [sent-128, score-0.297]
52 10 5 0 outcomes SB predictions MY predictions 10 5 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 Trial 30 35 40 45 50 Figure 2. [sent-130, score-0.253]
53 1 T a s k er r o r We assessed prediction performance by comparing the prediction with the actual outcome in the sequence. [sent-133, score-0.413]
54 Task error was measured by normalized city-block distance T 1 (4) task error= ∑ yt ,1 − ytO,1 + yt ,2 − ytO,2 (T − 1) t =2 where yO represents the observer’s prediction. [sent-134, score-0.47]
55 Even though more suitable probabilistic measures for prediction error could have been adopted, we wanted to allow comparison of observer’s performance with both probabilistic and non-probabilistic models. [sent-136, score-0.18]
56 We also assessed the performance of five models – their task errors ranged from 2. [sent-140, score-0.19]
57 This fits with our definition of the Bayesian models as “ideal observer” models – their task error is lower than any other model’s and any human observer’s task error. [sent-145, score-0.355]
58 The fast and frugal models (Section 5) had task errors ranging from 2. [sent-146, score-0.236]
59 We assessed model fit by comparing the model’s prediction against the human observers’ predictions, again using a normalized city-block distance model error= T 1 ∑ ytM − ytO,1 + ytM − ytO,2 ,1 ,2 (T − 1) t=2 (5) where yM represents the model’s prediction. [sent-154, score-0.444]
60 The model error for each individual observer is shown in Figure 3. [sent-155, score-0.27]
61 It is important to note that because each model is associated with a set of free parameters, the parameters optimized for task error and model error are different. [sent-156, score-0.265]
62 For Figure 3, the parameters were optimized to minimize Equation (5) for each individual observer, showing the extent to which these models can capture the performance of individual observers, not necessarily providing the best task performance. [sent-157, score-0.173]
63 1 B ay e s i a n p re d i ct i o n m o d e l s At each trial t, the model was provided with the sequence of all previous outcomes. [sent-163, score-0.173]
64 In the full Bayesian model, the whole sequence of observations up to the current trial is available for prediction, leading to a memory requirement of up to T=1500 trials – a psychologically unreasonable assumption. [sent-167, score-0.259]
65 The LB model showed almost no decrement in task performance compared to the full Bayesian model. [sent-169, score-0.173]
66 2 I n d i v i d u a l D i f f er e nc e s The right-hand panel of Figure 4 plots each observer’s task error as a function of the mean city-block distance between their subsequent button presses. [sent-172, score-0.512]
67 , ML and DN) had large average changes between successive button pushes, and also had large task error: These observers were too “twitchy”. [sent-176, score-0.663]
68 , SB and NP) were not twitchy enough, and also had large task error. [sent-179, score-0.27]
69 Instead of using mean button change distance to index twitchiness (as in 1 Error bars indicate bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. [sent-184, score-0.454]
70 A similar U-shaped pattern is observed: individuals with too large or too small α estimates have large task errors. [sent-186, score-0.212]
71 Left-hand panel indexes twitchiness using estimated α parameters from Bayesian model fits. [sent-203, score-0.248]
72 3 F a s t - a n d - F r u g a l ( F F ) p r e d ic t i o n m o d e l s These models perform the prediction task using simple heuristics that are cognitively plausible. [sent-206, score-0.307]
73 Second, remembered stimulus values that occurred after the most recently detected changepoint are used to generate the next prediction. [sent-209, score-0.79]
74 A simple heuristic is used to detect changepoints: If the distance between the most recent observation and prediction is greater than some threshold amount, a change is inferred. [sent-210, score-0.349]
75 We defined the distance between a prediction (p) and an observation (y) as the difference between the log-likelihoods of y assuming θ=p and θ=y. [sent-211, score-0.212]
76 |θ, K) is the binomial density with parameters θ and K, the distance between observation y and prediction p is defined as d(y,p)=log(fB(y|y,K))-log(fB(y|p,K)). [sent-213, score-0.271]
77 A changepoint on time step t+1 is inferred whenever d(yt,pt)>C. [sent-214, score-0.675]
78 The parameter C governs the twitchiness of the model predictions. [sent-215, score-0.171]
79 If C is large, only very dramatic changepoints will be detected, and the model will be too conservative. [sent-216, score-0.216]
80 If C is small, the model will be too twitchy, and will detect changepoints on the basis of small random fluctuations. [sent-217, score-0.255]
81 Predictions are based on the most recent M observations, which are kept in memory, unless a changepoint has been detected in which case only those observations occurring after the changepoint are used for prediction. [sent-218, score-1.465]
82 Human observers were reticent to make predictions very close to the boundaries. [sent-220, score-0.379]
83 This was modeled by allowing the FF model to change its prediction for the next time step, yt+1, towards the mean prediction (0. [sent-221, score-0.451]
84 If the probability of a change occurring is α, the best guess will be 0. [sent-224, score-0.158]
85 5 if that change occurs, or the mean p if the change does not occur. [sent-225, score-0.196]
86 Instead, an estimated value of α is used based on the number of changepoints detected in the data series up to time t. [sent-228, score-0.226]
87 If the twitchiness threshold parameter C becomes arbitrarily large, the model never detects a change and instead becomes a continuous running average model. [sent-230, score-0.269]
88 Alternatively, if we assume no memory the model must based each prediction on only the previous stimulus (i. [sent-232, score-0.243]
89 Above, in Figure 3, we labeled the complete FF model as FF1, the boxcar model as FF2 and the memoryless model FF3. [sent-235, score-0.214]
90 Figure 3 showed that the complete FF model (FF1) fit the data from all observers significantly better than either the boxcar model (FF2) or the memoryless model (FF3). [sent-236, score-0.623]
91 Exceptions were observers PH, DN and ML, for whom all three FF model fit equally well. [sent-237, score-0.423]
92 This result suggests that our observers were (mostly) doing more than just keeping a running average of the data, or using only the most recent observation. [sent-238, score-0.323]
93 The FF1 model fit the data about as well as the Bayesian models for all observers except MY and MS. [sent-239, score-0.423]
94 Note that, in general, the FF1 and Bayesian model fits are very good: the average city block distance between the human data and the model prediction is around 0. [sent-240, score-0.345]
95 6 C onclusion We used an online prediction task to study changepoint detection. [sent-242, score-0.903]
96 Human observers had to predict the next observation in stochastic sequences containing random changepoints. [sent-243, score-0.352]
97 We showed that some observers are too “twitchy”: They perform poorly on the prediction task because they see changes where only random fluctuation exists. [sent-244, score-0.645]
98 Other observers are not twitchy enough, and they perform poorly because they fail to see small changes. [sent-245, score-0.475]
99 We developed a Bayesian changepoint detection model that performed the task optimally, and also provided a good fit to human data when sub-optimal parameter settings were used. [sent-246, score-0.978]
100 Finally, we developed a fast-and-frugal model that showed how participants may be able to perform well at the task using minimal information and simple decision heuristics. [sent-247, score-0.173]
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simIndex simValue paperId paperTitle
same-paper 1 1.0000004 156 nips-2005-Prediction and Change Detection
Author: Mark Steyvers, Scott Brown
Abstract: We measure the ability of human observers to predict the next datum in a sequence that is generated by a simple statistical process undergoing change at random points in time. Accurate performance in this task requires the identification of changepoints. We assess individual differences between observers both empirically, and using two kinds of models: a Bayesian approach for change detection and a family of cognitively plausible fast and frugal models. Some individuals detect too many changes and hence perform sub-optimally due to excess variability. Other individuals do not detect enough changes, and perform sub-optimally because they fail to notice short-term temporal trends. 1 Intr oduction Decision-making often requires a rapid response to change. For example, stock analysts need to quickly detect changes in the market in order to adjust investment strategies. Coaches need to track changes in a player’s performance in order to adjust strategy. When tracking changes, there are costs involved when either more or less changes are observed than actually occurred. For example, when using an overly conservative change detection criterion, a stock analyst might miss important short-term trends and interpret them as random fluctuations instead. On the other hand, a change may also be detected too readily. For example, in basketball, a player who makes a series of consecutive baskets is often identified as a “hot hand” player whose underlying ability is perceived to have suddenly increased [1,2]. This might lead to sub-optimal passing strategies, based on random fluctuations. We are interested in explaining individual differences in a sequential prediction task. Observers are shown stimuli generated from a simple statistical process with the task of predicting the next datum in the sequence. The latent parameters of the statistical process change discretely at random points in time. Performance in this task depends on the accurate detection of those changepoints, as well as inference about future outcomes based on the outcomes that followed the most recent inferred changepoint. There is much prior research in statistics on the problem of identifying changepoints [3,4,5]. In this paper, we adopt a Bayesian approach to the changepoint identification problem and develop a simple inference procedure to predict the next datum in a sequence. The Bayesian model serves as an ideal observer model and is useful to characterize the ways in which individuals deviate from optimality. The plan of the paper is as follows. We first introduce the sequential prediction task and discuss a Bayesian analysis of this prediction problem. We then discuss the results from a few individuals in this prediction task and show how the Bayesian approach can capture individual differences with a single “twitchiness” parameter that describes how readily changes are perceived in random sequences. We will show that some individuals are too twitchy: their performance is too variable because they base their predictions on too little of the recent data. Other individuals are not twitchy enough, and they fail to capture fast changes in the data. We also show how behavior can be explained with a set of fast and frugal models [6]. These are cognitively realistic models that operate under plausible computational constraints. 2 A pr ediction task wit h m ult iple c hange points In the prediction task, stimuli are presented sequentially and the task is to predict the next stimulus in the sequence. After t trials, the observer has been presented with stimuli y1, y2, …, yt and the task is to make a prediction about yt+1. After the prediction is made, the actual outcome yt+1 is revealed and the next trial proceeds to the prediction of yt+2. This procedure starts with y1 and is repeated for T trials. The observations yt are D-dimensional vectors with elements sampled from binomial distributions. The parameters of those distributions change discretely at random points in time such that the mean increases or decreases after a change point. This generates a sequence of observation vectors, y1, y2, …, yT, where each yt = {yt,1 … yt,D}. Each of the yt,d is sampled from a binomial distribution Bin(θt,d,K), so 0 ≤ yt,d ≤ K. The parameter vector θt ={θt,1 … θt,D} changes depending on the locations of the changepoints. At each time step, xt is a binary indicator for the occurrence of a changepoint occurring at time t+1. The parameter α determines the probability of a change occurring in the sequence. The generative model is specified by the following algorithm: 1. For d=1..D sample θ1,d from a Uniform(0,1) distribution 2. For t=2..T, (a) Sample xt-1 from a Bernoulli(α) distribution (b) If xt-1=0, then θt=θt-1, else for d=1..D sample θt,d from a Uniform(0,1) distribution (c) for d=1..D, sample yt from a Bin(θt,d,K) distribution Table 1 shows some data generated from the changepoint model with T=20, α=.1,and D=1. In the prediction task, y will be observed, but x and θ are not. Table 1: Example data t x θ y 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 .68 .68 .68 .68 .48 .48 .48 .74 .74 .74 .74 .74 .74 .19 .19 .87 .87 .87 .87 .87 9 7 8 7 4 4 4 9 8 3 6 7 8 2 1 8 9 9 8 8 3 A Bayesian pr ediction m ode l In both our Bayesian and fast-and-frugal analyses, the prediction task is decomposed into two inference procedures. First, the changepoint locations are identified. This is followed by predictive inference for the next outcome based on the most recent changepoint locations. Several Bayesian approaches have been developed for changepoint problems involving single or multiple changepoints [3,5]. We apply a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) analysis to approximate the joint posterior distribution over changepoint assignments x while integrating out θ. Gibbs sampling will be used to sample from this posterior marginal distribution. The samples can then be used to predict the next outcome in the sequence. 3.1 I n f e r e nc e f o r c h a n g e p o i n t a s s i g n m e n t s . To apply Gibbs sampling, we evaluate the conditional probability of assigning a changepoint at time i, given all other changepoint assignments and the current α value. By integrating out θ, the conditional probability is P ( xi | x−i , y, α ) = ∫ P ( xi ,θ , α | x− i , y ) (1) θ where x− i represents all switch point assignments except xi. This can be simplified by considering the location of the most recent changepoint preceding and following time i and the outcomes occurring between these locations. Let niL be the number of time steps from the last changepoint up to and including the current time step i such that xi − nL =1 and xi − nL + j =0 for 0 < niL . Similarly, let niR be the number of time steps that i i follow time step i up to the next changepoint such that xi + n R =1 and xi + nR − j =0 for i R i 0 < n . Let y = L i ∑ i − niL < k ≤ i i yk and y = ∑ k < k ≤i + n R yk . The update equation for the R i i changepoint assignment can then be simplified to P ( xi = m | x−i ) ∝ ( ) ( ( ) D Γ 1 + y L + y R Γ 1 + Kn L + Kn R − y L − y R ⎧ i, j i, j i i i, j i, j ⎪ (1 − α ) ∏ L R Γ 2 + Kni + Kni ⎪ j =1 ⎪ ⎨ L L L R R R ⎪ D Γ 1 + yi, j Γ 1 + Kni − yi, j Γ 1 + yi, j Γ 1 + Kni − yi, j α∏ ⎪ Γ 2 + KniL Γ 2 + KniR ⎪ j =1 ⎩ ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ) m=0 ) (2) m =1 We initialize the Gibbs sampler by sampling each xt from a Bernoulli(α) distribution. All changepoint assignments are then updated sequentially by the Gibbs sampling equation above. The sampler is run for M iterations after which one set of changepoint assignments is saved. The Gibbs sampler is then restarted multiple times until S samples have been collected. Although we could have included an update equation for α, in this analysis we treat α as a known constant. This will be useful when characterizing the differences between human observers in terms of differences in α. 3.2 P r e d i c ti v e i n f er e n ce The next latent parameter value θt+1 and outcome yt+1 can be predicted on the basis of observed outcomes that occurred after the last inferred changepoint: θ t+1, j = t ∑ i =t* +1 yt+1, j = round (θt +1, j K ) yi, j / K , (3) where t* is the location of the most recent change point. By considering multiple Gibbs samples, we get a distribution over outcomes yt+1. We base the model predictions on the mean of this distribution. 3.3 I l l u s t r a t i o n o f m o d e l p er f o r m a n c e Figure 1 illustrates the performance of the model on a one dimensional sequence (D=1) generated from the changepoint model with T=160, α=0.05, and K=10. The Gibbs sampler was run for M=30 iterations and S=200 samples were collected. The top panel shows the actual changepoints (triangles) and the distribution of changepoint assignments averaged over samples. The bottom panel shows the observed data y (thin lines) as well as the θ values in the generative model (rescaled between 0 and 10). At locations with large changes between observations, the marginal changepoint probability is quite high. At other locations, the true change in the mean is very small, and the model is less likely to put in a changepoint. The lower right panel shows the distribution over predicted θt+1 values. xt 1 0.5 0 yt 10 1 5 θt+1 0.5 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 0 Figure 1. Results of model simulation. 4 Prediction experiment We tested performance of 9 human observers in the prediction task. The observers included the authors, a visitor, and one student who were aware of the statistical nature of the task as well as naïve students. The observers were seated in front of an LCD touch screen displaying a two-dimensional grid of 11 x 11 buttons. The changepoint model was used to generate a sequence of T=1500 stimuli for two binomial variables y1 and y2 (D=2, K=10). The change probability α was set to 0.1. The two variables y1 and y2 specified the two-dimensional button location. The same sequence was used for all observers. On each trial, the observer touched a button on the grid displayed on the touch screen. Following each button press, the button corresponding to the next {y1,y2} outcome in the sequence was highlighted. Observers were instructed to press the button that best predicted the next location of the highlighted button. The 1500 trials were divided into three blocks of 500 trials. Breaks were allowed between blocks. The whole experiment lasted between 15 and 30 minutes. Figure 2 shows the first 50 trials from the third block of the experiment. The top and bottom panels show the actual outcomes for the y1 and y2 button grid coordinates as well as the predictions for two observers (SB and MY). The figure shows that at trial 15, the y1 and y2 coordinates show a large shift followed by an immediate shift in observer’s MY predictions (on trial 16). Observer SB waits until trial 17 to make a shift. 10 5 0 outcomes SB predictions MY predictions 10 5 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 Trial 30 35 40 45 50 Figure 2. Trial by trial predictions from two observers. 4.1 T a s k er r o r We assessed prediction performance by comparing the prediction with the actual outcome in the sequence. Task error was measured by normalized city-block distance T 1 (4) task error= ∑ yt ,1 − ytO,1 + yt ,2 − ytO,2 (T − 1) t =2 where yO represents the observer’s prediction. Note that the very first trial is excluded from this calculation. Even though more suitable probabilistic measures for prediction error could have been adopted, we wanted to allow comparison of observer’s performance with both probabilistic and non-probabilistic models. Task error ranged from 2.8 (for participant MY) to 3.3 (for ML). We also assessed the performance of five models – their task errors ranged from 2.78 to 3.20. The Bayesian models (Section 3) had the lowest task errors, just below 2.8. This fits with our definition of the Bayesian models as “ideal observer” models – their task error is lower than any other model’s and any human observer’s task error. The fast and frugal models (Section 5) had task errors ranging from 2.85 to 3.20. 5 Modeling R esults We will refer to the models with the following letter codes: B=Bayesian Model, LB=limited Bayesian model, FF1..3=fast and frugal models 1..3. We assessed model fit by comparing the model’s prediction against the human observers’ predictions, again using a normalized city-block distance model error= T 1 ∑ ytM − ytO,1 + ytM − ytO,2 ,1 ,2 (T − 1) t=2 (5) where yM represents the model’s prediction. The model error for each individual observer is shown in Figure 3. It is important to note that because each model is associated with a set of free parameters, the parameters optimized for task error and model error are different. For Figure 3, the parameters were optimized to minimize Equation (5) for each individual observer, showing the extent to which these models can capture the performance of individual observers, not necessarily providing the best task performance. B LB FF1 FF2 MY MS MM EJ FF3 Model Error 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 PH NP DN SB ML 1 Figure 3. Model error for each individual observer. 5.1 B ay e s i a n p re d i ct i o n m o d e l s At each trial t, the model was provided with the sequence of all previous outcomes. The Gibbs sampling and inference procedures from Eq. (2) and (3) were applied with M=30 iterations and S=200 samples. The change probability α was a free parameter. In the full Bayesian model, the whole sequence of observations up to the current trial is available for prediction, leading to a memory requirement of up to T=1500 trials – a psychologically unreasonable assumption. We therefore also simulated a limited Bayesian model (LB) where the observed sequence was truncated to the last 10 outcomes. The LB model showed almost no decrement in task performance compared to the full Bayesian model. Figure 3 also shows that it fit human data quite well. 5.2 I n d i v i d u a l D i f f er e nc e s The right-hand panel of Figure 4 plots each observer’s task error as a function of the mean city-block distance between their subsequent button presses. This shows a clear U-shaped function. Observers with very variable predictions (e.g., ML and DN) had large average changes between successive button pushes, and also had large task error: These observers were too “twitchy”. Observers with very small average button changes (e.g., SB and NP) were not twitchy enough, and also had large task error. Observers in the middle had the lowest task error (e.g., MS and MY). The left-hand panel of Figure 4 shows the same data, but with the x-axis based on the Bayesian model fits. Instead of using mean button change distance to index twitchiness (as in 1 Error bars indicate bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. the right-hand panel), the left-hand panel uses the estimated α parameters from the Bayesian model. A similar U-shaped pattern is observed: individuals with too large or too small α estimates have large task errors. 3.3 DN 3.2 Task Error ML SB 3.2 NP 3.1 Task Error 3.3 PH EJ 3 MM MS MY 2.9 2.8 10 -4 10 -3 10 -2 DN NP 3.1 3 PH EJ MM MS 2.9 B ML SB MY 2.8 10 -1 10 0 0.5 1 α 1.5 2 Mean Button Change 2.5 3 Figure 4. Task error vs. “twitchiness”. Left-hand panel indexes twitchiness using estimated α parameters from Bayesian model fits. Right-hand panel uses mean distance between successive predictions. 5.3 F a s t - a n d - F r u g a l ( F F ) p r e d ic t i o n m o d e l s These models perform the prediction task using simple heuristics that are cognitively plausible. The FF models keep a short memory of previous stimulus values and make predictions using the same two-step process as the Bayesian model. First, a decision is made as to whether the latent parameter θ has changed. Second, remembered stimulus values that occurred after the most recently detected changepoint are used to generate the next prediction. A simple heuristic is used to detect changepoints: If the distance between the most recent observation and prediction is greater than some threshold amount, a change is inferred. We defined the distance between a prediction (p) and an observation (y) as the difference between the log-likelihoods of y assuming θ=p and θ=y. Thus, if fB(.|θ, K) is the binomial density with parameters θ and K, the distance between observation y and prediction p is defined as d(y,p)=log(fB(y|y,K))-log(fB(y|p,K)). A changepoint on time step t+1 is inferred whenever d(yt,pt)>C. The parameter C governs the twitchiness of the model predictions. If C is large, only very dramatic changepoints will be detected, and the model will be too conservative. If C is small, the model will be too twitchy, and will detect changepoints on the basis of small random fluctuations. Predictions are based on the most recent M observations, which are kept in memory, unless a changepoint has been detected in which case only those observations occurring after the changepoint are used for prediction. The prediction for time step t+1 is simply the mean of these observations, say p. Human observers were reticent to make predictions very close to the boundaries. This was modeled by allowing the FF model to change its prediction for the next time step, yt+1, towards the mean prediction (0.5). This change reflects a two-way bet. If the probability of a change occurring is α, the best guess will be 0.5 if that change occurs, or the mean p if the change does not occur. Thus, the prediction made is actually yt+1=1/2 α+(1-α)p. Note that we do not allow perfect knowledge of the probability of a changepoint, α. Instead, an estimated value of α is used based on the number of changepoints detected in the data series up to time t. The FF model nests two simpler FF models that are psychologically interesting. If the twitchiness threshold parameter C becomes arbitrarily large, the model never detects a change and instead becomes a continuous running average model. Predictions from this model are simply a boxcar smooth of the data. Alternatively, if we assume no memory the model must based each prediction on only the previous stimulus (i.e., M=1). Above, in Figure 3, we labeled the complete FF model as FF1, the boxcar model as FF2 and the memoryless model FF3. Figure 3 showed that the complete FF model (FF1) fit the data from all observers significantly better than either the boxcar model (FF2) or the memoryless model (FF3). Exceptions were observers PH, DN and ML, for whom all three FF model fit equally well. This result suggests that our observers were (mostly) doing more than just keeping a running average of the data, or using only the most recent observation. The FF1 model fit the data about as well as the Bayesian models for all observers except MY and MS. Note that, in general, the FF1 and Bayesian model fits are very good: the average city block distance between the human data and the model prediction is around 0.75 (out of 10) buttons on both the x- and y-axes. 6 C onclusion We used an online prediction task to study changepoint detection. Human observers had to predict the next observation in stochastic sequences containing random changepoints. We showed that some observers are too “twitchy”: They perform poorly on the prediction task because they see changes where only random fluctuation exists. Other observers are not twitchy enough, and they perform poorly because they fail to see small changes. We developed a Bayesian changepoint detection model that performed the task optimally, and also provided a good fit to human data when sub-optimal parameter settings were used. Finally, we developed a fast-and-frugal model that showed how participants may be able to perform well at the task using minimal information and simple decision heuristics. Acknowledgments We thank Eric-Jan Wagenmakers and Mike Yi for useful discussions related to this work. This work was supported in part by a grant from the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR grant number FA9550-04-1-0317). R e f er e n ce s [1] Gilovich, T., Vallone, R. and Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: on the misperception of random sequences. Cognitive Psychology17, 295-314. [2] Albright, S.C. (1993a). A statistical analysis of hitting streaks in baseball. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88, 1175-1183. [3] Stephens, D.A. (1994). Bayesian retrospective multiple changepoint identification. Applied Statistics 43(1), 159-178. [4] Carlin, B.P., Gelfand, A.E., & Smith, A.F.M. (1992). Hierarchical Bayesian analysis of changepoint problems. Applied Statistics 41(2), 389-405. [5] Green, P.J. (1995). Reversible jump Markov chain Monte Carlo computation and Bayesian model determination. Biometrika 82(4), 711-732. [6] Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D.G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650-669.
