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142 nips-2005-Oblivious Equilibrium: A Mean Field Approximation for Large-Scale Dynamic Games


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Author: Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Lanier Benkard, Benjamin Van Roy

Abstract: We propose a mean-field approximation that dramatically reduces the computational complexity of solving stochastic dynamic games. We provide conditions that guarantee our method approximates an equilibrium as the number of agents grow. We then derive a performance bound to assess how well the approximation performs for any given number of agents. We apply our method to an important class of problems in applied microeconomics. We show with numerical experiments that we are able to greatly expand the set of economic problems that can be analyzed computationally. 1

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Summary: the most important sentenses genereted by tfidf model

sentIndex sentText sentNum sentScore

1 edu Abstract We propose a mean-field approximation that dramatically reduces the computational complexity of solving stochastic dynamic games. [sent-3, score-0.216]

2 We provide conditions that guarantee our method approximates an equilibrium as the number of agents grow. [sent-4, score-0.53]

3 At each period of time, each agent has a given state and can make a decision. [sent-9, score-0.494]

4 Additionally, agents receive profits depending on the current states and decisions. [sent-11, score-0.277]

5 When there are more than a few agents participating in the game and/or more than a few states per agent, the curse of dimensionality renders dynamic programming algorithms intractable. [sent-14, score-0.399]

6 In this paper we consider a class of stochastic dynamic games where the state of an agent captures its competitive advantage. [sent-15, score-0.57]

7 Our main motivation is to consider an important class of models in applied economics, namely, dynamic industry models of imperfect competition. [sent-16, score-0.387]

8 To clarify the type of models we consider, let us describe a specific example of a dynamic industry model. [sent-18, score-0.349]

9 Consider an industry where a group of firms can invest to improve the quality of their products over time. [sent-19, score-0.378]

10 In this context, we propose a mean-field approximation approach that dramatically simplifies the computational complexity of stochastic dynamic games. [sent-24, score-0.216]

11 We propose a simple algorithm for computing an “oblivious” equilibrium in which each agent is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long run equilibrium distribution of states, but where agents ignore current information about rivals’ states. [sent-25, score-1.334]

12 We prove that, if the distribution of agents obeys a certain “light-tail” condition, when the number of agents becomes large the oblivious equilibrium approximates a MPE. [sent-26, score-1.377]

13 We apply our method to analyze dynamic industry models of imperfect competition. [sent-28, score-0.387]

14 The state of each agent captures its ability to compete in the environment. [sent-43, score-0.459]

15 At time t, the state of agent i ∈ S is denoted by xit ∈ N. [sent-44, score-0.559]

16 We define the system state st to be a vector over individual states that specifies, for each state x ∈ N, the number of agents at state x in period t. [sent-45, score-0.838]

17 For each i ∈ S, we define s−i,t ∈ S to be the state of the competitors of agent i; that is, s−i,t (x) = st (x) − 1 if xit = x, and s−i,t (x) = st (x), otherwise. [sent-47, score-0.862]

18 An agent’s single period expected profit πm (xit , s−i,t ) depends on its state xit , its competitors’ state s−i,t and a parameter m ∈ + . [sent-49, score-0.48]

19 For example, in the context of an industry model, m could represent the total number of consumers, that is, the size of the pie to be divided among all agents. [sent-50, score-0.292]

20 We interpret this decision as an investment to improve the state at the next period. [sent-54, score-0.26]

21 If an agent invests µit ∈ + , then the agent’s state at time t + 1 is given by, xi,t+1 = xit + w(µit , ζi,t+1 ), where the function w captures the impact of investment on the state and ζi,t+1 reflects uncertainty in the outcome of investment. [sent-55, score-0.838]

22 For example, in the context of an industry model, uncertainty may arise due to the risk associated with a research endeavor or a marketing campaign. [sent-56, score-0.267]

23 Hence, if the amount invested is larger it is more likely the agent will transit next period to a better state. [sent-58, score-0.419]

24 Each agent aims to maximize expected net present value. [sent-64, score-0.356]

25 The equilibrium concept we will use builds on the notion of a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), in the sense of [3]. [sent-66, score-0.623]

26 We further assume that equilibrium is symmetric, such that all agents use a common stationary strategy. [sent-67, score-0.53]

27 In particular, there is a function µ such that at each time t, each agent i ∈ S makes a decision µit = µ(xit , s−i,t ). [sent-68, score-0.299]

28 We define the value function V (x, s|µ , µ) to be the expected net present value for an agent at state x when its competitors’ state is s, given that its competitors each follows a common strategy µ ∈ M, and the agent itself follows strategy µ ∈ M. [sent-70, score-1.098]

29 In particular, ∞ β k−t (π(xik , s−i,k ) − dιik ) xit = x, s−i,t = s , V (x, s|µ , µ) = Eµ ,µ k=t where i is taken to be the index of an agent at state x at time t, and the subscripts of the expectation indicate the strategy followed by agent i and the strategy followed by its competitors. [sent-71, score-1.022]

30 In an abuse of notation, we will use the shorthand, V (x, s|µ) ≡ V (x, s|µ, µ), to refer to the expected discounted value of profits when agent i follows the same strategy µ as its competitors. [sent-72, score-0.456]

31 An equilibrium to our model comprises a strategy µ ∈ M that satisfy the following condition: (2. [sent-73, score-0.365]

32 µ ∈M Under some technical conditions, one can establish existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies [4]. [sent-75, score-0.383]

33 Dynamic programming algorithms can be used to optimize agent strategies, and equilibria to our model can be computed via their iterative application. [sent-77, score-0.394]

34 In this setting, each agent can potentially make near-optimal decisions based only on its own state and the long run average system state. [sent-81, score-0.555]

35 With this motivation, we consider restricting agent strategies so that each agent’s decisions depend only on the agent’s state. [sent-82, score-0.429]

36 We call such restricted strategies oblivious since they involve decisions made without full knowledge of the circumstances — in particular, the state of the system. [sent-83, score-0.846]

37 Let ˜ ˜ M ⊂ M denote the set of oblivious strategies. [sent-84, score-0.609]

38 Let sµ be the long-run expected system state when all agents use an oblivious strategy ˜ ˜ ˜ µ ∈ M. [sent-86, score-1.094]

39 For an oblivious strategy µ ∈ M we define an oblivious value function ∞ ˜ V (x|µ , µ) = Eµ β k−t (π(xik , sµ ) − dιik ) xit = x . [sent-87, score-1.444]

40 ˜ k=t This value function should be interpreted as the expected net present value of an agent that is at state x and follows oblivious strategy µ , under the assumption that its competitors’ ˜ ˜ state will be sµ for all time. [sent-88, score-1.252]

41 Again, we abuse notation by using V (x|µ) ≡ V (x|µ, µ) ˜ to refer to the oblivious value function when agent i follows the same strategy µ as its competitors. [sent-89, score-1.04]

42 We now define a new solution concept: an oblivious equilibrium consists of a strategy ˜ µ ∈ M that satisfy the following condition: ˜ ˜ (3. [sent-90, score-0.974]

43 ˜ µ ∈M In an oblivious equilibrium firms optimize an oblivious value function assuming that its competitors’ state will be sµ for all time. [sent-92, score-1.617]

44 It ˜ is straightforward to show that an oblivious equilibrium exists under mild technical conditions. [sent-94, score-0.901]

45 With respect to uniqueness, we have been unable to find multiple oblivious equilibria in any of the applied problems we have considered