2 0.088979229 45 nips-2005-Conditional Visual Tracking in Kernel Space
Author: Cristian Sminchisescu, Atul Kanujia, Zhiguo Li, Dimitris Metaxas
Abstract: We present a conditional temporal probabilistic framework for reconstructing 3D human motion in monocular video based on descriptors encoding image silhouette observations. For computational efÄ?Ĺš ciency we restrict visual inference to low-dimensional kernel induced non-linear state spaces. Our methodology (kBME) combines kernel PCA-based non-linear dimensionality reduction (kPCA) and Conditional Bayesian Mixture of Experts (BME) in order to learn complex multivalued predictors between observations and model hidden states. This is necessary for accurate, inverse, visual perception inferences, where several probable, distant 3D solutions exist due to noise or the uncertainty of monocular perspective projection. Low-dimensional models are appropriate because many visual processes exhibit strong non-linear correlations in both the image observations and the target, hidden state variables. The learned predictors are temporally combined within a conditional graphical model in order to allow a principled propagation of uncertainty. We study several predictors and empirically show that the proposed algorithm positively compares with techniques based on regression, Kernel Dependency Estimation (KDE) or PCA alone, and gives results competitive to those of high-dimensional mixture predictors at a fraction of their computational cost. We show that the method successfully reconstructs the complex 3D motion of humans in real monocular video sequences. 1 Introduction and Related Work We consider the problem of inferring 3D articulated human motion from monocular video. This research topic has applications for scene understanding including human-computer interfaces, markerless human motion capture, entertainment and surveillance. A monocular approach is relevant because in real-world settings the human body parts are rarely completely observed even when using multiple cameras. This is due to occlusions form other people or objects in the scene. A robust system has to necessarily deal with incomplete, ambiguous and uncertain measurements. Methods for 3D human motion reconstruction can be classiÄ?Ĺš ed as generative and discriminative. They both require a state representation, namely a 3D human model with kinematics (joint angles) or shape (surfaces or joint positions) and they both use a set of image features as observations for state inference. The computational goal in both cases is the conditional distribution for the model state given image observations. Generative model-based approaches [6, 16, 14, 13] have been demonstrated to Ä?Ĺš‚exibly reconstruct complex unknown human motions and to naturally handle problem constraints. However it is difÄ?Ĺš cult to construct reliable observation likelihoods due to the complexity of modeling human appearance. This varies widely due to different clothing and deformation, body proportions or lighting conditions. Besides being somewhat indirect, the generative approach further imposes strict conditional independence assumptions on the temporal observations given the states in order to ensure computational tractability. Due to these factors inference is expensive and produces highly multimodal state distributions [6, 16, 13]. Generative inference algorithms require complex annealing schedules [6, 13] or systematic non-linear search for local optima [16] in order to ensure continuing tracking. These difÄ?Ĺš culties motivate the advent of a complementary class of discriminative algorithms [10, 12, 18, 2], that approximate the state conditional directly, in order to simplify inference. However, inverse, observation-to-state multivalued mappings are difÄ?Ĺš cult to learn (see e.g. Ä?Ĺš g. 1a) and a probabilistic temporal setting is necessary. In an earlier paper [15] we introduced a probabilistic discriminative framework for human motion reconstruction. Because the method operates in the originally selected state and observation spaces that can be task generic, therefore redundant and often high-dimensional, inference is more expensive and can be less robust. To summarize, reconstructing 3D human motion in a Figure 1: (a, Left) Example of 180o ambiguity in predicting 3D human poses from silhouette image features (center). It is essential that multiple plausible solutions (e.g. F 1 and F2 ) are correctly represented and tracked over time. A single state predictor will either average the distant solutions or zig-zag between them, see also tables 1 and 2. (b, Right) A conditional chain model. The local distributions p(yt |yt−1 , zt ) or p(yt |zt ) are learned as in Ä?Ĺš g. 2. For inference, the predicted local state conditional is recursively combined with the Ä?Ĺš ltered prior c.f . (1). conditional temporal framework poses the following difÄ?Ĺš culties: (i) The mapping between temporal observations and states is multivalued (i.e. the local conditional distributions to be learned are multimodal), therefore it cannot be accurately represented using global function approximations. (ii) Human models have multivariate, high-dimensional continuous states of 50 or more human joint angles. The temporal state conditionals are multimodal which makes efÄ?Ĺš cient Kalman Ä?Ĺš ltering algorithms inapplicable. General inference methods (particle Ä?Ĺš lters, mixtures) have to be used instead, but these are expensive for high-dimensional models (e.g. when reconstructing the motion of several people that operate in a joint state space). (iii) The components of the human state and of the silhouette observation vector exhibit strong correlations, because many repetitive human activities like walking or running have low intrinsic dimensionality. It appears wasteful to work with high-dimensional states of 50+ joint angles. Even if the space were truly high-dimensional, predicting correlated state dimensions independently may still be suboptimal. In this paper we present a conditional temporal estimation algorithm that restricts visual inference to low-dimensional, kernel induced state spaces. To exploit correlations among observations and among state variables, we model the local, temporal conditional distributions using ideas from Kernel PCA [11, 19] and conditional mixture modeling [7, 5], here adapted to produce multiple probabilistic predictions. The corresponding predictor is referred to as a Conditional Bayesian Mixture of Low-dimensional Kernel-Induced Experts (kBME). By integrating it within a conditional graphical model framework (Ä?Ĺš g. 1b), we can exploit temporal constraints probabilistically. We demonstrate that this methodology is effective for reconstructing the 3D motion of multiple people in monocular video. Our contribution w.r.t. [15] is a probabilistic conditional inference framework that operates over a non-linear, kernel-induced low-dimensional state spaces, and a set of experiments (on both real and artiÄ?Ĺš cial image sequences) that show how the proposed framework positively compares with powerful predictors based on KDE, PCA, or with the high-dimensional models of [15] at a fraction of their cost. 2 Probabilistic Inference in a Kernel Induced State Space We work with conditional graphical models with a chain structure [9], as shown in Ä?Ĺš g. 1b, These have continuous temporal states yt , t = 1 . . . T , observations zt . For compactness, we denote joint states Yt = (y1 , y2 , . . . , yt ) or joint observations Zt = (z1 , . . . , zt ). Learning and inference are based on local conditionals: p(yt |zt ) and p(yt |yt−1 , zt ), with yt and zt being low-dimensional, kernel induced representations of some initial model having state xt and observation rt . We obtain zt , yt from rt , xt using kernel PCA [11, 19]. Inference is performed in a low-dimensional, non-linear, kernel induced latent state space (see Ä?Ĺš g. 1b and Ä?Ĺš g. 2 and (1)). For display or error reporting, we compute the original conditional p(x|r), or a temporally Ä?Ĺš ltered version p(xt |Rt ), Rt = (r1 , r2 , . . . , rt ), using a learned pre-image state map [3]. 2.1 Density Propagation for Continuous Conditional Chains For online Ä?Ĺš ltering, we compute the optimal distribution p(yt |Zt ) for the state yt , conditioned by observations Zt up to time t. The Ä?Ĺš ltered density can be recursively derived as: p(yt |Zt ) = p(yt |yt−1 , zt )p(yt−1 |Zt−1 ) (1) yt−1 We compute using a conditional mixture for p(yt |yt−1 , zt ) (a Bayesian mixture of experts c.f . §2.2) and the prior p(yt−1 |Zt−1 ), each having, say M components. We integrate M 2 pairwise products of Gaussians analytically. The means of the expanded posterior are clustered and the centers are used to initialize a reduced M -component Kullback-Leibler approximation that is reÄ?Ĺš ned using gradient descent [15]. The propagation rule (1) is similar to the one used for discrete state labels [9], but here we work with multivariate continuous state spaces and represent the local multimodal state conditionals using kBME (Ä?Ĺš g. 2), and not log-linear models [9] (these would require intractable normalization). This complex continuous model rules out inference based on Kalman Ä?Ĺš ltering or dynamic programming [9]. 2.2 Learning Bayesian Mixtures over Kernel Induced State Spaces (kBME) In order to model conditional mappings between low-dimensional non-linear spaces we rely on kernel dimensionality reduction and conditional mixture predictors. The authors of KDE [19] propose a powerful structured unimodal predictor. This works by decorrelating the output using kernel PCA and learning a ridge regressor between the input and each decorrelated output dimension. Our procedure is also based on kernel PCA but takes into account the structure of the studied visual problem where both inputs and outputs are likely to be low-dimensional and the mapping between them multivalued. The output variables xi are projected onto the column vectors of the principal space in order to obtain their principal coordinates y i . A z ∈ P(Fr ) O p(y|z) kP CA ĂŽĹšr (r) ⊂ Fr O / y ∈ P(Fx ) O QQQ QQQ QQQ kP CA QQQ Q( ĂŽĹšx (x) ⊂ Fx x ≈ PreImage(y) O ĂŽĹšr ĂŽĹšx r ∈ R ⊂ Rr x ∈ X ⊂ Rx p(x|r) ≈ p(x|y) Figure 2: The learned low-dimensional predictor, kBME, for computing p(x|r) â‰Ä„ p(xt |rt ), ∀t. (We similarly learn p(xt |xt−1 , rt ), with input (x, r) instead of r – here we illustrate only p(x|r) for clarity.) The input r and the output x are decorrelated using Kernel PCA to obtain z and y respectively. The kernels used for the input and output are ĂŽĹš r and ĂŽĹšx , with induced feature spaces Fr and Fx , respectively. Their principal subspaces obtained by kernel PCA are denoted by P(Fr ) and P(Fx ), respectively. A conditional Bayesian mixture of experts p(y|z) is learned using the low-dimensional representation (z, y). Using learned local conditionals of the form p(yt |zt ) or p(yt |yt−1 , zt ), temporal inference can be efÄ?Ĺš ciently performed in a low-dimensional kernel induced state space (see e.g. (1) and Ä?Ĺš g. 1b). For visualization and error measurement, the Ä?Ĺš ltered density, e.g. p(yt |Zt ), can be mapped back to p(xt |Rt ) using the pre-image c.f . (3). similar procedure is performed on the inputs ri to obtain zi . In order to relate the reduced feature spaces of z and y (P(Fr ) and P(Fx )), we estimate a probability distribution over mappings from training pairs (zi , yi ). We use a conditional Bayesian mixture of experts (BME) [7, 5] in order to account for ambiguity when mapping similar, possibly identical reduced feature inputs to very different feature outputs, as common in our problem (Ä?Ĺš g. 1a). This gives a model that is a conditional mixture of low-dimensional kernel-induced experts (kBME): M g(z|δ j )N (y|Wj z, ĂŽĹ j ) p(y|z) = (2) j=1 where g(z|δ j ) is a softmax function parameterized by δ j and (Wj , ĂŽĹ j ) are the parameters and the output covariance of expert j, here a linear regressor. As in many Bayesian settings [17, 5], the weights of the experts and of the gates, Wj and δ j , are controlled by hierarchical priors, typically Gaussians with 0 mean, and having inverse variance hyperparameters controlled by a second level of Gamma distributions. We learn this model using a double-loop EM and employ ML-II type approximations [8, 17] with greedy (weight) subset selection [17, 15]. Finally, the kBME algorithm requires the computation of pre-images in order to recover the state distribution x from it’s image y ∈ P(Fx ). This is a closed form computation for polynomial kernels of odd degree. For more general kernels optimization or learning (regression based) methods are necessary [3]. Following [3, 19], we use a sparse Bayesian kernel regressor to learn the pre-image. This is based on training data (xi , yi ): p(x|y) = N (x|AĂŽĹšy (y), â„Ĺš) (3) with parameters and covariances (A, â„Ĺš). Since temporal inference is performed in the low-dimensional kernel induced state space, the pre-image function needs to be calculated only for visualizing results or for the purpose of error reporting. Propagating the result from the reduced feature space P(Fx ) to the output space X pro- duces a Gaussian mixture with M elements, having coefÄ?Ĺš cients g(z|δ j ) and components N (x|AĂŽĹšy (Wj z), AJĂŽĹšy ĂŽĹ j JĂŽĹšy A + â„Ĺš), where JĂŽĹšy is the Jacobian of the mapping ĂŽĹšy . 3 Experiments We run experiments on both real image sequences (Ä?Ĺš g. 5 and Ä?Ĺš g. 6) and on sequences where silhouettes were artiÄ?Ĺš cially rendered. The prediction error is reported in degrees (for mixture of experts, this is w.r.t. the most probable one, but see also Ä?Ĺš g. 4a), and normalized per joint angle, per frame. The models are learned using standard cross-validation. Pre-images are learned using kernel regressors and have average error 1.7o . Training Set and Model State Representation: For training we gather pairs of 3D human poses together with their image projections, here silhouettes, using the graphics package Maya. We use realistically rendered computer graphics human surface models which we animate using human motion capture [1]. Our original human representation (x) is based on articulated skeletons with spherical joints and has 56 skeletal d.o.f. including global translation. The database consists of 8000 samples of human activities including walking, running, turns, jumps, gestures in conversations, quarreling and pantomime. Image Descriptors: We work with image silhouettes obtained using statistical background subtraction (with foreground and background models). Silhouettes are informative for pose estimation although prone to ambiguities (e.g. the left / right limb assignment in side views) or occasional lack of observability of some of the d.o.f. (e.g. 180o ambiguities in the global azimuthal orientation for frontal views, e.g. Ä?Ĺš g. 1a). These are multiplied by intrinsic forward / backward monocular ambiguities [16]. As observations r, we use shape contexts extracted on the silhouette [4] (5 radial, 12 angular bins, size range 1/8 to 3 on log scale). The features are computed at different scales and sizes for points sampled on the silhouette. To work in a common coordinate system, we cluster all features in the training set into K = 50 clusters. To compute the representation of a new shape feature (a point on the silhouette), we ‘project’ onto the common basis by (inverse distance) weighted voting into the cluster centers. To obtain the representation (r) for a new silhouette we regularly sample 200 points on it and add all their feature vectors into a feature histogram. Because the representation uses overlapping features of the observation the elements of the descriptor are not independent. However, a conditional temporal framework (Ä?Ĺš g. 1b) Ä?Ĺš‚exibly accommodates this. For experiments, we use Gaussian kernels for the joint angle feature space and dot product kernels for the observation feature space. We learn state conditionals for p(yt |zt ) and p(yt |yt−1 , zt ) using 6 dimensions for the joint angle kernel induced state space and 25 dimensions for the observation induced feature space, respectively. In Ä?Ĺš g. 3b) we show an evaluation of the efÄ?Ĺš cacy of our kBME predictor for different dimensions in the joint angle kernel induced state space (the observation feature space dimension is here 50). On the analyzed dancing sequence, that involves complex motions of the arms and the legs, the non-linear model signiÄ?Ĺš cantly outperforms alternative PCA methods and gives good predictions for compact, low-dimensional models.1 In tables 1 and 2, as well as Ä?Ĺš g. 4, we perform quantitative experiments on artiÄ?Ĺš cially rendered silhouettes. 3D ground truth joint angles are available and this allows a more 1 Running times: On a Pentium 4 PC (3 GHz, 2 GB RAM), a full dimensional BME model with 5 experts takes 802s to train p(xt |xt−1 , rt ), whereas a kBME (including the pre-image) takes 95s to train p(yt |yt−1 , zt ). The prediction time is 13.7s for BME and 8.7s (including the pre-image cost 1.04s) for kBME. The integration in (1) takes 2.67s for BME and 0.31s for kBME. The speed-up for kBME is signiÄ?Ĺš cant and likely to increase with original models having higher dimensionality. Prediction Error Number of Clusters 100 1000 100 10 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Degree of Multimodality kBME KDE_RVM PCA_BME PCA_RVM 10 1 0 20 40 Number of Dimensions 60 Figure 3: (a, Left) Analysis of ‘multimodality’ for a training set. The input zt dimension is 25, the output yt dimension is 6, both reduced using kPCA. We cluster independently in (yt−1 , zt ) and yt using many clusters (2100) to simulate small input perturbations and we histogram the yt clusters falling within each cluster in (yt−1 , zt ). This gives intuition on the degree of ambiguity in modeling p(yt |yt−1 , zt ), for small perturbations in the input. (b, Right) Evaluation of dimensionality reduction methods for an artiÄ?Ĺš cial dancing sequence (models trained on 300 samples). The kBME is our model §2.2, whereas the KDE-RVM is a KDE model learned with a Relevance Vector Machine (RVM) [17] feature space map. PCA-BME and PCA-RVM are models where the mappings between feature spaces (obtained using PCA) is learned using a BME and a RVM. The non-linearity is signiÄ?Ĺš cant. Kernel-based methods outperform PCA and give low prediction error for 5-6d models. systematic evaluation. Notice that the kernelized low-dimensional models generally outperform the PCA ones. At the same time, they give results competitive to the ones of high-dimensional BME predictors, while being lower-dimensional and therefore signiÄ?Ĺš cantly less expensive for inference, e.g. the integral in (1). In Ä?Ĺš g. 5 and Ä?Ĺš g. 6 we show human motion reconstruction results for two real image sequences. Fig. 5 shows the good quality reconstruction of a person performing an agile jump. (Given the missing observations in a side view, 3D inference for the occluded body parts would not be possible without using prior knowledge!) For this sequence we do inference using conditionals having 5 modes and reduced 6d states. We initialize tracking using p(yt |zt ), whereas for inference we use p(yt |yt−1 , zt ) within (1). In the second sequence in Ä?Ĺš g. 6, we simultaneously reconstruct the motion of two people mimicking domestic activities, namely washing a window and picking an object. Here we do inference over a product, 12-dimensional state space consisting of the joint 6d state of each person. We obtain good 3D reconstruction results, using only 5 hypotheses. Notice however, that the results are not perfect, there are small errors in the elbow and the bending of the knee for the subject at the l.h.s., and in the different wrist orientations for the subject at the r.h.s. This reÄ?Ĺš‚ects the bias of our training set. Walk and turn Conversation Run and turn left KDE-RR 10.46 7.95 5.22 RVM 4.95 4.96 5.02 KDE-RVM 7.57 6.31 6.25 BME 4.27 4.15 5.01 kBME 4.69 4.79 4.92 Table 1: Comparison of average joint angle prediction error for different models. All kPCA-based models use 6 output dimensions. Testing is done on 100 video frames for each sequence, the inputs are artiÄ?Ĺš cially generated silhouettes, not in the training set. 3D joint angle ground truth is used for evaluation. KDE-RR is a KDE model with ridge regression (RR) for the feature space mapping, KDE-RVM uses an RVM. BME uses a Bayesian mixture of experts with no dimensionality reduction. kBME is our proposed model. kPCAbased methods use kernel regressors to compute pre-images. Expert Prediction Frequency − Closest to Ground truth Frequency − Close to ground truth 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 Expert Number 14 10 8 6 4 2 0 5 1st Probable Prev Output 2nd Probable Prev Output 3rd Probable Prev Output 4th Probable Prev Output 5th Probable Prev Output 12 1 2 3 4 Current Expert 5 Figure 4: (a, Left) Histogram showing the accuracy of various expert predictors: how many times the expert ranked as the k-th most probable by the model (horizontal axis) is closest to the ground truth. The model is consistent (the most probable expert indeed is the most accurate most frequently), but occasionally less probable experts are better. (b, Right) Histograms show the dynamics of p(yt |yt−1 , zt ), i.e. how the probability mass is redistributed among experts between two successive time steps, in a conversation sequence. Walk and turn back Run and turn KDE-RR 7.59 17.7 RVM 6.9 16.8 KDE-RVM 7.15 16.08 BME 3.6 8.2 kBME 3.72 8.01 Table 2: Joint angle prediction error computed for two complex sequences with walks, runs and turns, thus more ambiguity (100 frames). Models have 6 state dimensions. Unimodal predictors average competing solutions. kBME has signiÄ?Ĺš cantly lower error. Figure 5: Reconstruction of a jump (selected frames). Top: original image sequence. Middle: extracted silhouettes. Bottom: 3D reconstruction seen from a synthetic viewpoint. 4 Conclusion We have presented a probabilistic framework for conditional inference in latent kernelinduced low-dimensional state spaces. Our approach has the following properties: (a) Figure 6: Reconstructing the activities of 2 people operating in an 12-d state space (each person has its own 6d state). Top: original image sequence. Bottom: 3D reconstruction seen from a synthetic viewpoint. Accounts for non-linear correlations among input or output variables, by using kernel nonlinear dimensionality reduction (kPCA); (b) Learns probability distributions over mappings between low-dimensional state spaces using conditional Bayesian mixture of experts, as required for accurate prediction. In the resulting low-dimensional kBME predictor ambiguities and multiple solutions common in visual, inverse perception problems are accurately represented. (c) Works in a continuous, conditional temporal probabilistic setting and offers a formal management of uncertainty. We show comparisons that demonstrate how the proposed approach outperforms regression, PCA or KDE alone for reconstructing the 3D human motion in monocular video. Future work we will investigate scaling aspects for large training sets and alternative structured prediction methods. References [1] CMU Human Motion DataBase. Online at http://mocap.cs.cmu.edu/search.html, 2003. [2] A. Agarwal and B. Triggs. 3d human pose from silhouettes by Relevance Vector Regression. In CVPR, 2004. [3] G. Bakir, J. Weston, and B. Scholkopf. Learning to Ä?Ĺš nd pre-images. In NIPS, 2004. [4] S. Belongie, J. Malik, and J. Puzicha. Shape matching and object recognition using shape contexts. PAMI, 24, 2002. [5] C. Bishop and M. Svensen. Bayesian mixtures of experts. In UAI, 2003. [6] J. Deutscher, A. Blake, and I. Reid. Articulated Body Motion Capture by Annealed Particle Filtering. In CVPR, 2000. [7] M. Jordan and R. Jacobs. Hierarchical mixtures of experts and the EM algorithm. Neural Computation, (6):181–214, 1994. [8] D. Mackay. Bayesian interpolation. Neural Computation, 4(5):720–736, 1992. [9] A. McCallum, D. Freitag, and F. Pereira. Maximum entropy Markov models for information extraction and segmentation. In ICML, 2000. [10] R. Rosales and S. Sclaroff. Learning Body Pose Via Specialized Maps. In NIPS, 2002. [11] B. Sch¨ lkopf, A. Smola, and K. M¨ ller. Nonlinear component analysis as a kernel eigenvalue o u problem. Neural Computation, 10:1299–1319, 1998. [12] G. Shakhnarovich, P. Viola, and T. Darrell. Fast Pose Estimation with Parameter Sensitive Hashing. In ICCV, 2003. [13] L. Sigal, S. Bhatia, S. Roth, M. Black, and M. Isard. Tracking Loose-limbed People. In CVPR, 2004. [14] C. Sminchisescu and A. Jepson. Generative Modeling for Continuous Non-Linearly Embedded Visual Inference. In ICML, pages 759–766, Banff, 2004. [15] C. Sminchisescu, A. Kanaujia, Z. Li, and D. Metaxas. Discriminative Density Propagation for 3D Human Motion Estimation. In CVPR, 2005. [16] C. Sminchisescu and B. Triggs. Kinematic Jump Processes for Monocular 3D Human Tracking. In CVPR, volume 1, pages 69–76, Madison, 2003. [17] M. Tipping. Sparse Bayesian learning and the Relevance Vector Machine. JMLR, 2001. [18] C. Tomasi, S. Petrov, and A. Sastry. 3d tracking = classiÄ?Ĺš cation + interpolation. In ICCV, 2003. [19] J. Weston, O. Chapelle, A. Elisseeff, B. Scholkopf, and V. Vapnik. Kernel dependency estimation. In NIPS, 2002.
3 0.088180564 34 nips-2005-Bayesian Surprise Attracts Human Attention
Author: Laurent Itti, Pierre F. Baldi
Abstract: The concept of surprise is central to sensory processing, adaptation, learning, and attention. Yet, no widely-accepted mathematical theory currently exists to quantitatively characterize surprise elicited by a stimulus or event, for observers that range from single neurons to complex natural or engineered systems. We describe a formal Bayesian definition of surprise that is the only consistent formulation under minimal axiomatic assumptions. Surprise quantifies how data affects a natural or artificial observer, by measuring the difference between posterior and prior beliefs of the observer. Using this framework we measure the extent to which humans direct their gaze towards surprising items while watching television and video games. We find that subjects are strongly attracted towards surprising locations, with 72% of all human gaze shifts directed towards locations more surprising than the average, a figure which rises to 84% when considering only gaze targets simultaneously selected by all subjects. The resulting theory of surprise is applicable across different spatio-temporal scales, modalities, and levels of abstraction. Life is full of surprises, ranging from a great christmas gift or a new magic trick, to wardrobe malfunctions, reckless drivers, terrorist attacks, and tsunami waves. Key to survival is our ability to rapidly attend to, identify, and learn from surprising events, to decide on present and future courses of action [1]. Yet, little theoretical and computational understanding exists of the very essence of surprise, as evidenced by the absence from our everyday vocabulary of a quantitative unit of surprise: Qualities such as the “wow factor” have remained vague and elusive to mathematical analysis. Informal correlates of surprise exist at nearly all stages of neural processing. In sensory neuroscience, it has been suggested that only the unexpected at one stage is transmitted to the next stage [2]. Hence, sensory cortex may have evolved to adapt to, to predict, and to quiet down the expected statistical regularities of the world [3, 4, 5, 6], focusing instead on events that are unpredictable or surprising. Electrophysiological evidence for this early sensory emphasis onto surprising stimuli exists from studies of adaptation in visual [7, 8, 4, 9], olfactory [10, 11], and auditory cortices [12], subcortical structures like the LGN [13], and even retinal ganglion cells [14, 15] and cochlear hair cells [16]: neural response greatly attenuates with repeated or prolonged exposure to an initially novel stimulus. Surprise and novelty are also central to learning and memory formation [1], to the point that surprise is believed to be a necessary trigger for associative learning [17, 18], as supported by mounting evidence for a role of the hippocampus as a novelty detector [19, 20, 21]. Finally, seeking novelty is a well-identified human character trait, with possible association with the dopamine D4 receptor gene [22, 23, 24]. In the Bayesian framework, we develop the only consistent theory of surprise, in terms of the difference between the posterior and prior distributions of beliefs of an observer over the available class of models or hypotheses about the world. We show that this definition derived from first principles presents key advantages over more ad-hoc formulations, typically relying on detecting outlier stimuli. Armed with this new framework, we provide direct experimental evidence that surprise best characterizes what attracts human gaze in large amounts of natural video stimuli. We here extend a recent pilot study [25], adding more comprehensive theory, large-scale human data collection, and additional analysis. 1 Theory Bayesian Definition of Surprise. We propose that surprise is a general concept, which can be derived from first principles and formalized across spatio-temporal scales, sensory modalities, and, more generally, data types and data sources. Two elements are essential for a principled definition of surprise. First, surprise can exist only in the presence of uncertainty, which can arise from intrinsic stochasticity, missing information, or limited computing resources. A world that is purely deterministic and predictable in real-time for a given observer contains no surprises. Second, surprise can only be defined in a relative, subjective, manner and is related to the expectations of the observer, be it a single synapse, neuronal circuit, organism, or computer device. The same data may carry different amount of surprise for different observers, or even for the same observer taken at different times. In probability and decision theory it can be shown that the only consistent and optimal way for modeling and reasoning about uncertainty is provided by the Bayesian theory of probability [26, 27, 28]. Furthermore, in the Bayesian framework, probabilities correspond to subjective degrees of beliefs in hypotheses or models which are updated, as data is acquired, using Bayes’ theorem as the fundamental tool for transforming prior belief distributions into posterior belief distributions. Therefore, within the same optimal framework, the only consistent definition of surprise must involve: (1) probabilistic concepts to cope with uncertainty; and (2) prior and posterior distributions to capture subjective expectations. Consistently with this Bayesian approach, the background information of an observer is captured by his/her/its prior probability distribution {P (M )}M ∈M over the hypotheses or models M in a model space M. Given this prior distribution of beliefs, the fundamental effect of a new data observation D on the observer is to change the prior distribution {P (M )}M ∈M into the posterior distribution {P (M |D)}M ∈M via Bayes theorem, whereby P (D|M ) ∀M ∈ M, P (M |D) = P (M ). (1) P (D) In this framework, the new data observation D carries no surprise if it leaves the observer beliefs unaffected, that is, if the posterior is identical to the prior; conversely, D is surprising if the posterior distribution resulting from observing D significantly differs from the prior distribution. Therefore we formally measure surprise elicited by data as some distance measure between the posterior and prior distributions. This is best done using the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [29]. Thus, surprise is defined by the average of the log-odd ratio: P (M |D) S(D, M) = KL(P (M |D), P (M )) = P (M |D) log dM (2) P (M ) M taken with respect to the posterior distribution over the model class M. Note that KL is not symmetric but has well-known theoretical advantages, including invariance with respect to Figure 1: Computing surprise in early sensory neurons. (a) Prior data observations, tuning preferences, and top-down influences contribute to shaping a set of “prior beliefs” a neuron may have over a class of internal models or hypotheses about the world. For instance, M may be a set of Poisson processes parameterized by the rate λ, with {P (M )}M ∈M = {P (λ)}λ∈I +∗ the prior distribution R of beliefs about which Poisson models well describe the world as sensed by the neuron. New data D updates the prior into the posterior using Bayes’ theorem. Surprise quantifies the difference between the posterior and prior distributions over the model class M. The remaining panels detail how surprise differs from conventional model fitting and outlier-based novelty. (b) In standard iterative Bayesian model fitting, at every iteration N , incoming data DN is used to update the prior {P (M |D1 , D2 , ..., DN −1 )}M ∈M into the posterior {P (M |D1 , D2 , ..., DN )}M ∈M . Freezing this learning at a given iteration, one then picks the currently best model, usually using either a maximum likelihood criterion, or a maximum a posteriori one (yielding MM AP shown). (c) This best model is used for a number of tasks at the current iteration, including outlier-based novelty detection. New data is then considered novel at that instant if it has low likelihood for the best model b a (e.g., DN is more novel than DN ). This focus onto the single best model presents obvious limitations, especially in situations where other models are nearly as good (e.g., M∗ in panel (b) is entirely ignored during standard novelty computation). One palliative solution is to consider mixture models, or simply P (D), but this just amounts to shifting the problem into a different model class. (d) Surprise directly addresses this problem by simultaneously considering all models and by measuring how data changes the observer’s distribution of beliefs from {P (M |D1 , D2 , ..., DN −1 )}M ∈M to {P (M |D1 , D2 , ..., DN )}M ∈M over the entire model class M (orange shaded area). reparameterizations. A unit of surprise — a “wow” — may then be defined for a single model M as the amount of surprise corresponding to a two-fold variation between P (M |D) and P (M ), i.e., as log P (M |D)/P (M ) (with log taken in base 2), with the total number of wows experienced for all models obtained through the integration in eq. 2. Surprise and outlier detection. Outlier detection based on the likelihood P (D|M best ) of D given a single best model Mbest is at best an approximation to surprise and, in some cases, is misleading. Consider, for instance, a case where D has very small probability both for a model or hypothesis M and for a single alternative hypothesis M. Although D is a strong outlier, it carries very little information regarding whether M or M is the better model, and therefore very little surprise. Thus an outlier detection method would strongly focus attentional resources onto D, although D is a false positive, in the sense that it carries no useful information for discriminating between the two alternative hypotheses M and M. Figure 1 further illustrates this disconnect between outlier detection and surprise. 2 Human experiments To test the surprise hypothesis — that surprise attracts human attention and gaze in natural scenes — we recorded eye movements from eight na¨ve observers (three females and ı five males, ages 23-32, normal or corrected-to-normal vision). Each watched a subset from 50 videoclips totaling over 25 minutes of playtime (46,489 video frames, 640 × 480, 60.27 Hz, mean screen luminance 30 cd/m2 , room 4 cd/m2 , viewing distance 80cm, field of view 28◦ × 21◦ ). Clips comprised outdoors daytime and nighttime scenes of crowded environments, video games, and television broadcast including news, sports, and commercials. Right-eye position was tracked with a 240 Hz video-based device (ISCAN RK-464), with methods as previously [30]. Two hundred calibrated eye movement traces (10,192 saccades) were analyzed, corresponding to four distinct observers for each of the 50 clips. Figure 2 shows sample scanpaths for one videoclip. To characterize image regions selected by participants, we process videoclips through computational metrics that output a topographic dynamic master response map, assigning in real-time a response value to every input location. A good master map would highlight, more than expected by chance, locations gazed to by observers. To score each metric we hence sample, at onset of every human saccade, master map activity around the saccade’s future endpoint, and around a uniformly random endpoint (random sampling was repeated 100 times to evaluate variability). We quantify differences between histograms of master Figure 2: (a) Sample eye movement traces from four observers (squares denote saccade endpoints). (b) Our data exhibits high inter-individual overlap, shown here with the locations where one human saccade endpoint was nearby (≈ 5◦ ) one (white squares), two (cyan squares), or all three (black squares) other humans. (c) A metric where the master map was created from the three eye movement traces other than that being tested yields an upper-bound KL score, computed by comparing the histograms of metric values at human (narrow blue bars) and random (wider green bars) saccade targets. Indeed, this metric’s map was very sparse (many random saccades landing on locations with nearzero response), yet humans preferentially saccaded towards the three active hotspots corresponding to the eye positions of three other humans (many human saccades landing on locations with near-unity responses). map samples collected from human and random saccades using again the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance: metrics which better predict human scanpaths exhibit higher distances from random as, typically, observers non-uniformly gaze towards a minority of regions with highest metric responses while avoiding a majority of regions with low metric responses. This approach presents several advantages over simpler scoring schemes [31, 32], including agnosticity to putative mechanisms for generating saccades and the fact that applying any continuous nonlinearity to master map values would not affect scoring. Experimental results. We test six computational metrics, encompassing and extending the state-of-the-art found in previous studies. The first three quantify static image properties (local intensity variance in 16 × 16 image patches [31]; local oriented edge density as measured with Gabor filters [33]; and local Shannon entropy in 16 × 16 image patches [34]). The remaining three metrics are more sensitive to dynamic events (local motion [33]; outlier-based saliency [33]; and surprise [25]). For all metrics, we find that humans are significantly attracted by image regions with higher metric responses. However, the static metrics typically respond vigorously at numerous visual locations (Figure 3), hence they are poorly specific and yield relatively low KL scores between humans and random. The metrics sensitive to motion, outliers, and surprising events, in comparison, yield sparser maps and higher KL scores. The surprise metric of interest here quantifies low-level surprise in image patches over space and time, and at this point does not account for high-level or cognitive beliefs of our human observers. Rather, it assumes a family of simple models for image patches, each processed through 72 early feature detectors sensitive to color, orientation, motion, etc., and computes surprise from shifts in the distribution of beliefs about which models better describe the patches (see [25] and [35] for details). We find that the surprise metric significantly outperforms all other computational metrics (p < 10−100 or better on t-tests for equality of KL scores), scoring nearly 20% better than the second-best metric (saliency) and 60% better than the best static metric (entropy). Surprising stimuli often substantially differ from simple feature outliers; for example, a continually blinking light on a static background elicits sustained flicker due to its locally outlier temporal dynamics but is only surprising for a moment. Similarly, a shower of randomly-colored pixels continually excites all low-level feature detectors but rapidly becomes unsurprising. Strongest attractors of human attention. Clearly, in our and previous eye-tracking experiments, in some situations potentially interesting targets were more numerous than in others. With many possible targets, different observers may orient towards different locations, making it more difficult for a single metric to accurately predict all observers. Hence we consider (Figure 4) subsets of human saccades where at least two, three, or all four observers simultaneously agreed on a gaze target. Observers could have agreed based on bottom-up factors (e.g., only one location had interesting visual appearance at that time), top-down factors (e.g., only one object was of current cognitive interest), or both (e.g., a single cognitively interesting object was present which also had distinctive appearance). Irrespectively of the cause for agreement, it indicates consolidated belief that a location was attractive. While the KL scores of all metrics improved when progressively focusing onto only those locations, dynamic metrics improved more steeply, indicating that stimuli which more reliably attracted all observers carried more motion, saliency, and surprise. Surprise remained significantly the best metric to characterize these agreed-upon attractors of human gaze (p < 10−100 or better on t-tests for equality of KL scores). Overall, surprise explained the greatest fraction of human saccades, indicating that humans are significantly attracted towards surprising locations in video displays. Over 72% of all human saccades were targeted to locations predicted to be more surprising than on average. When only considering saccades where two, three, or four observers agreed on a common gaze target, this figure rose to 76%, 80%, and 84%, respectively. Figure 3: (a) Sample video frames, with corresponding human saccades and predictions from the entropy, surprise, and human-derived metrics. Entropy maps, like intensity variance and orientation maps, exhibited many locations with high responses, hence had low specificity and were poorly discriminative. In contrast, motion, saliency, and surprise maps were much sparser and more specific, with surprise significantly more often on target. For three example frames (first column), saccades from one subject are shown (arrows) with corresponding apertures over which master map activity at the saccade endpoint was sampled (circles). (b) KL scores for these metrics indicate significantly different performance levels, and a strict ranking of variance < orientation < entropy < motion < saliency < surprise < human-derived. KL scores were computed by comparing the number of human saccades landing onto each given range of master map values (narrow blue bars) to the number of random saccades hitting the same range (wider green bars). A score of zero would indicate equality between the human and random histograms, i.e., humans did not tend to hit various master map values any differently from expected by chance, or, the master map could not predict human saccades better than random saccades. Among the six computational metrics tested in total, surprise performed best, in that surprising locations were relatively few yet reliably gazed to by humans. Figure 4: KL scores when considering only saccades where at least one (all 10,192 saccades), two (7,948 saccades), three (5,565 saccades), or all four (2,951 saccades) humans agreed on a common gaze location, for the static (a) and dynamic metrics (b). Static metrics improved substantially when progressively focusing onto saccades with stronger inter-observer agreement (average slope 0.56 ± 0.37 percent KL score units per 1,000 pruned saccades). Hence, when humans agreed on a location, they also tended to be more reliably predicted by the metrics. Furthermore, dynamic metrics improved 4.5 times more steeply (slope 2.44 ± 0.37), suggesting a stronger role of dynamic events in attracting human attention. Surprising events were significantly the strongest (t-tests for equality of KL scores between surprise and other metrics, p < 10−100 ). 3 Discussion While previous research has shown with either static scenes or dynamic synthetic stimuli that humans preferentially fixate regions of high entropy [34], contrast [31], saliency [32], flicker [36], or motion [37], our data provides direct experimental evidence that humans fixate surprising locations even more reliably. These conclusions were made possible by developing new tools to quantify what attracts human gaze over space and time in dynamic natural scenes. Surprise explained best where humans look when considering all saccades, and even more so when restricting the analysis to only those saccades for which human observers tended to agree. Surprise hence represents an inexpensive, easily computable approximation to human attentional allocation. In the absence of quantitative tools to measure surprise, most experimental and modeling work to date has adopted the approximation that novel events are surprising, and has focused on experimental scenarios which are simple enough to ensure an overlap between informal notions of novelty and surprise: for example, a stimulus is novel during testing if it has not been seen during training [9]. Our definition opens new avenues for more sophisticated experiments, where surprise elicited by different stimuli can be precisely compared and calibrated, yielding predictions at the single-unit as well as behavioral levels. The definition of surprise — as the distance between the posterior and prior distributions of beliefs over models — is entirely general and readily applicable to the analysis of auditory, olfactory, gustatory, or somatosensory data. While here we have focused on behavior rather than detailed biophysical implementation, it is worth noting that detecting surprise in neural spike trains does not require semantic understanding of the data carried by the spike trains, and thus could provide guiding signals during self-organization and development of sensory areas. At higher processing levels, top-down cues and task demands are known to combine with stimulus novelty in capturing attention and triggering learning [1, 38], ideas which may now be formalized and quantified in terms of priors, posteriors, and surprise. Surprise, indeed, inherently depends on uncertainty and on prior beliefs. Hence surprise theory can further be tested and utilized in experiments where the prior is biased, for ex- ample by top-down instructions or prior exposures to stimuli [38]. In addition, simple surprise-based behavioral measures such as the eye-tracking one used here may prove useful for early diagnostic of human conditions including autism and attention-deficit hyperactive disorder, as well as for quantitative comparison between humans and animals which may have lower or different priors, including monkeys, frogs, and flies. Beyond sensory biology, computable surprise could guide the development of data mining and compression systems (giving more bits to surprising regions of interest), to find surprising agents in crowds, surprising sentences in books or speeches, surprising sequences in genomes, surprising medical symptoms, surprising odors in airport luggage racks, surprising documents on the world-wide-web, or to design surprising advertisements. Acknowledgments: Supported by HFSP, NSF and NGA (L.I.), NIH and NSF (P.B.). 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4 0.078570113 5 nips-2005-A Computational Model of Eye Movements during Object Class Detection
Author: Wei Zhang, Hyejin Yang, Dimitris Samaras, Gregory J. Zelinsky
Abstract: We present a computational model of human eye movements in an object class detection task. The model combines state-of-the-art computer vision object class detection methods (SIFT features trained using AdaBoost) with a biologically plausible model of human eye movement to produce a sequence of simulated fixations, culminating with the acquisition of a target. We validated the model by comparing its behavior to the behavior of human observers performing the identical object class detection task (looking for a teddy bear among visually complex nontarget objects). We found considerable agreement between the model and human data in multiple eye movement measures, including number of fixations, cumulative probability of fixating the target, and scanpath distance.
5 0.077602468 173 nips-2005-Sensory Adaptation within a Bayesian Framework for Perception
Author: Alan Stocker, Eero P. Simoncelli
Abstract: We extend a previously developed Bayesian framework for perception to account for sensory adaptation. We first note that the perceptual effects of adaptation seems inconsistent with an adjustment of the internally represented prior distribution. Instead, we postulate that adaptation increases the signal-to-noise ratio of the measurements by adapting the operational range of the measurement stage to the input range. We show that this changes the likelihood function in such a way that the Bayesian estimator model can account for reported perceptual behavior. In particular, we compare the model’s predictions to human motion discrimination data and demonstrate that the model accounts for the commonly observed perceptual adaptation effects of repulsion and enhanced discriminability. 1 Motivation A growing number of studies support the notion that humans are nearly optimal when performing perceptual estimation tasks that require the combination of sensory observations with a priori knowledge. The Bayesian formulation of these problems defines the optimal strategy, and provides a principled yet simple computational framework for perception that can account for a large number of known perceptual effects and illusions, as demonstrated in sensorimotor learning [1], cue combination [2], or visual motion perception [3], just to name a few of the many examples. Adaptation is a fundamental phenomenon in sensory perception that seems to occur at all processing levels and modalities. A variety of computational principles have been suggested as explanations for adaptation. Many of these are based on the concept of maximizing the sensory information an observer can obtain about a stimulus despite limited sensory resources [4, 5, 6]. More mechanistically, adaptation can be interpreted as the attempt of the sensory system to adjusts its (limited) dynamic range such that it is maximally informative with respect to the statistics of the stimulus. A typical example is observed in the retina, which manages to encode light intensities that vary over nine orders of magnitude using ganglion cells whose dynamic range covers only two orders of magnitude. This is achieved by adapting to the local mean as well as higher order statistics of the visual input over short time-scales [7]. ∗ corresponding author. If a Bayesian framework is to provide a valid computational explanation of perceptual processes, then it needs to account for the behavior of a perceptual system, regardless of its adaptation state. In general, adaptation in a sensory estimation task seems to have two fundamental effects on subsequent perception: • Repulsion: The estimate of parameters of subsequent stimuli are repelled by those of the adaptor stimulus, i.e. the perceived values for the stimulus variable that is subject to the estimation task are more distant from the adaptor value after adaptation. This repulsive effect has been reported for perception of visual speed (e.g. [8, 9]), direction-of-motion [10], and orientation [11]. • Increased sensitivity: Adaptation increases the observer’s discrimination ability around the adaptor (e.g. for visual speed [12, 13]), however it also seems to decrease it further away from the adaptor as shown in the case of direction-of-motion discrimination [14]. In this paper, we show that these two perceptual effects can be explained within a Bayesian estimation framework of perception. Note that our description is at an abstract functional level - we do not attempt to provide a computational model for the underlying mechanisms responsible for adaptation, and this clearly separates this paper from other work which might seem at first glance similar [e.g., 15]. 2 Adaptive Bayesian estimator framework Suppose that an observer wants to estimate a property of a stimulus denoted by the variable θ, based on a measurement m. In general, the measurement can be vector-valued, and is corrupted by both internal and external noise. Hence, combining the noisy information gained by the measurement m with a priori knowledge about θ is advantageous. According to Bayes’ rule 1 p(θ|m) = p(m|θ)p(θ) . (1) α That is, the probability of stimulus value θ given m (posterior) is the product of the likelihood p(m|θ) of the particular measurement and the prior p(θ). The normalization constant α serves to ensure that the posterior is a proper probability distribution. Under the assumpˆ tion of a squared-error loss function, the optimal estimate θ(m) is the mean of the posterior, thus ∞ ˆ θ(m) = θ p(θ|m) dθ . (2) 0 ˆ Note that θ(m) describes an estimate for a single measurement m. As discussed in [16], the measurement will vary stochastically over the course of many exposures to the same stimulus, and thus the estimator will also vary. We return to this issue in Section 3.2. Figure 1a illustrates a Bayesian estimator, in which the shape of the (arbitrary) prior distribution leads on average to a shift of the estimate toward a lower value of θ than the true stimulus value θstim . The likelihood and the prior are the fundamental constituents of the Bayesian estimator model. Our goal is to describe how adaptation alters these constituents so as to account for the perceptual effects of repulsion and increased sensitivity. Adaptation does not change the prior ... An intuitively sensible hypothesis is that adaptation changes the prior distribution. Since the prior is meant to reflect the knowledge the observer has about the distribution of occurrences of the variable θ in the world, repeated viewing of stimuli with the same parameter a b probability probability attraction ! posterior likelihood prior modified prior à θ θ ˆ θ' θ θadapt Figure 1: Hypothetical model in which adaptation alters the prior distribution. a) Unadapted Bayesian estimation configuration in which the prior leads to a shift of the estimate ˆ θ, relative to the stimulus parameter θstim . Both the likelihood function and the prior distriˆ bution contribute to the exact value of the estimate θ (mean of the posterior). b) Adaptation acts by increasing the prior distribution around the value, θadapt , of the adapting stimulus ˆ parameter. Consequently, an subsequent estimate θ of the same stimulus parameter value θstim is attracted toward the adaptor. This is the opposite of observed perceptual effects, and we thus conclude that adjustments of the prior in a Bayesian model do not account for adaptation. value θadapt should presumably increase the prior probability in the vicinity of θadapt . Figure 1b schematically illustrates the effect of such a change in the prior distribution. The estimated (perceived) value of the parameter under the adapted condition is attracted to the adapting parameter value. In order to account for observed perceptual repulsion effects, the prior would have to decrease at the location of the adapting parameter, a behavior that seems fundamentally inconsistent with the notion of a prior distribution. ... but increases the reliability of the measurements Since a change in the prior distribution is not consistent with repulsion, we are led to the conclusion that adaptation must change the likelihood function. But why, and how should this occur? In order to answer this question, we reconsider the functional purpose of adaptation. We assume that adaptation acts to allocate more resources to the representation of the parameter values in the vicinity of the adaptor [4], resulting in a local increase in the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). This can be accomplished, for example, by dynamically adjusting the operational range to the statistics of the input. This kind of increased operational gain around the adaptor has been effectively demonstrated in the process of retinal adaptation [17]. In the context of our Bayesian estimator framework, and restricting to the simple case of a scalar-valued measurement, adaptation results in a narrower conditional probability density p(m|θ) in the immediate vicinity of the adaptor, thus an increase in the reliability of the measurement m. This is offset by a broadening of the conditional probability density p(m|θ) in the region beyond the adaptor vicinity (we assume that total resources are conserved, and thus an increase around the adaptor must necessarily lead to a decrease elsewhere). Figure 2 illustrates the effect of this local increase in signal-to-noise ratio on the likeli- unadapted adapted θadapt p(m2| θ )' 1/SNR θ θ θ1 θ2 θ1 p(m2|θ) θ2 θ m2 p(m1| θ )' m1 m m p(m1|θ) θ θ θ θadapt p(m| θ2)' p(m|θ2) likelihoods p(m|θ1) p(m| θ1)' p(m|θadapt )' conditionals Figure 2: Measurement noise, conditionals and likelihoods. The two-dimensional conditional density, p(m|θ), is shown as a grayscale image for both the unadapted and adapted cases. We assume here that adaptation increases the reliability (SNR) of the measurement around the parameter value of the adaptor. This is balanced by a decrease in SNR of the measurement further away from the adaptor. Because the likelihood is a function of θ (horizontal slices, shown plotted at right), this results in an asymmetric change in the likelihood that is in agreement with a repulsive effect on the estimate. a b ^ ∆θ ^ ∆θ [deg] + 0 60 30 0 -30 - θ θ adapt -60 -180 -90 90 θadapt 180 θ [deg] Figure 3: Repulsion: Model predictions vs. human psychophysics. a) Difference in perceived direction in the pre- and post-adaptation condition, as predicted by the model. Postadaptive percepts of motion direction are repelled away from the direction of the adaptor. b) Typical human subject data show a qualitatively similar repulsive effect. Data (and fit) are replotted from [10]. hood function. The two gray-scale images represent the conditional probability densities, p(m|θ), in the unadapted and the adapted state. They are formed by assuming additive noise on the measurement m of constant variance (unadapted) or with a variance that decreases symmetrically in the vicinity of the adaptor parameter value θadapt , and grows slightly in the region beyond. In the unadapted state, the likelihood is convolutional and the shape and variance are equivalent to the distribution of measurement noise. However, in the adapted state, because the likelihood is a function of θ (horizontal slice through the conditional surface) it is no longer convolutional around the adaptor. As a result, the mean is pushed away from the adaptor, as illustrated in the two graphs on the right. Assuming that the prior distribution is fairly smooth, this repulsion effect is transferred to the posterior distribution, and thus to the estimate. 3 Simulation Results We have qualitatively demonstrated that an increase in the measurement reliability around the adaptor is consistent with the repulsive effects commonly seen as a result of perceptual adaptation. In this section, we simulate an adapted Bayesian observer by assuming a simple model for the changes in signal-to-noise ratio due to adaptation. We address both repulsion and changes in discrimination threshold. In particular, we compare our model predictions with previously published data from psychophysical experiments examining human perception of motion direction. 3.1 Repulsion In the unadapted state, we assume the measurement noise to be additive and normally distributed, and constant over the whole measurement space. Thus, assuming that m and θ live in the same space, the likelihood is a Gaussian of constant width. In the adapted state, we assume a simple functional description for the variance of the measurement noise around the adapter. Specifically, we use a constant plus a difference of two Gaussians, a b relative discrimination threshold relative discrimination threshold 1.8 1 θ θadapt 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 -40 -20 θ adapt 20 40 θ [deg] Figure 4: Discrimination thresholds: Model predictions vs. human psychophysics. a) The model predicts that thresholds for direction discrimination are reduced at the adaptor. It also predicts two side-lobes of increased threshold at further distance from the adaptor. b) Data of human psychophysics are in qualitative agreement with the model. Data are replotted from [14] (see also [11]). each having equal area, with one twice as broad as the other (see Fig. 2). Finally, for simplicity, we assume a flat prior, but any reasonable smooth prior would lead to results that are qualitatively similar. Then, according to (2) we compute the predicted estimate of motion direction in both the unadapted and the adapted case. Figure 3a shows the predicted difference between the pre- and post-adaptive average estimate of direction, as a function of the stimulus direction, θstim . The adaptor is indicated with an arrow. The repulsive effect is clearly visible. For comparison, Figure 3b shows human subject data replotted from [10]. The perceived motion direction of a grating was estimated, under both adapted and unadapted conditions, using a two-alternative-forced-choice experimental paradigm. The plot shows the change in perceived direction as a function of test stimulus direction relative to that of the adaptor. Comparison of the two panels of Figure 3 indicate that despite the highly simplified construction of the model, the prediction is quite good, and even includes the small but consistent repulsive effects observed 180 degrees from the adaptor. 3.2 Changes in discrimination threshold Adaptation also changes the ability of human observers to discriminate between the direction of two different moving stimuli. In order to model discrimination thresholds, we need to consider a Bayesian framework that can account not only for the mean of the estimate but also its variability. We have recently developed such a framework, and used it to quantitatively constrain the likelihood and the prior from psychophysical data [16]. This framework accounts for the effect of the measurement noise on the variability of the ˆ ˆ estimate θ. Specifically, it provides a characterization of the distribution p(θ|θstim ) of the estimate for a given stimulus direction in terms of its expected value and its variance as a function of the measurement noise. As in [16] we write ˆ ∂ θ(m) 2 ˆ var θ|θstim = var m ( ) |m=θstim . (3) ∂m Assuming that discrimination threshold is proportional to the standard deviation, ˆ var θ|θstim , we can now predict how discrimination thresholds should change after adaptation. Figure 4a shows the predicted change in discrimination thresholds relative to the unadapted condition for the same model parameters as in the repulsion example (Figure 3a). Thresholds are slightly reduced at the adaptor, but increase symmetrically for directions further away from the adaptor. For comparison, Figure 4b shows the relative change in discrimination thresholds for a typical human subject [14]. Again, the behavior of the human observer is qualitatively well predicted. 4 Discussion We have shown that adaptation can be incorporated into a Bayesian estimation framework for human sensory perception. Adaptation seems unlikely to manifest itself as a change in the internal representation of prior distributions, as this would lead to perceptual bias effects that are opposite to those observed in human subjects. Instead, we argue that adaptation leads to an increase in reliability of the measurement in the vicinity of the adapting stimulus parameter. We show that this change in the measurement reliability results in changes of the likelihood function, and that an estimator that utilizes this likelihood function will exhibit the commonly-observed adaptation effects of repulsion and changes in discrimination threshold. We further confirm our model by making quantitative predictions and comparing them with known psychophysical data in the case of human perception of motion direction. 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Saul, Yair Weiss, and L´ on Bottou, editors, Advances in Neural Infore mation Processing Systems NIPS 17, pages 1361–1368, Cambridge, MA, 2005. MIT Press. [17] D. Tranchina, J. Gordon, and R.M. Shapley. Retinal light adaptation – evidence for a feedback mechanism. Nature, 310:314–316, July 1984. ´ [18] S. Deneve. Bayesian inference in spiking neurons. In Lawrence K. Saul, Yair Weiss, and L eon Bottou, editors, Adv. Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS*04), vol 17, Cambridge, MA, 2005. MIT Press. [19] R. Rao. Hierarchical Bayesian inference in networks of spiking neurons. In Lawrence K. Saul, Yair Weiss, and L´ on Bottou, editors, Adv. Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS*04), e vol 17, Cambridge, MA, 2005. MIT Press.
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same-paper 1 0.93292767 156 nips-2005-Prediction and Change Detection
Author: Mark Steyvers, Scott Brown
Abstract: We measure the ability of human observers to predict the next datum in a sequence that is generated by a simple statistical process undergoing change at random points in time. Accurate performance in this task requires the identification of changepoints. We assess individual differences between observers both empirically, and using two kinds of models: a Bayesian approach for change detection and a family of cognitively plausible fast and frugal models. Some individuals detect too many changes and hence perform sub-optimally due to excess variability. Other individuals do not detect enough changes, and perform sub-optimally because they fail to notice short-term temporal trends. 1 Intr oduction Decision-making often requires a rapid response to change. For example, stock analysts need to quickly detect changes in the market in order to adjust investment strategies. Coaches need to track changes in a player’s performance in order to adjust strategy. When tracking changes, there are costs involved when either more or less changes are observed than actually occurred. For example, when using an overly conservative change detection criterion, a stock analyst might miss important short-term trends and interpret them as random fluctuations instead. On the other hand, a change may also be detected too readily. For example, in basketball, a player who makes a series of consecutive baskets is often identified as a “hot hand” player whose underlying ability is perceived to have suddenly increased [1,2]. This might lead to sub-optimal passing strategies, based on random fluctuations. We are interested in explaining individual differences in a sequential prediction task. Observers are shown stimuli generated from a simple statistical process with the task of predicting the next datum in the sequence. The latent parameters of the statistical process change discretely at random points in time. Performance in this task depends on the accurate detection of those changepoints, as well as inference about future outcomes based on the outcomes that followed the most recent inferred changepoint. There is much prior research in statistics on the problem of identifying changepoints [3,4,5]. In this paper, we adopt a Bayesian approach to the changepoint identification problem and develop a simple inference procedure to predict the next datum in a sequence. The Bayesian model serves as an ideal observer model and is useful to characterize the ways in which individuals deviate from optimality. The plan of the paper is as follows. We first introduce the sequential prediction task and discuss a Bayesian analysis of this prediction problem. We then discuss the results from a few individuals in this prediction task and show how the Bayesian approach can capture individual differences with a single “twitchiness” parameter that describes how readily changes are perceived in random sequences. We will show that some individuals are too twitchy: their performance is too variable because they base their predictions on too little of the recent data. Other individuals are not twitchy enough, and they fail to capture fast changes in the data. We also show how behavior can be explained with a set of fast and frugal models [6]. These are cognitively realistic models that operate under plausible computational constraints. 2 A pr ediction task wit h m ult iple c hange points In the prediction task, stimuli are presented sequentially and the task is to predict the next stimulus in the sequence. After t trials, the observer has been presented with stimuli y1, y2, …, yt and the task is to make a prediction about yt+1. After the prediction is made, the actual outcome yt+1 is revealed and the next trial proceeds to the prediction of yt+2. This procedure starts with y1 and is repeated for T trials. The observations yt are D-dimensional vectors with elements sampled from binomial distributions. The parameters of those distributions change discretely at random points in time such that the mean increases or decreases after a change point. This generates a sequence of observation vectors, y1, y2, …, yT, where each yt = {yt,1 … yt,D}. Each of the yt,d is sampled from a binomial distribution Bin(θt,d,K), so 0 ≤ yt,d ≤ K. The parameter vector θt ={θt,1 … θt,D} changes depending on the locations of the changepoints. At each time step, xt is a binary indicator for the occurrence of a changepoint occurring at time t+1. The parameter α determines the probability of a change occurring in the sequence. The generative model is specified by the following algorithm: 1. For d=1..D sample θ1,d from a Uniform(0,1) distribution 2. For t=2..T, (a) Sample xt-1 from a Bernoulli(α) distribution (b) If xt-1=0, then θt=θt-1, else for d=1..D sample θt,d from a Uniform(0,1) distribution (c) for d=1..D, sample yt from a Bin(θt,d,K) distribution Table 1 shows some data generated from the changepoint model with T=20, α=.1,and D=1. In the prediction task, y will be observed, but x and θ are not. Table 1: Example data t x θ y 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 .68 .68 .68 .68 .48 .48 .48 .74 .74 .74 .74 .74 .74 .19 .19 .87 .87 .87 .87 .87 9 7 8 7 4 4 4 9 8 3 6 7 8 2 1 8 9 9 8 8 3 A Bayesian pr ediction m ode l In both our Bayesian and fast-and-frugal analyses, the prediction task is decomposed into two inference procedures. First, the changepoint locations are identified. This is followed by predictive inference for the next outcome based on the most recent changepoint locations. Several Bayesian approaches have been developed for changepoint problems involving single or multiple changepoints [3,5]. We apply a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) analysis to approximate the joint posterior distribution over changepoint assignments x while integrating out θ. Gibbs sampling will be used to sample from this posterior marginal distribution. The samples can then be used to predict the next outcome in the sequence. 3.1 I n f e r e nc e f o r c h a n g e p o i n t a s s i g n m e n t s . To apply Gibbs sampling, we evaluate the conditional probability of assigning a changepoint at time i, given all other changepoint assignments and the current α value. By integrating out θ, the conditional probability is P ( xi | x−i , y, α ) = ∫ P ( xi ,θ , α | x− i , y ) (1) θ where x− i represents all switch point assignments except xi. This can be simplified by considering the location of the most recent changepoint preceding and following time i and the outcomes occurring between these locations. Let niL be the number of time steps from the last changepoint up to and including the current time step i such that xi − nL =1 and xi − nL + j =0 for 0 < niL . Similarly, let niR be the number of time steps that i i follow time step i up to the next changepoint such that xi + n R =1 and xi + nR − j =0 for i R i 0 < n . Let y = L i ∑ i − niL < k ≤ i i yk and y = ∑ k < k ≤i + n R yk . The update equation for the R i i changepoint assignment can then be simplified to P ( xi = m | x−i ) ∝ ( ) ( ( ) D Γ 1 + y L + y R Γ 1 + Kn L + Kn R − y L − y R ⎧ i, j i, j i i i, j i, j ⎪ (1 − α ) ∏ L R Γ 2 + Kni + Kni ⎪ j =1 ⎪ ⎨ L L L R R R ⎪ D Γ 1 + yi, j Γ 1 + Kni − yi, j Γ 1 + yi, j Γ 1 + Kni − yi, j α∏ ⎪ Γ 2 + KniL Γ 2 + KniR ⎪ j =1 ⎩ ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ) m=0 ) (2) m =1 We initialize the Gibbs sampler by sampling each xt from a Bernoulli(α) distribution. All changepoint assignments are then updated sequentially by the Gibbs sampling equation above. The sampler is run for M iterations after which one set of changepoint assignments is saved. The Gibbs sampler is then restarted multiple times until S samples have been collected. Although we could have included an update equation for α, in this analysis we treat α as a known constant. This will be useful when characterizing the differences between human observers in terms of differences in α. 3.2 P r e d i c ti v e i n f er e n ce The next latent parameter value θt+1 and outcome yt+1 can be predicted on the basis of observed outcomes that occurred after the last inferred changepoint: θ t+1, j = t ∑ i =t* +1 yt+1, j = round (θt +1, j K ) yi, j / K , (3) where t* is the location of the most recent change point. By considering multiple Gibbs samples, we get a distribution over outcomes yt+1. We base the model predictions on the mean of this distribution. 3.3 I l l u s t r a t i o n o f m o d e l p er f o r m a n c e Figure 1 illustrates the performance of the model on a one dimensional sequence (D=1) generated from the changepoint model with T=160, α=0.05, and K=10. The Gibbs sampler was run for M=30 iterations and S=200 samples were collected. The top panel shows the actual changepoints (triangles) and the distribution of changepoint assignments averaged over samples. The bottom panel shows the observed data y (thin lines) as well as the θ values in the generative model (rescaled between 0 and 10). At locations with large changes between observations, the marginal changepoint probability is quite high. At other locations, the true change in the mean is very small, and the model is less likely to put in a changepoint. The lower right panel shows the distribution over predicted θt+1 values. xt 1 0.5 0 yt 10 1 5 θt+1 0.5 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 0 Figure 1. Results of model simulation. 4 Prediction experiment We tested performance of 9 human observers in the prediction task. The observers included the authors, a visitor, and one student who were aware of the statistical nature of the task as well as naïve students. The observers were seated in front of an LCD touch screen displaying a two-dimensional grid of 11 x 11 buttons. The changepoint model was used to generate a sequence of T=1500 stimuli for two binomial variables y1 and y2 (D=2, K=10). The change probability α was set to 0.1. The two variables y1 and y2 specified the two-dimensional button location. The same sequence was used for all observers. On each trial, the observer touched a button on the grid displayed on the touch screen. Following each button press, the button corresponding to the next {y1,y2} outcome in the sequence was highlighted. Observers were instructed to press the button that best predicted the next location of the highlighted button. The 1500 trials were divided into three blocks of 500 trials. Breaks were allowed between blocks. The whole experiment lasted between 15 and 30 minutes. Figure 2 shows the first 50 trials from the third block of the experiment. The top and bottom panels show the actual outcomes for the y1 and y2 button grid coordinates as well as the predictions for two observers (SB and MY). The figure shows that at trial 15, the y1 and y2 coordinates show a large shift followed by an immediate shift in observer’s MY predictions (on trial 16). Observer SB waits until trial 17 to make a shift. 10 5 0 outcomes SB predictions MY predictions 10 5 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 Trial 30 35 40 45 50 Figure 2. Trial by trial predictions from two observers. 4.1 T a s k er r o r We assessed prediction performance by comparing the prediction with the actual outcome in the sequence. Task error was measured by normalized city-block distance T 1 (4) task error= ∑ yt ,1 − ytO,1 + yt ,2 − ytO,2 (T − 1) t =2 where yO represents the observer’s prediction. Note that the very first trial is excluded from this calculation. Even though more suitable probabilistic measures for prediction error could have been adopted, we wanted to allow comparison of observer’s performance with both probabilistic and non-probabilistic models. Task error ranged from 2.8 (for participant MY) to 3.3 (for ML). We also assessed the performance of five models – their task errors ranged from 2.78 to 3.20. The Bayesian models (Section 3) had the lowest task errors, just below 2.8. This fits with our definition of the Bayesian models as “ideal observer” models – their task error is lower than any other model’s and any human observer’s task error. The fast and frugal models (Section 5) had task errors ranging from 2.85 to 3.20. 5 Modeling R esults We will refer to the models with the following letter codes: B=Bayesian Model, LB=limited Bayesian model, FF1..3=fast and frugal models 1..3. We assessed model fit by comparing the model’s prediction against the human observers’ predictions, again using a normalized city-block distance model error= T 1 ∑ ytM − ytO,1 + ytM − ytO,2 ,1 ,2 (T − 1) t=2 (5) where yM represents the model’s prediction. The model error for each individual observer is shown in Figure 3. It is important to note that because each model is associated with a set of free parameters, the parameters optimized for task error and model error are different. For Figure 3, the parameters were optimized to minimize Equation (5) for each individual observer, showing the extent to which these models can capture the performance of individual observers, not necessarily providing the best task performance. B LB FF1 FF2 MY MS MM EJ FF3 Model Error 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 PH NP DN SB ML 1 Figure 3. Model error for each individual observer. 5.1 B ay e s i a n p re d i ct i o n m o d e l s At each trial t, the model was provided with the sequence of all previous outcomes. The Gibbs sampling and inference procedures from Eq. (2) and (3) were applied with M=30 iterations and S=200 samples. The change probability α was a free parameter. In the full Bayesian model, the whole sequence of observations up to the current trial is available for prediction, leading to a memory requirement of up to T=1500 trials – a psychologically unreasonable assumption. We therefore also simulated a limited Bayesian model (LB) where the observed sequence was truncated to the last 10 outcomes. The LB model showed almost no decrement in task performance compared to the full Bayesian model. Figure 3 also shows that it fit human data quite well. 5.2 I n d i v i d u a l D i f f er e nc e s The right-hand panel of Figure 4 plots each observer’s task error as a function of the mean city-block distance between their subsequent button presses. This shows a clear U-shaped function. Observers with very variable predictions (e.g., ML and DN) had large average changes between successive button pushes, and also had large task error: These observers were too “twitchy”. Observers with very small average button changes (e.g., SB and NP) were not twitchy enough, and also had large task error. Observers in the middle had the lowest task error (e.g., MS and MY). The left-hand panel of Figure 4 shows the same data, but with the x-axis based on the Bayesian model fits. Instead of using mean button change distance to index twitchiness (as in 1 Error bars indicate bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. the right-hand panel), the left-hand panel uses the estimated α parameters from the Bayesian model. A similar U-shaped pattern is observed: individuals with too large or too small α estimates have large task errors. 3.3 DN 3.2 Task Error ML SB 3.2 NP 3.1 Task Error 3.3 PH EJ 3 MM MS MY 2.9 2.8 10 -4 10 -3 10 -2 DN NP 3.1 3 PH EJ MM MS 2.9 B ML SB MY 2.8 10 -1 10 0 0.5 1 α 1.5 2 Mean Button Change 2.5 3 Figure 4. Task error vs. “twitchiness”. Left-hand panel indexes twitchiness using estimated α parameters from Bayesian model fits. Right-hand panel uses mean distance between successive predictions. 5.3 F a s t - a n d - F r u g a l ( F F ) p r e d ic t i o n m o d e l s These models perform the prediction task using simple heuristics that are cognitively plausible. The FF models keep a short memory of previous stimulus values and make predictions using the same two-step process as the Bayesian model. First, a decision is made as to whether the latent parameter θ has changed. Second, remembered stimulus values that occurred after the most recently detected changepoint are used to generate the next prediction. A simple heuristic is used to detect changepoints: If the distance between the most recent observation and prediction is greater than some threshold amount, a change is inferred. We defined the distance between a prediction (p) and an observation (y) as the difference between the log-likelihoods of y assuming θ=p and θ=y. Thus, if fB(.|θ, K) is the binomial density with parameters θ and K, the distance between observation y and prediction p is defined as d(y,p)=log(fB(y|y,K))-log(fB(y|p,K)). A changepoint on time step t+1 is inferred whenever d(yt,pt)>C. The parameter C governs the twitchiness of the model predictions. If C is large, only very dramatic changepoints will be detected, and the model will be too conservative. If C is small, the model will be too twitchy, and will detect changepoints on the basis of small random fluctuations. Predictions are based on the most recent M observations, which are kept in memory, unless a changepoint has been detected in which case only those observations occurring after the changepoint are used for prediction. The prediction for time step t+1 is simply the mean of these observations, say p. Human observers were reticent to make predictions very close to the boundaries. This was modeled by allowing the FF model to change its prediction for the next time step, yt+1, towards the mean prediction (0.5). This change reflects a two-way bet. If the probability of a change occurring is α, the best guess will be 0.5 if that change occurs, or the mean p if the change does not occur. Thus, the prediction made is actually yt+1=1/2 α+(1-α)p. Note that we do not allow perfect knowledge of the probability of a changepoint, α. Instead, an estimated value of α is used based on the number of changepoints detected in the data series up to time t. The FF model nests two simpler FF models that are psychologically interesting. If the twitchiness threshold parameter C becomes arbitrarily large, the model never detects a change and instead becomes a continuous running average model. Predictions from this model are simply a boxcar smooth of the data. Alternatively, if we assume no memory the model must based each prediction on only the previous stimulus (i.e., M=1). Above, in Figure 3, we labeled the complete FF model as FF1, the boxcar model as FF2 and the memoryless model FF3. Figure 3 showed that the complete FF model (FF1) fit the data from all observers significantly better than either the boxcar model (FF2) or the memoryless model (FF3). Exceptions were observers PH, DN and ML, for whom all three FF model fit equally well. This result suggests that our observers were (mostly) doing more than just keeping a running average of the data, or using only the most recent observation. The FF1 model fit the data about as well as the Bayesian models for all observers except MY and MS. Note that, in general, the FF1 and Bayesian model fits are very good: the average city block distance between the human data and the model prediction is around 0.75 (out of 10) buttons on both the x- and y-axes. 6 C onclusion We used an online prediction task to study changepoint detection. Human observers had to predict the next observation in stochastic sequences containing random changepoints. We showed that some observers are too “twitchy”: They perform poorly on the prediction task because they see changes where only random fluctuation exists. Other observers are not twitchy enough, and they perform poorly because they fail to see small changes. We developed a Bayesian changepoint detection model that performed the task optimally, and also provided a good fit to human data when sub-optimal parameter settings were used. Finally, we developed a fast-and-frugal model that showed how participants may be able to perform well at the task using minimal information and simple decision heuristics. Acknowledgments We thank Eric-Jan Wagenmakers and Mike Yi for useful discussions related to this work. This work was supported in part by a grant from the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR grant number FA9550-04-1-0317). R e f er e n ce s [1] Gilovich, T., Vallone, R. and Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: on the misperception of random sequences. Cognitive Psychology17, 295-314. [2] Albright, S.C. (1993a). A statistical analysis of hitting streaks in baseball. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88, 1175-1183. [3] Stephens, D.A. (1994). Bayesian retrospective multiple changepoint identification. Applied Statistics 43(1), 159-178. [4] Carlin, B.P., Gelfand, A.E., & Smith, A.F.M. (1992). Hierarchical Bayesian analysis of changepoint problems. Applied Statistics 41(2), 389-405. [5] Green, P.J. (1995). Reversible jump Markov chain Monte Carlo computation and Bayesian model determination. Biometrika 82(4), 711-732. [6] Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D.G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650-669.
2 0.6599341 34 nips-2005-Bayesian Surprise Attracts Human Attention
Author: Laurent Itti, Pierre F. Baldi
Abstract: The concept of surprise is central to sensory processing, adaptation, learning, and attention. Yet, no widely-accepted mathematical theory currently exists to quantitatively characterize surprise elicited by a stimulus or event, for observers that range from single neurons to complex natural or engineered systems. We describe a formal Bayesian definition of surprise that is the only consistent formulation under minimal axiomatic assumptions. Surprise quantifies how data affects a natural or artificial observer, by measuring the difference between posterior and prior beliefs of the observer. Using this framework we measure the extent to which humans direct their gaze towards surprising items while watching television and video games. We find that subjects are strongly attracted towards surprising locations, with 72% of all human gaze shifts directed towards locations more surprising than the average, a figure which rises to 84% when considering only gaze targets simultaneously selected by all subjects. The resulting theory of surprise is applicable across different spatio-temporal scales, modalities, and levels of abstraction. Life is full of surprises, ranging from a great christmas gift or a new magic trick, to wardrobe malfunctions, reckless drivers, terrorist attacks, and tsunami waves. Key to survival is our ability to rapidly attend to, identify, and learn from surprising events, to decide on present and future courses of action [1]. Yet, little theoretical and computational understanding exists of the very essence of surprise, as evidenced by the absence from our everyday vocabulary of a quantitative unit of surprise: Qualities such as the “wow factor” have remained vague and elusive to mathematical analysis. Informal correlates of surprise exist at nearly all stages of neural processing. In sensory neuroscience, it has been suggested that only the unexpected at one stage is transmitted to the next stage [2]. Hence, sensory cortex may have evolved to adapt to, to predict, and to quiet down the expected statistical regularities of the world [3, 4, 5, 6], focusing instead on events that are unpredictable or surprising. Electrophysiological evidence for this early sensory emphasis onto surprising stimuli exists from studies of adaptation in visual [7, 8, 4, 9], olfactory [10, 11], and auditory cortices [12], subcortical structures like the LGN [13], and even retinal ganglion cells [14, 15] and cochlear hair cells [16]: neural response greatly attenuates with repeated or prolonged exposure to an initially novel stimulus. Surprise and novelty are also central to learning and memory formation [1], to the point that surprise is believed to be a necessary trigger for associative learning [17, 18], as supported by mounting evidence for a role of the hippocampus as a novelty detector [19, 20, 21]. Finally, seeking novelty is a well-identified human character trait, with possible association with the dopamine D4 receptor gene [22, 23, 24]. In the Bayesian framework, we develop the only consistent theory of surprise, in terms of the difference between the posterior and prior distributions of beliefs of an observer over the available class of models or hypotheses about the world. We show that this definition derived from first principles presents key advantages over more ad-hoc formulations, typically relying on detecting outlier stimuli. Armed with this new framework, we provide direct experimental evidence that surprise best characterizes what attracts human gaze in large amounts of natural video stimuli. We here extend a recent pilot study [25], adding more comprehensive theory, large-scale human data collection, and additional analysis. 1 Theory Bayesian Definition of Surprise. We propose that surprise is a general concept, which can be derived from first principles and formalized across spatio-temporal scales, sensory modalities, and, more generally, data types and data sources. Two elements are essential for a principled definition of surprise. First, surprise can exist only in the presence of uncertainty, which can arise from intrinsic stochasticity, missing information, or limited computing resources. A world that is purely deterministic and predictable in real-time for a given observer contains no surprises. Second, surprise can only be defined in a relative, subjective, manner and is related to the expectations of the observer, be it a single synapse, neuronal circuit, organism, or computer device. The same data may carry different amount of surprise for different observers, or even for the same observer taken at different times. In probability and decision theory it can be shown that the only consistent and optimal way for modeling and reasoning about uncertainty is provided by the Bayesian theory of probability [26, 27, 28]. Furthermore, in the Bayesian framework, probabilities correspond to subjective degrees of beliefs in hypotheses or models which are updated, as data is acquired, using Bayes’ theorem as the fundamental tool for transforming prior belief distributions into posterior belief distributions. Therefore, within the same optimal framework, the only consistent definition of surprise must involve: (1) probabilistic concepts to cope with uncertainty; and (2) prior and posterior distributions to capture subjective expectations. Consistently with this Bayesian approach, the background information of an observer is captured by his/her/its prior probability distribution {P (M )}M ∈M over the hypotheses or models M in a model space M. Given this prior distribution of beliefs, the fundamental effect of a new data observation D on the observer is to change the prior distribution {P (M )}M ∈M into the posterior distribution {P (M |D)}M ∈M via Bayes theorem, whereby P (D|M ) ∀M ∈ M, P (M |D) = P (M ). (1) P (D) In this framework, the new data observation D carries no surprise if it leaves the observer beliefs unaffected, that is, if the posterior is identical to the prior; conversely, D is surprising if the posterior distribution resulting from observing D significantly differs from the prior distribution. Therefore we formally measure surprise elicited by data as some distance measure between the posterior and prior distributions. This is best done using the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [29]. Thus, surprise is defined by the average of the log-odd ratio: P (M |D) S(D, M) = KL(P (M |D), P (M )) = P (M |D) log dM (2) P (M ) M taken with respect to the posterior distribution over the model class M. Note that KL is not symmetric but has well-known theoretical advantages, including invariance with respect to Figure 1: Computing surprise in early sensory neurons. (a) Prior data observations, tuning preferences, and top-down influences contribute to shaping a set of “prior beliefs” a neuron may have over a class of internal models or hypotheses about the world. For instance, M may be a set of Poisson processes parameterized by the rate λ, with {P (M )}M ∈M = {P (λ)}λ∈I +∗ the prior distribution R of beliefs about which Poisson models well describe the world as sensed by the neuron. New data D updates the prior into the posterior using Bayes’ theorem. Surprise quantifies the difference between the posterior and prior distributions over the model class M. The remaining panels detail how surprise differs from conventional model fitting and outlier-based novelty. (b) In standard iterative Bayesian model fitting, at every iteration N , incoming data DN is used to update the prior {P (M |D1 , D2 , ..., DN −1 )}M ∈M into the posterior {P (M |D1 , D2 , ..., DN )}M ∈M . Freezing this learning at a given iteration, one then picks the currently best model, usually using either a maximum likelihood criterion, or a maximum a posteriori one (yielding MM AP shown). (c) This best model is used for a number of tasks at the current iteration, including outlier-based novelty detection. New data is then considered novel at that instant if it has low likelihood for the best model b a (e.g., DN is more novel than DN ). This focus onto the single best model presents obvious limitations, especially in situations where other models are nearly as good (e.g., M∗ in panel (b) is entirely ignored during standard novelty computation). One palliative solution is to consider mixture models, or simply P (D), but this just amounts to shifting the problem into a different model class. (d) Surprise directly addresses this problem by simultaneously considering all models and by measuring how data changes the observer’s distribution of beliefs from {P (M |D1 , D2 , ..., DN −1 )}M ∈M to {P (M |D1 , D2 , ..., DN )}M ∈M over the entire model class M (orange shaded area). reparameterizations. A unit of surprise — a “wow” — may then be defined for a single model M as the amount of surprise corresponding to a two-fold variation between P (M |D) and P (M ), i.e., as log P (M |D)/P (M ) (with log taken in base 2), with the total number of wows experienced for all models obtained through the integration in eq. 2. Surprise and outlier detection. Outlier detection based on the likelihood P (D|M best ) of D given a single best model Mbest is at best an approximation to surprise and, in some cases, is misleading. Consider, for instance, a case where D has very small probability both for a model or hypothesis M and for a single alternative hypothesis M. Although D is a strong outlier, it carries very little information regarding whether M or M is the better model, and therefore very little surprise. Thus an outlier detection method would strongly focus attentional resources onto D, although D is a false positive, in the sense that it carries no useful information for discriminating between the two alternative hypotheses M and M. Figure 1 further illustrates this disconnect between outlier detection and surprise. 2 Human experiments To test the surprise hypothesis — that surprise attracts human attention and gaze in natural scenes — we recorded eye movements from eight na¨ve observers (three females and ı five males, ages 23-32, normal or corrected-to-normal vision). Each watched a subset from 50 videoclips totaling over 25 minutes of playtime (46,489 video frames, 640 × 480, 60.27 Hz, mean screen luminance 30 cd/m2 , room 4 cd/m2 , viewing distance 80cm, field of view 28◦ × 21◦ ). Clips comprised outdoors daytime and nighttime scenes of crowded environments, video games, and television broadcast including news, sports, and commercials. Right-eye position was tracked with a 240 Hz video-based device (ISCAN RK-464), with methods as previously [30]. Two hundred calibrated eye movement traces (10,192 saccades) were analyzed, corresponding to four distinct observers for each of the 50 clips. Figure 2 shows sample scanpaths for one videoclip. To characterize image regions selected by participants, we process videoclips through computational metrics that output a topographic dynamic master response map, assigning in real-time a response value to every input location. A good master map would highlight, more than expected by chance, locations gazed to by observers. To score each metric we hence sample, at onset of every human saccade, master map activity around the saccade’s future endpoint, and around a uniformly random endpoint (random sampling was repeated 100 times to evaluate variability). We quantify differences between histograms of master Figure 2: (a) Sample eye movement traces from four observers (squares denote saccade endpoints). (b) Our data exhibits high inter-individual overlap, shown here with the locations where one human saccade endpoint was nearby (≈ 5◦ ) one (white squares), two (cyan squares), or all three (black squares) other humans. (c) A metric where the master map was created from the three eye movement traces other than that being tested yields an upper-bound KL score, computed by comparing the histograms of metric values at human (narrow blue bars) and random (wider green bars) saccade targets. Indeed, this metric’s map was very sparse (many random saccades landing on locations with nearzero response), yet humans preferentially saccaded towards the three active hotspots corresponding to the eye positions of three other humans (many human saccades landing on locations with near-unity responses). map samples collected from human and random saccades using again the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance: metrics which better predict human scanpaths exhibit higher distances from random as, typically, observers non-uniformly gaze towards a minority of regions with highest metric responses while avoiding a majority of regions with low metric responses. This approach presents several advantages over simpler scoring schemes [31, 32], including agnosticity to putative mechanisms for generating saccades and the fact that applying any continuous nonlinearity to master map values would not affect scoring. Experimental results. We test six computational metrics, encompassing and extending the state-of-the-art found in previous studies. The first three quantify static image properties (local intensity variance in 16 × 16 image patches [31]; local oriented edge density as measured with Gabor filters [33]; and local Shannon entropy in 16 × 16 image patches [34]). The remaining three metrics are more sensitive to dynamic events (local motion [33]; outlier-based saliency [33]; and surprise [25]). For all metrics, we find that humans are significantly attracted by image regions with higher metric responses. However, the static metrics typically respond vigorously at numerous visual locations (Figure 3), hence they are poorly specific and yield relatively low KL scores between humans and random. The metrics sensitive to motion, outliers, and surprising events, in comparison, yield sparser maps and higher KL scores. The surprise metric of interest here quantifies low-level surprise in image patches over space and time, and at this point does not account for high-level or cognitive beliefs of our human observers. Rather, it assumes a family of simple models for image patches, each processed through 72 early feature detectors sensitive to color, orientation, motion, etc., and computes surprise from shifts in the distribution of beliefs about which models better describe the patches (see [25] and [35] for details). We find that the surprise metric significantly outperforms all other computational metrics (p < 10−100 or better on t-tests for equality of KL scores), scoring nearly 20% better than the second-best metric (saliency) and 60% better than the best static metric (entropy). Surprising stimuli often substantially differ from simple feature outliers; for example, a continually blinking light on a static background elicits sustained flicker due to its locally outlier temporal dynamics but is only surprising for a moment. Similarly, a shower of randomly-colored pixels continually excites all low-level feature detectors but rapidly becomes unsurprising. Strongest attractors of human attention. Clearly, in our and previous eye-tracking experiments, in some situations potentially interesting targets were more numerous than in others. With many possible targets, different observers may orient towards different locations, making it more difficult for a single metric to accurately predict all observers. Hence we consider (Figure 4) subsets of human saccades where at least two, three, or all four observers simultaneously agreed on a gaze target. Observers could have agreed based on bottom-up factors (e.g., only one location had interesting visual appearance at that time), top-down factors (e.g., only one object was of current cognitive interest), or both (e.g., a single cognitively interesting object was present which also had distinctive appearance). Irrespectively of the cause for agreement, it indicates consolidated belief that a location was attractive. While the KL scores of all metrics improved when progressively focusing onto only those locations, dynamic metrics improved more steeply, indicating that stimuli which more reliably attracted all observers carried more motion, saliency, and surprise. Surprise remained significantly the best metric to characterize these agreed-upon attractors of human gaze (p < 10−100 or better on t-tests for equality of KL scores). Overall, surprise explained the greatest fraction of human saccades, indicating that humans are significantly attracted towards surprising locations in video displays. Over 72% of all human saccades were targeted to locations predicted to be more surprising than on average. When only considering saccades where two, three, or four observers agreed on a common gaze target, this figure rose to 76%, 80%, and 84%, respectively. Figure 3: (a) Sample video frames, with corresponding human saccades and predictions from the entropy, surprise, and human-derived metrics. Entropy maps, like intensity variance and orientation maps, exhibited many locations with high responses, hence had low specificity and were poorly discriminative. In contrast, motion, saliency, and surprise maps were much sparser and more specific, with surprise significantly more often on target. For three example frames (first column), saccades from one subject are shown (arrows) with corresponding apertures over which master map activity at the saccade endpoint was sampled (circles). (b) KL scores for these metrics indicate significantly different performance levels, and a strict ranking of variance < orientation < entropy < motion < saliency < surprise < human-derived. KL scores were computed by comparing the number of human saccades landing onto each given range of master map values (narrow blue bars) to the number of random saccades hitting the same range (wider green bars). A score of zero would indicate equality between the human and random histograms, i.e., humans did not tend to hit various master map values any differently from expected by chance, or, the master map could not predict human saccades better than random saccades. Among the six computational metrics tested in total, surprise performed best, in that surprising locations were relatively few yet reliably gazed to by humans. Figure 4: KL scores when considering only saccades where at least one (all 10,192 saccades), two (7,948 saccades), three (5,565 saccades), or all four (2,951 saccades) humans agreed on a common gaze location, for the static (a) and dynamic metrics (b). Static metrics improved substantially when progressively focusing onto saccades with stronger inter-observer agreement (average slope 0.56 ± 0.37 percent KL score units per 1,000 pruned saccades). Hence, when humans agreed on a location, they also tended to be more reliably predicted by the metrics. Furthermore, dynamic metrics improved 4.5 times more steeply (slope 2.44 ± 0.37), suggesting a stronger role of dynamic events in attracting human attention. Surprising events were significantly the strongest (t-tests for equality of KL scores between surprise and other metrics, p < 10−100 ). 3 Discussion While previous research has shown with either static scenes or dynamic synthetic stimuli that humans preferentially fixate regions of high entropy [34], contrast [31], saliency [32], flicker [36], or motion [37], our data provides direct experimental evidence that humans fixate surprising locations even more reliably. These conclusions were made possible by developing new tools to quantify what attracts human gaze over space and time in dynamic natural scenes. Surprise explained best where humans look when considering all saccades, and even more so when restricting the analysis to only those saccades for which human observers tended to agree. Surprise hence represents an inexpensive, easily computable approximation to human attentional allocation. In the absence of quantitative tools to measure surprise, most experimental and modeling work to date has adopted the approximation that novel events are surprising, and has focused on experimental scenarios which are simple enough to ensure an overlap between informal notions of novelty and surprise: for example, a stimulus is novel during testing if it has not been seen during training [9]. Our definition opens new avenues for more sophisticated experiments, where surprise elicited by different stimuli can be precisely compared and calibrated, yielding predictions at the single-unit as well as behavioral levels. The definition of surprise — as the distance between the posterior and prior distributions of beliefs over models — is entirely general and readily applicable to the analysis of auditory, olfactory, gustatory, or somatosensory data. While here we have focused on behavior rather than detailed biophysical implementation, it is worth noting that detecting surprise in neural spike trains does not require semantic understanding of the data carried by the spike trains, and thus could provide guiding signals during self-organization and development of sensory areas. At higher processing levels, top-down cues and task demands are known to combine with stimulus novelty in capturing attention and triggering learning [1, 38], ideas which may now be formalized and quantified in terms of priors, posteriors, and surprise. Surprise, indeed, inherently depends on uncertainty and on prior beliefs. Hence surprise theory can further be tested and utilized in experiments where the prior is biased, for ex- ample by top-down instructions or prior exposures to stimuli [38]. In addition, simple surprise-based behavioral measures such as the eye-tracking one used here may prove useful for early diagnostic of human conditions including autism and attention-deficit hyperactive disorder, as well as for quantitative comparison between humans and animals which may have lower or different priors, including monkeys, frogs, and flies. Beyond sensory biology, computable surprise could guide the development of data mining and compression systems (giving more bits to surprising regions of interest), to find surprising agents in crowds, surprising sentences in books or speeches, surprising sequences in genomes, surprising medical symptoms, surprising odors in airport luggage racks, surprising documents on the world-wide-web, or to design surprising advertisements. Acknowledgments: Supported by HFSP, NSF and NGA (L.I.), NIH and NSF (P.B.). 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3 0.6382252 173 nips-2005-Sensory Adaptation within a Bayesian Framework for Perception
Author: Alan Stocker, Eero P. Simoncelli
Abstract: We extend a previously developed Bayesian framework for perception to account for sensory adaptation. We first note that the perceptual effects of adaptation seems inconsistent with an adjustment of the internally represented prior distribution. Instead, we postulate that adaptation increases the signal-to-noise ratio of the measurements by adapting the operational range of the measurement stage to the input range. We show that this changes the likelihood function in such a way that the Bayesian estimator model can account for reported perceptual behavior. In particular, we compare the model’s predictions to human motion discrimination data and demonstrate that the model accounts for the commonly observed perceptual adaptation effects of repulsion and enhanced discriminability. 1 Motivation A growing number of studies support the notion that humans are nearly optimal when performing perceptual estimation tasks that require the combination of sensory observations with a priori knowledge. The Bayesian formulation of these problems defines the optimal strategy, and provides a principled yet simple computational framework for perception that can account for a large number of known perceptual effects and illusions, as demonstrated in sensorimotor learning [1], cue combination [2], or visual motion perception [3], just to name a few of the many examples. Adaptation is a fundamental phenomenon in sensory perception that seems to occur at all processing levels and modalities. A variety of computational principles have been suggested as explanations for adaptation. Many of these are based on the concept of maximizing the sensory information an observer can obtain about a stimulus despite limited sensory resources [4, 5, 6]. More mechanistically, adaptation can be interpreted as the attempt of the sensory system to adjusts its (limited) dynamic range such that it is maximally informative with respect to the statistics of the stimulus. A typical example is observed in the retina, which manages to encode light intensities that vary over nine orders of magnitude using ganglion cells whose dynamic range covers only two orders of magnitude. This is achieved by adapting to the local mean as well as higher order statistics of the visual input over short time-scales [7]. ∗ corresponding author. If a Bayesian framework is to provide a valid computational explanation of perceptual processes, then it needs to account for the behavior of a perceptual system, regardless of its adaptation state. In general, adaptation in a sensory estimation task seems to have two fundamental effects on subsequent perception: • Repulsion: The estimate of parameters of subsequent stimuli are repelled by those of the adaptor stimulus, i.e. the perceived values for the stimulus variable that is subject to the estimation task are more distant from the adaptor value after adaptation. This repulsive effect has been reported for perception of visual speed (e.g. [8, 9]), direction-of-motion [10], and orientation [11]. • Increased sensitivity: Adaptation increases the observer’s discrimination ability around the adaptor (e.g. for visual speed [12, 13]), however it also seems to decrease it further away from the adaptor as shown in the case of direction-of-motion discrimination [14]. In this paper, we show that these two perceptual effects can be explained within a Bayesian estimation framework of perception. Note that our description is at an abstract functional level - we do not attempt to provide a computational model for the underlying mechanisms responsible for adaptation, and this clearly separates this paper from other work which might seem at first glance similar [e.g., 15]. 2 Adaptive Bayesian estimator framework Suppose that an observer wants to estimate a property of a stimulus denoted by the variable θ, based on a measurement m. In general, the measurement can be vector-valued, and is corrupted by both internal and external noise. Hence, combining the noisy information gained by the measurement m with a priori knowledge about θ is advantageous. According to Bayes’ rule 1 p(θ|m) = p(m|θ)p(θ) . (1) α That is, the probability of stimulus value θ given m (posterior) is the product of the likelihood p(m|θ) of the particular measurement and the prior p(θ). The normalization constant α serves to ensure that the posterior is a proper probability distribution. Under the assumpˆ tion of a squared-error loss function, the optimal estimate θ(m) is the mean of the posterior, thus ∞ ˆ θ(m) = θ p(θ|m) dθ . (2) 0 ˆ Note that θ(m) describes an estimate for a single measurement m. As discussed in [16], the measurement will vary stochastically over the course of many exposures to the same stimulus, and thus the estimator will also vary. We return to this issue in Section 3.2. Figure 1a illustrates a Bayesian estimator, in which the shape of the (arbitrary) prior distribution leads on average to a shift of the estimate toward a lower value of θ than the true stimulus value θstim . The likelihood and the prior are the fundamental constituents of the Bayesian estimator model. Our goal is to describe how adaptation alters these constituents so as to account for the perceptual effects of repulsion and increased sensitivity. Adaptation does not change the prior ... An intuitively sensible hypothesis is that adaptation changes the prior distribution. Since the prior is meant to reflect the knowledge the observer has about the distribution of occurrences of the variable θ in the world, repeated viewing of stimuli with the same parameter a b probability probability attraction ! posterior likelihood prior modified prior à θ θ ˆ θ' θ θadapt Figure 1: Hypothetical model in which adaptation alters the prior distribution. a) Unadapted Bayesian estimation configuration in which the prior leads to a shift of the estimate ˆ θ, relative to the stimulus parameter θstim . Both the likelihood function and the prior distriˆ bution contribute to the exact value of the estimate θ (mean of the posterior). b) Adaptation acts by increasing the prior distribution around the value, θadapt , of the adapting stimulus ˆ parameter. Consequently, an subsequent estimate θ of the same stimulus parameter value θstim is attracted toward the adaptor. This is the opposite of observed perceptual effects, and we thus conclude that adjustments of the prior in a Bayesian model do not account for adaptation. value θadapt should presumably increase the prior probability in the vicinity of θadapt . Figure 1b schematically illustrates the effect of such a change in the prior distribution. The estimated (perceived) value of the parameter under the adapted condition is attracted to the adapting parameter value. In order to account for observed perceptual repulsion effects, the prior would have to decrease at the location of the adapting parameter, a behavior that seems fundamentally inconsistent with the notion of a prior distribution. ... but increases the reliability of the measurements Since a change in the prior distribution is not consistent with repulsion, we are led to the conclusion that adaptation must change the likelihood function. But why, and how should this occur? In order to answer this question, we reconsider the functional purpose of adaptation. We assume that adaptation acts to allocate more resources to the representation of the parameter values in the vicinity of the adaptor [4], resulting in a local increase in the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). This can be accomplished, for example, by dynamically adjusting the operational range to the statistics of the input. This kind of increased operational gain around the adaptor has been effectively demonstrated in the process of retinal adaptation [17]. In the context of our Bayesian estimator framework, and restricting to the simple case of a scalar-valued measurement, adaptation results in a narrower conditional probability density p(m|θ) in the immediate vicinity of the adaptor, thus an increase in the reliability of the measurement m. This is offset by a broadening of the conditional probability density p(m|θ) in the region beyond the adaptor vicinity (we assume that total resources are conserved, and thus an increase around the adaptor must necessarily lead to a decrease elsewhere). Figure 2 illustrates the effect of this local increase in signal-to-noise ratio on the likeli- unadapted adapted θadapt p(m2| θ )' 1/SNR θ θ θ1 θ2 θ1 p(m2|θ) θ2 θ m2 p(m1| θ )' m1 m m p(m1|θ) θ θ θ θadapt p(m| θ2)' p(m|θ2) likelihoods p(m|θ1) p(m| θ1)' p(m|θadapt )' conditionals Figure 2: Measurement noise, conditionals and likelihoods. The two-dimensional conditional density, p(m|θ), is shown as a grayscale image for both the unadapted and adapted cases. We assume here that adaptation increases the reliability (SNR) of the measurement around the parameter value of the adaptor. This is balanced by a decrease in SNR of the measurement further away from the adaptor. Because the likelihood is a function of θ (horizontal slices, shown plotted at right), this results in an asymmetric change in the likelihood that is in agreement with a repulsive effect on the estimate. a b ^ ∆θ ^ ∆θ [deg] + 0 60 30 0 -30 - θ θ adapt -60 -180 -90 90 θadapt 180 θ [deg] Figure 3: Repulsion: Model predictions vs. human psychophysics. a) Difference in perceived direction in the pre- and post-adaptation condition, as predicted by the model. Postadaptive percepts of motion direction are repelled away from the direction of the adaptor. b) Typical human subject data show a qualitatively similar repulsive effect. Data (and fit) are replotted from [10]. hood function. The two gray-scale images represent the conditional probability densities, p(m|θ), in the unadapted and the adapted state. They are formed by assuming additive noise on the measurement m of constant variance (unadapted) or with a variance that decreases symmetrically in the vicinity of the adaptor parameter value θadapt , and grows slightly in the region beyond. In the unadapted state, the likelihood is convolutional and the shape and variance are equivalent to the distribution of measurement noise. However, in the adapted state, because the likelihood is a function of θ (horizontal slice through the conditional surface) it is no longer convolutional around the adaptor. As a result, the mean is pushed away from the adaptor, as illustrated in the two graphs on the right. Assuming that the prior distribution is fairly smooth, this repulsion effect is transferred to the posterior distribution, and thus to the estimate. 3 Simulation Results We have qualitatively demonstrated that an increase in the measurement reliability around the adaptor is consistent with the repulsive effects commonly seen as a result of perceptual adaptation. In this section, we simulate an adapted Bayesian observer by assuming a simple model for the changes in signal-to-noise ratio due to adaptation. We address both repulsion and changes in discrimination threshold. In particular, we compare our model predictions with previously published data from psychophysical experiments examining human perception of motion direction. 3.1 Repulsion In the unadapted state, we assume the measurement noise to be additive and normally distributed, and constant over the whole measurement space. Thus, assuming that m and θ live in the same space, the likelihood is a Gaussian of constant width. In the adapted state, we assume a simple functional description for the variance of the measurement noise around the adapter. Specifically, we use a constant plus a difference of two Gaussians, a b relative discrimination threshold relative discrimination threshold 1.8 1 θ θadapt 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 -40 -20 θ adapt 20 40 θ [deg] Figure 4: Discrimination thresholds: Model predictions vs. human psychophysics. a) The model predicts that thresholds for direction discrimination are reduced at the adaptor. It also predicts two side-lobes of increased threshold at further distance from the adaptor. b) Data of human psychophysics are in qualitative agreement with the model. Data are replotted from [14] (see also [11]). each having equal area, with one twice as broad as the other (see Fig. 2). Finally, for simplicity, we assume a flat prior, but any reasonable smooth prior would lead to results that are qualitatively similar. Then, according to (2) we compute the predicted estimate of motion direction in both the unadapted and the adapted case. Figure 3a shows the predicted difference between the pre- and post-adaptive average estimate of direction, as a function of the stimulus direction, θstim . The adaptor is indicated with an arrow. The repulsive effect is clearly visible. For comparison, Figure 3b shows human subject data replotted from [10]. The perceived motion direction of a grating was estimated, under both adapted and unadapted conditions, using a two-alternative-forced-choice experimental paradigm. The plot shows the change in perceived direction as a function of test stimulus direction relative to that of the adaptor. Comparison of the two panels of Figure 3 indicate that despite the highly simplified construction of the model, the prediction is quite good, and even includes the small but consistent repulsive effects observed 180 degrees from the adaptor. 3.2 Changes in discrimination threshold Adaptation also changes the ability of human observers to discriminate between the direction of two different moving stimuli. In order to model discrimination thresholds, we need to consider a Bayesian framework that can account not only for the mean of the estimate but also its variability. We have recently developed such a framework, and used it to quantitatively constrain the likelihood and the prior from psychophysical data [16]. This framework accounts for the effect of the measurement noise on the variability of the ˆ ˆ estimate θ. Specifically, it provides a characterization of the distribution p(θ|θstim ) of the estimate for a given stimulus direction in terms of its expected value and its variance as a function of the measurement noise. As in [16] we write ˆ ∂ θ(m) 2 ˆ var θ|θstim = var m ( ) |m=θstim . (3) ∂m Assuming that discrimination threshold is proportional to the standard deviation, ˆ var θ|θstim , we can now predict how discrimination thresholds should change after adaptation. Figure 4a shows the predicted change in discrimination thresholds relative to the unadapted condition for the same model parameters as in the repulsion example (Figure 3a). Thresholds are slightly reduced at the adaptor, but increase symmetrically for directions further away from the adaptor. For comparison, Figure 4b shows the relative change in discrimination thresholds for a typical human subject [14]. Again, the behavior of the human observer is qualitatively well predicted. 4 Discussion We have shown that adaptation can be incorporated into a Bayesian estimation framework for human sensory perception. Adaptation seems unlikely to manifest itself as a change in the internal representation of prior distributions, as this would lead to perceptual bias effects that are opposite to those observed in human subjects. Instead, we argue that adaptation leads to an increase in reliability of the measurement in the vicinity of the adapting stimulus parameter. We show that this change in the measurement reliability results in changes of the likelihood function, and that an estimator that utilizes this likelihood function will exhibit the commonly-observed adaptation effects of repulsion and changes in discrimination threshold. We further confirm our model by making quantitative predictions and comparing them with known psychophysical data in the case of human perception of motion direction. Many open questions remain. The results demonstrated here indicate that a resource allocation explanation is consistent with the functional effects of adaptation, but it seems unlikely that theory alone can lead to a unique quantitative prediction of the detailed form of these effects. Specifically, the constraints imposed by biological implementation are likely to play a role in determining the changes in measurement noise as a function of adaptor parameter value, and it will be important to characterize and interpret neural response changes in the context of our framework. Also, although we have argued that changes in the prior seem inconsistent with adaptation effects, it may be that such changes do occur but are offset by the likelihood effect, or occur only on much longer timescales. Last, if one considers sensory perception as the result of a cascade of successive processing stages (with both feedforward and feedback connections), it becomes necessary to expand the Bayesian description to describe this cascade [e.g., 18, 19]. For example, it may be possible to interpret this cascade as a sequence of Bayesian estimators, in which the measurement of each stage consists of the estimate computed at the previous stage. Adaptation could potentially occur in each of these processing stages, and it is of fundamental interest to understand how such a cascade can perform useful stable computations despite the fact that each of its elements is constantly readjusting its response properties. References [1] K. K¨ rding and D. Wolpert. Bayesian integration in sensorimotor learning. o 427(15):244–247, January 2004. Nature, [2] D C Knill and W Richards, editors. Perception as Bayesian Inference. Cambridge University Press, 1996. [3] Y. Weiss, E. Simoncelli, and E. Adelson. Motion illusions as optimal percept. Nature Neuroscience, 5(6):598–604, June 2002. [4] H.B. Barlow. Vision: Coding and Efficiency, chapter A theory about the functional role and synaptic mechanism of visual after-effects, pages 363–375. Cambridge University Press., 1990. [5] M.J. Wainwright. Visual adaptation as optimal information transmission. Vision Research, 39:3960–3974, 1999. [6] N. Brenner, W. Bialek, and R. de Ruyter van Steveninck. Adaptive rescaling maximizes information transmission. Neuron, 26:695–702, June 2000. [7] S.M. Smirnakis, M.J. Berry, D.K. Warland, W. Bialek, and M. Meister. Adaptation of retinal processing to image contrast and spatial scale. Nature, 386:69–73, March 1997. [8] P. Thompson. Velocity after-effects: the effects of adaptation to moving stimuli on the perception of subsequently seen moving stimuli. Vision Research, 21:337–345, 1980. [9] A.T. Smith. Velocity coding: evidence from perceived velocity shifts. Vision Research, 25(12):1969–1976, 1985. [10] P. Schrater and E. Simoncelli. Local velocity representation: evidence from motion adaptation. Vision Research, 38:3899–3912, 1998. [11] C.W. Clifford. Perceptual adaptation: motion parallels orientation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(3):136–143, March 2002. [12] C. Clifford and P. Wenderoth. Adaptation to temporal modulaton can enhance differential speed sensitivity. Vision Research, 39:4324–4332, 1999. [13] A. Kristjansson. Increased sensitivity to speed changes during adaptation to first-order, but not to second-order motion. Vision Research, 41:1825–1832, 2001. [14] R.E. Phinney, C. Bowd, and R. Patterson. Direction-selective coding of stereoscopic (cyclopean) motion. Vision Research, 37(7):865–869, 1997. [15] N.M. Grzywacz and R.M. Balboa. A Bayesian framework for sensory adaptation. Neural Computation, 14:543–559, 2002. [16] A.A. Stocker and E.P. Simoncelli. Constraining a Bayesian model of human visual speed perception. In Lawrence K. Saul, Yair Weiss, and L´ on Bottou, editors, Advances in Neural Infore mation Processing Systems NIPS 17, pages 1361–1368, Cambridge, MA, 2005. MIT Press. [17] D. Tranchina, J. Gordon, and R.M. Shapley. Retinal light adaptation – evidence for a feedback mechanism. Nature, 310:314–316, July 1984. ´ [18] S. Deneve. Bayesian inference in spiking neurons. In Lawrence K. Saul, Yair Weiss, and L eon Bottou, editors, Adv. Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS*04), vol 17, Cambridge, MA, 2005. MIT Press. [19] R. Rao. Hierarchical Bayesian inference in networks of spiking neurons. In Lawrence K. Saul, Yair Weiss, and L´ on Bottou, editors, Adv. Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS*04), e vol 17, Cambridge, MA, 2005. MIT Press.
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These balance problems, which occur even though the spectral method’s quotient-style objective function does encourage balance, can be fixed with a stricter balance constraint that turns the spectral mathematical program into an SDP that can be solved for million-node graphs by a method of Burer and Monteiro. 1 Background Graph partitioning is the NP-hard problem of finding a small graph cut subject to the constraint that neither side of the resulting partitioning of the nodes is “too small”. We will be dealing with several versions: the graph bisection problem, which requires perfect 1 : 1 2 2 balance; the β-balanced cut problem (with β a fraction such as 1 ), which requires at least 3 β : (1 − β) balance; and the quotient cut problem, which requires the small side to be large enough to “pay for” the edges in the cut. The quotient cut metric is c/ min(a, b), where c is the cutsize and a and b are the sizes of the two sides of the cut. All of the well-known variants of the quotient cut metric (e.g. normalized cut [15]) have similar behavior with respect to the issues discussed in this paper. The spectral method for graph partitioning was introduced in 1973 by Fiedler and Donath & Hoffman [6]. In the mid-1980’s Alon & Milman [1] proved that spectral cuts can be at worst quadratically bad; in the mid 1990’s Guattery & Miller [10] proved that this analysis is tight by exhibiting a family of n-node graphs whose spectral bisections cut O(n 2/3 ) edges versus the optimal O(n1/3 ) edges. On the other hand, Spielman & Teng [16] have proved stronger performance guarantees for the special case of spacelike graphs. The spectral method can be derived by relaxing a quadratic integer program which encodes the graph bisection problem (see section 3.1). The solution to this relaxation is the “Fiedler vector”, or second smallest eigenvector of the graph’s discrete Laplacian matrix, whose elements xi can be interpreted as an embedding of the graph on the line. To obtain a (A) Graph with nearly balanced 8-cut (B) Spectral Embedding (C) Notional Flow-based Embedding Figure 1: The spectral embedding hides the best solution from hyperplane rounding. specific cut, one must apply a “rounding method” to this embedding. The hyperplane rounding method chooses one of the n − 1 cuts which separate the nodes whose x i values lie above and below some split value x. ˆ 2 Using flow to find cuts that are hidden from hyperplane rounding Theorists have long known that the spectral method cannot distinguish between deep cuts and long paths, and that this confusion can cause it to cut a graph in the wrong direction thereby producing the spectral method’s worst-case behavior [10]. In this section we will show by example that even when the spectral method is not fooled into cutting in the wrong direction, the resulting embedding can hide the best cuts from the hyperplane rounding method. This is a possible explanation for the frequently made empirical observation (see e.g. [12]) that hyperplane roundings of spectral embeddings are noisy and therefore benefit from cleanup with a local search method such as Fiduccia-Matheyses [8]. Consider the graph in figure 1(a), which has a near-bisection cutting 8 edges. For this graph the spectral method produces the embedding shown in figure 1(b), and recommends that we make a vertical cut (across the horizontal dimension which is based on the Fiedler vector). This is correct in a generalized sense, but it is obvious that no hyperplane (or vertical line in this picture) can possibly extract the optimal 8-edge cut. Some insight into why spectral embeddings tend to have this problem can be obtained from the spectral method’s electrical interpretation. In this view the graph is represented by a resistor network [7]. Current flowing in this network causes voltage drops across the resistors, thus determining the nodes’ voltages and hence their positions. When current flows through a long series of resistors, it induces a progressive voltage drop. This is what causes the excessive length of the embeddings of the horizontal girder-like structures which are blocking all vertical hyperplane cuts in figure 1(b). If the embedding method were somehow not based on current, but rather on flow, which does not distinguish between a pipe and a series of pipes, then the long girders could retract into the two sides of the embedding, as suggested by figure 1(c), and the best cut would be revealed. Because theoretical flow-like embedding methods such as [14] are currently not practical, we point out that in cases like figure 1(b), where the spectral method has not chosen an incorrect direction for the cut, one can use an S-T max flow problem with the flow running in the recommended direction (horizontally for this embedding) to extract the good cut even though it is hidden from all hyperplanes. We currently use two different flow-based rounding methods. A method called MQI looks for quotient cuts, and is already described in [13]. Another method, that we shall call Midflow, looks for β-balanced cuts. The input to Midflow is a graph and an ordering of its nodes (obtained e.g. from a spectral embedding or from the projection of any embedding onto a line). We divide the graph’s nodes into 3 sets F, L, and U. The sets F and L respectively contain the first βn and last βn nodes in the ordering, and U contains the remaining 50-50 balance ng s ro un di Hy pe r pl an e neg-pos split quotient cut score (cutsize / size of small side) 0.01 ctor r ve iedle of F 0.004 0.003 0.00268 0.00232 Best hyperplane rounding of Fiedler Vector Best improvement with local search 0.002 0.00138 0.001 60000 80000 Midflow rounding beta = 1/4 100000 120000 0.00145 140000 Midflow rounding of Fiedler Vector beta = 1/3 160000 180000 200000 220000 240000 number of nodes on ’left’ side of cut (out of 324800) Figure 2: A typical example (see section 2.1) where flow-based rounding beats hyperplane rounding, even when the hyperplane cuts are improved with Fiduccia-Matheyses search. Note that for this spacelike graph, the best quotient cuts have reasonably good balance. U = n − 2βn nodes, which are “up for grabs”. We set up an S-T max flow problem with one node for every graph node plus 2 new nodes for the source and sink. For each graph edge there are two arcs, one in each direction, with unit capacity. Finally, the nodes in F are pinned to the source and the nodes in L are pinned to sink by infinite capacity arcs. This max-flow problem can be solved by a good implementation of the push-relabel algorithm (such as Goldberg and Cherkassky’s hi pr [4]) in time that empirically is nearly linear with a very good constant factor. Figure 6 shows that solving a MidFlow problem with hi pr can be 1000 times cheaper than finding a spectral embedding with ARPACK. When the goal is finding good β-balanced cuts, MidFlow rounding is strictly more powerful than hyperplane rounding; from a given node ordering hyperplane rounding chooses the best of U + 1 candidate cuts, while MidFlow rounding chooses the best of 2U candidates, including all of those considered by hyperplane rounding. [Similarly, MQI rounding is strictly more powerful than hyperplane rounding for the task of finding good quotient cuts.] 2.1 A concrete example The plot in figure 2 shows a number of cuts in a 324,800 node nearly planar graph derived from a 700x464 pixel downward-looking view of some clouds over some mountains.1 The y-axis of the plot is quotient cut score; smaller values are better. We note in passing that the commonly used split point x = 0 does not yield the best hyperplane cut. Our main ˆ point is that the two cuts generated by MidFlow rounding of the Fiedler vector (with β = 1 3 and β = 1 ) are nearly twice as good as the best hyperplane cut. Even after the best 4 hyperplane cut has been improved by taking the best result of 100 runs of a version of Fiduccia-Matheyses local search, it is still much worse than the cuts obtained by flowbased rounding. 1 The graph’s edges are unweighted but are chosen by a randomized rule which is more likely to include an edge between two neighboring pixels if they have a similar grey value. Good cuts in the graph tend to run along discontinuities in the image, as one would expect. quotient cut score 1 SDP-LB (smaller is better) 0.1 Scatter plot showing cuts in a
same-paper 3 0.91625321 156 nips-2005-Prediction and Change Detection
Author: Mark Steyvers, Scott Brown
Abstract: We measure the ability of human observers to predict the next datum in a sequence that is generated by a simple statistical process undergoing change at random points in time. Accurate performance in this task requires the identification of changepoints. We assess individual differences between observers both empirically, and using two kinds of models: a Bayesian approach for change detection and a family of cognitively plausible fast and frugal models. Some individuals detect too many changes and hence perform sub-optimally due to excess variability. Other individuals do not detect enough changes, and perform sub-optimally because they fail to notice short-term temporal trends. 1 Intr oduction Decision-making often requires a rapid response to change. For example, stock analysts need to quickly detect changes in the market in order to adjust investment strategies. Coaches need to track changes in a player’s performance in order to adjust strategy. When tracking changes, there are costs involved when either more or less changes are observed than actually occurred. For example, when using an overly conservative change detection criterion, a stock analyst might miss important short-term trends and interpret them as random fluctuations instead. On the other hand, a change may also be detected too readily. For example, in basketball, a player who makes a series of consecutive baskets is often identified as a “hot hand” player whose underlying ability is perceived to have suddenly increased [1,2]. This might lead to sub-optimal passing strategies, based on random fluctuations. We are interested in explaining individual differences in a sequential prediction task. Observers are shown stimuli generated from a simple statistical process with the task of predicting the next datum in the sequence. The latent parameters of the statistical process change discretely at random points in time. Performance in this task depends on the accurate detection of those changepoints, as well as inference about future outcomes based on the outcomes that followed the most recent inferred changepoint. There is much prior research in statistics on the problem of identifying changepoints [3,4,5]. In this paper, we adopt a Bayesian approach to the changepoint identification problem and develop a simple inference procedure to predict the next datum in a sequence. The Bayesian model serves as an ideal observer model and is useful to characterize the ways in which individuals deviate from optimality. The plan of the paper is as follows. We first introduce the sequential prediction task and discuss a Bayesian analysis of this prediction problem. We then discuss the results from a few individuals in this prediction task and show how the Bayesian approach can capture individual differences with a single “twitchiness” parameter that describes how readily changes are perceived in random sequences. We will show that some individuals are too twitchy: their performance is too variable because they base their predictions on too little of the recent data. Other individuals are not twitchy enough, and they fail to capture fast changes in the data. We also show how behavior can be explained with a set of fast and frugal models [6]. These are cognitively realistic models that operate under plausible computational constraints. 2 A pr ediction task wit h m ult iple c hange points In the prediction task, stimuli are presented sequentially and the task is to predict the next stimulus in the sequence. After t trials, the observer has been presented with stimuli y1, y2, …, yt and the task is to make a prediction about yt+1. After the prediction is made, the actual outcome yt+1 is revealed and the next trial proceeds to the prediction of yt+2. This procedure starts with y1 and is repeated for T trials. The observations yt are D-dimensional vectors with elements sampled from binomial distributions. The parameters of those distributions change discretely at random points in time such that the mean increases or decreases after a change point. This generates a sequence of observation vectors, y1, y2, …, yT, where each yt = {yt,1 … yt,D}. Each of the yt,d is sampled from a binomial distribution Bin(θt,d,K), so 0 ≤ yt,d ≤ K. The parameter vector θt ={θt,1 … θt,D} changes depending on the locations of the changepoints. At each time step, xt is a binary indicator for the occurrence of a changepoint occurring at time t+1. The parameter α determines the probability of a change occurring in the sequence. The generative model is specified by the following algorithm: 1. For d=1..D sample θ1,d from a Uniform(0,1) distribution 2. For t=2..T, (a) Sample xt-1 from a Bernoulli(α) distribution (b) If xt-1=0, then θt=θt-1, else for d=1..D sample θt,d from a Uniform(0,1) distribution (c) for d=1..D, sample yt from a Bin(θt,d,K) distribution Table 1 shows some data generated from the changepoint model with T=20, α=.1,and D=1. In the prediction task, y will be observed, but x and θ are not. Table 1: Example data t x θ y 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 .68 .68 .68 .68 .48 .48 .48 .74 .74 .74 .74 .74 .74 .19 .19 .87 .87 .87 .87 .87 9 7 8 7 4 4 4 9 8 3 6 7 8 2 1 8 9 9 8 8 3 A Bayesian pr ediction m ode l In both our Bayesian and fast-and-frugal analyses, the prediction task is decomposed into two inference procedures. First, the changepoint locations are identified. This is followed by predictive inference for the next outcome based on the most recent changepoint locations. Several Bayesian approaches have been developed for changepoint problems involving single or multiple changepoints [3,5]. We apply a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) analysis to approximate the joint posterior distribution over changepoint assignments x while integrating out θ. Gibbs sampling will be used to sample from this posterior marginal distribution. The samples can then be used to predict the next outcome in the sequence. 3.1 I n f e r e nc e f o r c h a n g e p o i n t a s s i g n m e n t s . To apply Gibbs sampling, we evaluate the conditional probability of assigning a changepoint at time i, given all other changepoint assignments and the current α value. By integrating out θ, the conditional probability is P ( xi | x−i , y, α ) = ∫ P ( xi ,θ , α | x− i , y ) (1) θ where x− i represents all switch point assignments except xi. This can be simplified by considering the location of the most recent changepoint preceding and following time i and the outcomes occurring between these locations. Let niL be the number of time steps from the last changepoint up to and including the current time step i such that xi − nL =1 and xi − nL + j =0 for 0 < niL . Similarly, let niR be the number of time steps that i i follow time step i up to the next changepoint such that xi + n R =1 and xi + nR − j =0 for i R i 0 < n . Let y = L i ∑ i − niL < k ≤ i i yk and y = ∑ k < k ≤i + n R yk . The update equation for the R i i changepoint assignment can then be simplified to P ( xi = m | x−i ) ∝ ( ) ( ( ) D Γ 1 + y L + y R Γ 1 + Kn L + Kn R − y L − y R ⎧ i, j i, j i i i, j i, j ⎪ (1 − α ) ∏ L R Γ 2 + Kni + Kni ⎪ j =1 ⎪ ⎨ L L L R R R ⎪ D Γ 1 + yi, j Γ 1 + Kni − yi, j Γ 1 + yi, j Γ 1 + Kni − yi, j α∏ ⎪ Γ 2 + KniL Γ 2 + KniR ⎪ j =1 ⎩ ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ) m=0 ) (2) m =1 We initialize the Gibbs sampler by sampling each xt from a Bernoulli(α) distribution. All changepoint assignments are then updated sequentially by the Gibbs sampling equation above. The sampler is run for M iterations after which one set of changepoint assignments is saved. The Gibbs sampler is then restarted multiple times until S samples have been collected. Although we could have included an update equation for α, in this analysis we treat α as a known constant. This will be useful when characterizing the differences between human observers in terms of differences in α. 3.2 P r e d i c ti v e i n f er e n ce The next latent parameter value θt+1 and outcome yt+1 can be predicted on the basis of observed outcomes that occurred after the last inferred changepoint: θ t+1, j = t ∑ i =t* +1 yt+1, j = round (θt +1, j K ) yi, j / K , (3) where t* is the location of the most recent change point. By considering multiple Gibbs samples, we get a distribution over outcomes yt+1. We base the model predictions on the mean of this distribution. 3.3 I l l u s t r a t i o n o f m o d e l p er f o r m a n c e Figure 1 illustrates the performance of the model on a one dimensional sequence (D=1) generated from the changepoint model with T=160, α=0.05, and K=10. The Gibbs sampler was run for M=30 iterations and S=200 samples were collected. The top panel shows the actual changepoints (triangles) and the distribution of changepoint assignments averaged over samples. The bottom panel shows the observed data y (thin lines) as well as the θ values in the generative model (rescaled between 0 and 10). At locations with large changes between observations, the marginal changepoint probability is quite high. At other locations, the true change in the mean is very small, and the model is less likely to put in a changepoint. The lower right panel shows the distribution over predicted θt+1 values. xt 1 0.5 0 yt 10 1 5 θt+1 0.5 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 0 Figure 1. Results of model simulation. 4 Prediction experiment We tested performance of 9 human observers in the prediction task. The observers included the authors, a visitor, and one student who were aware of the statistical nature of the task as well as naïve students. The observers were seated in front of an LCD touch screen displaying a two-dimensional grid of 11 x 11 buttons. The changepoint model was used to generate a sequence of T=1500 stimuli for two binomial variables y1 and y2 (D=2, K=10). The change probability α was set to 0.1. The two variables y1 and y2 specified the two-dimensional button location. The same sequence was used for all observers. On each trial, the observer touched a button on the grid displayed on the touch screen. Following each button press, the button corresponding to the next {y1,y2} outcome in the sequence was highlighted. Observers were instructed to press the button that best predicted the next location of the highlighted button. The 1500 trials were divided into three blocks of 500 trials. Breaks were allowed between blocks. The whole experiment lasted between 15 and 30 minutes. Figure 2 shows the first 50 trials from the third block of the experiment. The top and bottom panels show the actual outcomes for the y1 and y2 button grid coordinates as well as the predictions for two observers (SB and MY). The figure shows that at trial 15, the y1 and y2 coordinates show a large shift followed by an immediate shift in observer’s MY predictions (on trial 16). Observer SB waits until trial 17 to make a shift. 10 5 0 outcomes SB predictions MY predictions 10 5 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 Trial 30 35 40 45 50 Figure 2. Trial by trial predictions from two observers. 4.1 T a s k er r o r We assessed prediction performance by comparing the prediction with the actual outcome in the sequence. Task error was measured by normalized city-block distance T 1 (4) task error= ∑ yt ,1 − ytO,1 + yt ,2 − ytO,2 (T − 1) t =2 where yO represents the observer’s prediction. Note that the very first trial is excluded from this calculation. Even though more suitable probabilistic measures for prediction error could have been adopted, we wanted to allow comparison of observer’s performance with both probabilistic and non-probabilistic models. Task error ranged from 2.8 (for participant MY) to 3.3 (for ML). We also assessed the performance of five models – their task errors ranged from 2.78 to 3.20. The Bayesian models (Section 3) had the lowest task errors, just below 2.8. This fits with our definition of the Bayesian models as “ideal observer” models – their task error is lower than any other model’s and any human observer’s task error. The fast and frugal models (Section 5) had task errors ranging from 2.85 to 3.20. 5 Modeling R esults We will refer to the models with the following letter codes: B=Bayesian Model, LB=limited Bayesian model, FF1..3=fast and frugal models 1..3. We assessed model fit by comparing the model’s prediction against the human observers’ predictions, again using a normalized city-block distance model error= T 1 ∑ ytM − ytO,1 + ytM − ytO,2 ,1 ,2 (T − 1) t=2 (5) where yM represents the model’s prediction. The model error for each individual observer is shown in Figure 3. It is important to note that because each model is associated with a set of free parameters, the parameters optimized for task error and model error are different. For Figure 3, the parameters were optimized to minimize Equation (5) for each individual observer, showing the extent to which these models can capture the performance of individual observers, not necessarily providing the best task performance. B LB FF1 FF2 MY MS MM EJ FF3 Model Error 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 PH NP DN SB ML 1 Figure 3. Model error for each individual observer. 5.1 B ay e s i a n p re d i ct i o n m o d e l s At each trial t, the model was provided with the sequence of all previous outcomes. The Gibbs sampling and inference procedures from Eq. (2) and (3) were applied with M=30 iterations and S=200 samples. The change probability α was a free parameter. In the full Bayesian model, the whole sequence of observations up to the current trial is available for prediction, leading to a memory requirement of up to T=1500 trials – a psychologically unreasonable assumption. We therefore also simulated a limited Bayesian model (LB) where the observed sequence was truncated to the last 10 outcomes. The LB model showed almost no decrement in task performance compared to the full Bayesian model. Figure 3 also shows that it fit human data quite well. 5.2 I n d i v i d u a l D i f f er e nc e s The right-hand panel of Figure 4 plots each observer’s task error as a function of the mean city-block distance between their subsequent button presses. This shows a clear U-shaped function. Observers with very variable predictions (e.g., ML and DN) had large average changes between successive button pushes, and also had large task error: These observers were too “twitchy”. Observers with very small average button changes (e.g., SB and NP) were not twitchy enough, and also had large task error. Observers in the middle had the lowest task error (e.g., MS and MY). The left-hand panel of Figure 4 shows the same data, but with the x-axis based on the Bayesian model fits. Instead of using mean button change distance to index twitchiness (as in 1 Error bars indicate bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. the right-hand panel), the left-hand panel uses the estimated α parameters from the Bayesian model. A similar U-shaped pattern is observed: individuals with too large or too small α estimates have large task errors. 3.3 DN 3.2 Task Error ML SB 3.2 NP 3.1 Task Error 3.3 PH EJ 3 MM MS MY 2.9 2.8 10 -4 10 -3 10 -2 DN NP 3.1 3 PH EJ MM MS 2.9 B ML SB MY 2.8 10 -1 10 0 0.5 1 α 1.5 2 Mean Button Change 2.5 3 Figure 4. Task error vs. “twitchiness”. Left-hand panel indexes twitchiness using estimated α parameters from Bayesian model fits. Right-hand panel uses mean distance between successive predictions. 5.3 F a s t - a n d - F r u g a l ( F F ) p r e d ic t i o n m o d e l s These models perform the prediction task using simple heuristics that are cognitively plausible. The FF models keep a short memory of previous stimulus values and make predictions using the same two-step process as the Bayesian model. First, a decision is made as to whether the latent parameter θ has changed. Second, remembered stimulus values that occurred after the most recently detected changepoint are used to generate the next prediction. A simple heuristic is used to detect changepoints: If the distance between the most recent observation and prediction is greater than some threshold amount, a change is inferred. We defined the distance between a prediction (p) and an observation (y) as the difference between the log-likelihoods of y assuming θ=p and θ=y. Thus, if fB(.|θ, K) is the binomial density with parameters θ and K, the distance between observation y and prediction p is defined as d(y,p)=log(fB(y|y,K))-log(fB(y|p,K)). A changepoint on time step t+1 is inferred whenever d(yt,pt)>C. The parameter C governs the twitchiness of the model predictions. If C is large, only very dramatic changepoints will be detected, and the model will be too conservative. If C is small, the model will be too twitchy, and will detect changepoints on the basis of small random fluctuations. Predictions are based on the most recent M observations, which are kept in memory, unless a changepoint has been detected in which case only those observations occurring after the changepoint are used for prediction. The prediction for time step t+1 is simply the mean of these observations, say p. Human observers were reticent to make predictions very close to the boundaries. This was modeled by allowing the FF model to change its prediction for the next time step, yt+1, towards the mean prediction (0.5). This change reflects a two-way bet. If the probability of a change occurring is α, the best guess will be 0.5 if that change occurs, or the mean p if the change does not occur. Thus, the prediction made is actually yt+1=1/2 α+(1-α)p. Note that we do not allow perfect knowledge of the probability of a changepoint, α. Instead, an estimated value of α is used based on the number of changepoints detected in the data series up to time t. The FF model nests two simpler FF models that are psychologically interesting. If the twitchiness threshold parameter C becomes arbitrarily large, the model never detects a change and instead becomes a continuous running average model. Predictions from this model are simply a boxcar smooth of the data. Alternatively, if we assume no memory the model must based each prediction on only the previous stimulus (i.e., M=1). Above, in Figure 3, we labeled the complete FF model as FF1, the boxcar model as FF2 and the memoryless model FF3. Figure 3 showed that the complete FF model (FF1) fit the data from all observers significantly better than either the boxcar model (FF2) or the memoryless model (FF3). Exceptions were observers PH, DN and ML, for whom all three FF model fit equally well. This result suggests that our observers were (mostly) doing more than just keeping a running average of the data, or using only the most recent observation. The FF1 model fit the data about as well as the Bayesian models for all observers except MY and MS. Note that, in general, the FF1 and Bayesian model fits are very good: the average city block distance between the human data and the model prediction is around 0.75 (out of 10) buttons on both the x- and y-axes. 6 C onclusion We used an online prediction task to study changepoint detection. Human observers had to predict the next observation in stochastic sequences containing random changepoints. We showed that some observers are too “twitchy”: They perform poorly on the prediction task because they see changes where only random fluctuation exists. Other observers are not twitchy enough, and they perform poorly because they fail to see small changes. We developed a Bayesian changepoint detection model that performed the task optimally, and also provided a good fit to human data when sub-optimal parameter settings were used. Finally, we developed a fast-and-frugal model that showed how participants may be able to perform well at the task using minimal information and simple decision heuristics. Acknowledgments We thank Eric-Jan Wagenmakers and Mike Yi for useful discussions related to this work. This work was supported in part by a grant from the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR grant number FA9550-04-1-0317). R e f er e n ce s [1] Gilovich, T., Vallone, R. and Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: on the misperception of random sequences. Cognitive Psychology17, 295-314. [2] Albright, S.C. (1993a). A statistical analysis of hitting streaks in baseball. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88, 1175-1183. [3] Stephens, D.A. (1994). Bayesian retrospective multiple changepoint identification. Applied Statistics 43(1), 159-178. [4] Carlin, B.P., Gelfand, A.E., & Smith, A.F.M. (1992). Hierarchical Bayesian analysis of changepoint problems. Applied Statistics 41(2), 389-405. [5] Green, P.J. (1995). Reversible jump Markov chain Monte Carlo computation and Bayesian model determination. Biometrika 82(4), 711-732. [6] Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D.G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650-669.
4 0.9004851 186 nips-2005-TD(0) Leads to Better Policies than Approximate Value Iteration
Author: Benjamin V. Roy
Abstract: We consider approximate value iteration with a parameterized approximator in which the state space is partitioned and the optimal cost-to-go function over each partition is approximated by a constant. We establish performance loss bounds for policies derived from approximations associated with fixed points. These bounds identify benefits to having projection weights equal to the invariant distribution of the resulting policy. Such projection weighting leads to the same fixed points as TD(0). Our analysis also leads to the first performance loss bound for approximate value iteration with an average cost objective. 1 Preliminaries Consider a discrete-time communicating Markov decision process (MDP) with a finite state space S = {1, . . . , |S|}. At each state x ∈ S, there is a finite set Ux of admissible actions. If the current state is x and an action u ∈ Ux is selected, a cost of gu (x) is incurred, and the system transitions to a state y ∈ S with probability pxy (u). For any x ∈ S and u ∈ Ux , y∈S pxy (u) = 1. Costs are discounted at a rate of α ∈ (0, 1) per period. Each instance of such an MDP is defined by a quintuple (S, U, g, p, α). A (stationary deterministic) policy is a mapping µ that assigns an action u ∈ Ux to each state x ∈ S. If actions are selected based on a policy µ, the state follows a Markov process with transition matrix Pµ , where each (x, y)th entry is equal to pxy (µ(x)). The restriction to communicating MDPs ensures that it is possible to reach any state from any other state. Each policy µ is associated with a cost-to-go function Jµ ∈ |S| , defined by Jµ = ∞ t t −1 gµ , where, with some abuse of notation, gµ (x) = gµ(x) (x) t=0 α Pµ gµ = (I − αPµ ) for each x ∈ S. A policy µ is said to be greedy with respect to a function J if µ(x) ∈ argmin(gu (x) + α y∈S pxy (u)J(y)) for all x ∈ S. u∈Ux The optimal cost-to-go function J ∗ ∈ |S| is defined by J ∗ (x) = minµ Jµ (x), for all x ∈ S. A policy µ∗ is said to be optimal if Jµ∗ = J ∗ . It is well-known that an optimal policy exists. Further, a policy µ∗ is optimal if and only if it is greedy with respect to J ∗ . Hence, given the optimal cost-to-go function, optimal actions can computed be minimizing the right-hand side of the above inclusion. Value iteration generates a sequence J converging to J ∗ according to J +1 = T J , where T is the dynamic programming operator, defined by (T J)(x) = minu∈Ux (gu (x) + α y∈S pxy (u)J(y)), for all x ∈ S and J ∈ |S| . This sequence converges to J ∗ for any initialization of J0 . 2 Approximate Value Iteration The state spaces of relevant MDPs are typically so large that computation and storage of a cost-to-go function is infeasible. One approach to dealing with this obstacle involves partitioning the state space S into a manageable number K of disjoint subsets S1 , . . . , SK and approximating the optimal cost-to-go function with a function that is constant over each partition. This can be thought of as a form of state aggregation – all states within a given partition are assumed to share a common optimal cost-to-go. To represent an approximation, we define a matrix Φ ∈ |S|×K such that each kth column is an indicator function for the kth partition Sk . Hence, for any r ∈ K , k, and x ∈ Sk , (Φr)(x) = rk . In this paper, we study variations of value iteration, each of which computes a vector r so that Φr approximates J ∗ . The use of such a policy µr which is greedy with respect to Φr is justified by the following result (see [10] for a proof): ˜ Theorem 1 If µ is a greedy policy with respect to a function J ∈ Jµ − J ∗ ≤ ∞ 2α ˜ J∗ − J 1−α |S| then ∞. One common way of approximating a function J ∈ |S| with a function of the form Φr involves projection with respect to a weighted Euclidean norm · π . The weighted Euclidean 1/2 |S| 2 norm: J 2,π = . Here, π ∈ + is a vector of weights that assign x∈S π(x)J (x) relative emphasis among states. The projection Ππ J is the function Φr that attains the minimum of J −Φr 2,π ; if there are multiple functions Φr that attain the minimum, they must form an affine space, and the projection is taken to be the one with minimal norm Φr 2,π . Note that in our context, where each kth column of Φ represents an indicator function for the kth partition, for any π, J, and x ∈ Sk , (Ππ J)(x) = y∈Sk π(y)J(y)/ y∈Sk π(y). Approximate value iteration begins with a function Φr(0) and generates a sequence according to Φr( +1) = Ππ T Φr( ) . It is well-known that the dynamic programming operator T is a contraction mapping with respect to the maximum norm. Further, Ππ is maximum-norm nonexpansive [16, 7, 8]. (This is not true for general Φ, but is true in our context in which columns of Φ are indicator functions for partitions.) It follows that the composition Ππ T is a contraction mapping. By the contraction mapping theorem, Ππ T has a unique fixed point Φ˜, which is the limit of the sequence Φr( ) . Further, the following result holds: r Theorem 2 For any MDP, partition, and weights π with support intersecting every partition, if Φ˜ = Ππ T Φ˜ then r r Φ˜ − J ∗ r ∞ ≤ 2 min J ∗ − Φr 1 − α r∈ K and (1 − α) Jµr − J ∗ ˜ ∞ ≤ ∞, 4α min J ∗ − Φr 1 − α r∈ K ∞. The first inequality of the theorem is an approximation error bound, established in [16, 7, 8] for broader classes of approximators that include state aggregation as a special case. The second is a performance loss bound, derived by simply combining the approximation error bound and Theorem 1. Note that Jµr (x) ≥ J ∗ (x) for all x, so the left-hand side of the performance loss bound ˜ is the maximal increase in cost-to-go, normalized by 1 − α. This normalization is natural, since a cost-to-go function is a linear combination of expected future costs, with coefficients 1, α, α2 , . . ., which sum to 1/(1 − α). Our motivation of the normalizing constant begs the question of whether, for fixed MDP parameters (S, U, g, p) and fixed Φ, minr J ∗ − Φr ∞ also grows with 1/(1 − α). It turns out that minr J ∗ − Φr ∞ = O(1). To see why, note that for any µ, Jµ = (I − αPµ )−1 gµ = 1 λ µ + hµ , 1−α where λµ (x) is the expected average cost if the process starts in state x and is controlled by policy µ, τ −1 1 t λµ = lim Pµ gµ , τ →∞ τ t=0 and hµ is the discounted differential cost function hµ = (I − αPµ )−1 (gµ − λµ ). Both λµ and hµ converge to finite vectors as α approaches 1 [3]. For an optimal policy µ∗ , limα↑1 λµ∗ (x) does not depend on x (in our context of a communicating MDP). Since constant functions lie in the range of Φ, lim min J ∗ − Φr α↑1 r∈ K ∞ ≤ lim hµ∗ α↑1 ∞ < ∞. The performance loss bound still exhibits an undesirable dependence on α through the coefficient 4α/(1 − α). In most relevant contexts, α is close to 1; a representative value might be 0.99. Consequently, 4α/(1 − α) can be very large. Unfortunately, the bound is sharp, as expressed by the following theorem. We will denote by 1 the vector with every component equal to 1. Theorem 3 For any δ > 0, α ∈ (0, 1), and ∆ ≥ 0, there exists MDP parameters (S, U, g, p) and a partition such that minr∈ K J ∗ − Φr ∞ = ∆ and, if Φ˜ = Ππ T Φ˜ r r with π = 1, 4α min J ∗ − Φr ∞ − δ. (1 − α) Jµr − J ∗ ∞ ≥ ˜ 1 − α r∈ K This theorem is established through an example in [22]. The choice of uniform weights (π = 1) is meant to point out that even for such a simple, perhaps natural, choice of weights, the performance loss bound is sharp. Based on Theorems 2 and 3, one might expect that there exists MDP parameters (S, U, g, p) and a partition such that, with π = 1, (1 − α) Jµr − J ∗ ˜ ∞ =Θ 1 min J ∗ − Φr 1 − α r∈ K ∞ . In other words, that the performance loss is both lower and upper bounded by 1/(1 − α) times the smallest possible approximation error. It turns out that this is not true, at least if we restrict to a finite state space. However, as the following theorem establishes, the coefficient multiplying minr∈ K J ∗ − Φr ∞ can grow arbitrarily large as α increases, keeping all else fixed. Theorem 4 For any L and ∆ ≥ 0, there exists MDP parameters (S, U, g, p) and a partition such that limα↑1 minr∈ K J ∗ − Φr ∞ = ∆ and, if Φ˜ = Ππ T Φ˜ with π = 1, r r lim inf (1 − α) (Jµr (x) − J ∗ (x)) ≥ L lim min J ∗ − Φr ∞ , ˜ α↑1 α↑1 r∈ K for all x ∈ S. This Theorem is also established through an example [22]. For any µ and x, lim ((1 − α)Jµ (x) − λµ (x)) = lim(1 − α)hµ (x) = 0. α↑1 α↑1 Combined with Theorem 4, this yields the following corollary. Corollary 1 For any L and ∆ ≥ 0, there exists MDP parameters (S, U, g, p) and a partition such that limα↑1 minr∈ K J ∗ − Φr ∞ = ∆ and, if Φ˜ = Ππ T Φ˜ with π = 1, r r ∗ lim inf (λµr (x) − λµ∗ (x)) ≥ L lim min J − Φr ∞ , ˜ α↑1 α↑1 r∈ K for all x ∈ S. 3 Using the Invariant Distribution In the previous section, we considered an approximation Φ˜ that solves Ππ T Φ˜ = Φ˜ for r r r some arbitrary pre-selected weights π. We now turn to consider use of an invariant state distribution πr of Pµr as the weight vector.1 This leads to a circular definition: the weights ˜ ˜ are used in defining r and now we are defining the weights in terms of r. What we are ˜ ˜ really after here is a vector r that satisfies Ππr T Φ˜ = Φ˜. The following theorem captures ˜ r r ˜ the associated benefits. (Due to space limitations, we omit the proof, which is provided in the full length version of this paper [22].) Theorem 5 For any MDP and partition, if Φ˜ = Ππr T Φ˜ and πr has support intersecting r r ˜ ˜ T every partition, (1 − α)πr (Jµr − J ∗ ) ≤ 2α minr∈ K J ∗ − Φr ∞ . ˜ ˜ When α is close to 1, which is typical, the right-hand side of our new performance loss bound is far less than that of Theorem 2. The primary improvement is in the omission of a factor of 1 − α from the denominator. But for the bounds to be compared in a meaningful way, we must also relate the left-hand-side expressions. A relation can be based on the fact that for all µ, limα↑1 (1 − α)Jµ − λµ ∞ = 0, as explained in Section 2. In particular, based on this, we have lim(1 − α) Jµ − J ∗ ∞ = |λµ − λ∗ | = λµ − λ∗ = lim π T (Jµ − J ∗ ), α↑1 α↑1 for all policies µ and probability distributions π. Hence, the left-hand-side expressions from the two performance bounds become directly comparable as α approaches 1. Another interesting comparison can be made by contrasting Corollary 1 against the following immediate consequence of Theorem 5. Corollary 2 For all MDP parameters (S, U, g, p) and partitions, if Φ˜ = Ππr T Φ˜ and r r ˜ lim inf α↑1 x∈Sk πr (x) > 0 for all k, ˜ lim sup λµr − λµ∗ ∞ ≤ 2 lim min J ∗ − Φr ∞ . ˜ α↑1 α↑1 r∈ K The comparison suggests that solving Φ˜ = Ππr T Φ˜ is strongly preferable to solving r r ˜ Φ˜ = Ππ T Φ˜ with π = 1. r r 1 By an invariant state distribution of a transition matrix P , we mean any probability distribution π such that π T P = π T . In the event that Pµr has multiple invariant distributions, πr denotes an ˜ ˜ arbitrary choice. 4 Exploration If a vector r solves Φ˜ = Ππr T Φ˜ and the support of πr intersects every partition, Theorem ˜ r r ˜ ˜ 5 promises a desirable bound. However, there are two significant shortcomings to this solution concept, which we will address in this section. First, in some cases, the equation Ππr T Φ˜ = Φ˜ does not have a solution. It is easy to produce examples of this; though r r ˜ no example has been documented for the particular class of approximators we are using here, [2] offers an example involving a different linearly parameterized approximator that captures the spirit of what can happen. Second, it would be nice to relax the requirement that the support of πr intersect every partition. ˜ To address these shortcomings, we introduce stochastic policies. A stochastic policy µ maps state-action pairs to probabilities. For each x ∈ S and u ∈ Ux , µ(x, u) is the probability of taking action u when in state x. Hence, µ(x, u) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ S and u ∈ Ux , and u∈Ux µ(x, u) = 1 for all x ∈ S. Given a scalar > 0 and a function J, the -greedy Boltzmann exploration policy with respect to J is defined by µ(x, u) = e−(Tu J)(x)(|Ux |−1)/ e . −(Tu J)(x)(|Ux |−1)/ e u∈Ux e For any > 0 and r, let µr denote the -greedy Boltzmann exploration policy with respect to Φr. Further, we define a modified dynamic programming operator that incorporates Boltzmann exploration: (T J)(x) = u∈Ux e−(Tu J)(x)(|Ux |−1)/ e (Tu J)(x) . −(Tu J)(x)(|Ux |−1)/ e u∈Ux e As approaches 0, -greedy Boltzmann exploration policies become greedy and the modified dynamic programming operators become the dynamic programming operator. More precisely, for all r, x, and J, lim ↓0 µr (x, µr (x)) = 1 and lim ↓1 T J = T J. These are immediate consequences of the following result (see [4] for a proof). Lemma 1 For any n, v ∈ mini vi . n , mini vi + ≥ i e−vi (n−1)/ e vi / i e−vi (n−1)/ e ≥ Because we are only concerned with communicating MDPs, there is a unique invariant state distribution associated with each -greedy Boltzmann exploration policy µr and the support of this distribution is S. Let πr denote this distribution. We consider a vector r that ˜ solves Φ˜ = Ππr T Φ˜. For any > 0, there exists a solution to this equation (this is an r r ˜ immediate extension of Theorem 5.1 from [4]). We have the following performance loss bound, which parallels Theorem 5 but with an equation for which a solution is guaranteed to exist and without any requirement on the resulting invariant distribution. (Again, we omit the proof, which is available in [22].) Theorem 6 For any MDP, partition, and > 0, if Φ˜ = Ππr T Φ˜ then (1 − r r ˜ T ∗ ∗ α)(πr ) (Jµr − J ) ≤ 2α minr∈ K J − Φr ∞ + . ˜ ˜ 5 Computation: TD(0) Though computation is not a focus of this paper, we offer a brief discussion here. First, we describe a simple algorithm from [16], which draws on ideas from temporal-difference learning [11, 12] and Q-learning [23, 24] to solve Φ˜ = Ππ T Φ˜. It requires an abilr r ity to sample a sequence of states x(0) , x(1) , x(2) , . . ., each independent and identically distributed according to π. Also required is a way to efficiently compute (T Φr)(x) = minu∈Ux (gu (x) + α y∈S pxy (u)(Φr)(y)), for any given x and r. This is typically possible when the action set Ux and the support of px· (u) (i.e., the set of states that can follow x if action u is selected) are not too large. The algorithm generates a sequence of vectors r( ) according to r( +1) = r( ) + γ φ(x( ) ) (T Φr( ) )(x( ) ) − (Φr( ) )(x( ) ) , where γ is a step size and φ(x) denotes the column vector made up of components from the xth row of Φ. In [16], using results from [15, 9], it is shown that under appropriate assumptions on the step size sequence, r( ) converges to a vector r that solves Φ˜ = Ππ T Φ˜. ˜ r r The equation Φ˜ = Ππ T Φ˜ may have no solution. Further, the requirement that states r r are sampled independently from the invariant distribution may be impractical. However, a natural extension of the above algorithm leads to an easily implementable version of TD(0) that aims at solving Φ˜ = Ππr T Φ˜. The algorithm requires simulation of a trajectory r r ˜ x0 , x1 , x2 , . . . of the MDP, with each action ut ∈ Uxt generated by the -greedy Boltzmann exploration policy with respect to Φr(t) . The sequence of vectors r(t) is generated according to r(t+1) = r(t) + γt φ(xt ) (T Φr(t) )(xt ) − (Φr(t) )(xt ) . Under suitable conditions on the step size sequence, if this algorithm converges, the limit satisfies Φ˜ = Ππr T Φ˜. Whether such an algorithm converges and whether there are r r ˜ other algorithms that can effectively solve Φ˜ = Ππr T Φ˜ for broad classes of relevant r r ˜ problems remain open issues. 6 Extensions and Open Issues Our results demonstrate that weighting a Euclidean norm projection by the invariant distribution of a greedy (or approximately greedy) policy can lead to a dramatic performance gain. It is intriguing that temporal-difference learning implicitly carries out such a projection, and consequently, any limit of convergence obeys the stronger performance loss bound. This is not the first time that the invariant distribution has been shown to play a critical role in approximate value iteration and temporal-difference learning. In prior work involving approximation of a cost-to-go function for a fixed policy (no control) and a general linearly parameterized approximator (arbitrary matrix Φ), it was shown that weighting by the invariant distribution is key to ensuring convergence and an approximation error bound [17, 18]. Earlier empirical work anticipated this [13, 14]. The temporal-difference learning algorithm presented in Section 5 is a version of TD(0), This is a special case of TD(λ), which is parameterized by λ ∈ [0, 1]. It is not known whether the results of this paper can be extended to the general case of λ ∈ [0, 1]. Prior research has suggested that larger values of λ lead to superior results. In particular, an example of [1] and the approximation error bounds of [17, 18], both of which are restricted to the case of a fixed policy, suggest that approximation error is amplified by a factor of 1/(1 − α) as λ is changed from 1 to 0. The results of Sections 3 and 4 suggest that this factor vanishes if one considers a controlled process and performance loss rather than approximation error. Whether the results of this paper can be extended to accommodate approximate value iteration with general linearly parameterized approximators remains an open issue. In this broader context, error and performance loss bounds of the kind offered by Theorem 2 are unavailable, even when the invariant distribution is used to weight the projection. Such error and performance bounds are available, on the other hand, for the solution to a certain linear program [5, 6]. Whether a factor of 1/(1 − α) can similarly be eliminated from these bounds is an open issue. Our results can be extended to accommodate an average cost objective, assuming that the MDP is communicating. With Boltzmann exploration, the equation of interest becomes Φ˜ = Ππr (T Φ˜ − λ1). r r ˜ ˜ ˜ The variables include an estimate λ ∈ of the minimal average cost λ∗ ∈ and an approximation Φ˜ of the optimal differential cost function h∗ . The discount factor α is set r to 1 in computing an -greedy Boltzmann exploration policy as well as T . There is an average-cost version of temporal-difference learning for which any limit of convergence ˜ ˜ (λ, r) satisfies this equation [19, 20, 21]. Generalization of Theorem 2 does not lead to a useful result because the right-hand side of the bound becomes infinite as α approaches 1. On the other hand, generalization of Theorem 6 yields the first performance loss bound for approximate value iteration with an average-cost objective: Theorem 7 For any communicating MDP with an average-cost objective, partition, and r ˜ > 0, if Φ˜ = Ππr (T Φ˜ − λ1) then r ˜ λµr − λ∗ ≤ 2 min h∗ − Φr ˜ r∈ K ∞ + . Here, λµr ∈ denotes the average cost under policy µr , which is well-defined because the ˜ ˜ process is irreducible under an -greedy Boltzmann exploration policy. This theorem can be proved by taking limits on the left and right-hand sides of the bound of Theorem 6. It is easy to see that the limit of the left-hand side is λµr − λ∗ . The limit of minr∈ K J ∗ − Φr ∞ ˜ on the right-hand side is minr∈ K h∗ − Φr ∞ . (This follows from the analysis of [3].) Acknowledgments This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant ECS-9985229 and by the Office of Naval Research under Grant MURI N00014-001-0637. The author’s understanding of the topic benefited from collaborations with Dimitri Bertsekas, Daniela de Farias, and John Tsitsiklis. A full length version of this paper has been submitted to Mathematics of Operations Research and has benefited from a number of useful comments and suggestions made by reviewers. References [1] D. P. Bertsekas. A counterexample to temporal-difference learning. Neural Computation, 7:270–279, 1994. [2] D. P. Bertsekas and J. N. Tsitsiklis. Neuro-Dynamic Programming. Athena Scientific, Belmont, MA, 1996. [3] D. Blackwell. Discrete dynamic programming. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 33:719–726, 1962. [4] D. P. de Farias and B. Van Roy. On the existence of fixed points for approximate value iteration and temporal-difference learning. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 105(3), 2000. [5] D. P. de Farias and B. Van Roy. Approximate dynamic programming via linear programming. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 14. 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In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 9, Cambridge, MA, 1997. MIT Press. [19] J. N. Tsitsiklis and B. Van Roy. Average cost temporal-difference learning. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 1997. [20] J. N. Tsitsiklis and B. Van Roy. Average cost temporal-difference learning. Automatica, 35(11):1799–1808, 1999. [21] J. N. Tsitsiklis and B. Van Roy. On average versus discounted reward temporaldifference learning. Machine Learning, 49(2-3):179–191, 2002. [22] B. Van Roy. Performance loss bounds for approximate value iteration with state aggregation. Under review with Mathematics of Operations Research, available at www.stanford.edu/ bvr/psfiles/aggregation.pdf, 2005. [23] C. J. C. H. Watkins. Learning From Delayed Rewards. PhD thesis, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK, 1989. [24] C. J. C. H. Watkins and P. Dayan. Q-learning. Machine Learning, 8:279–292, 1992.
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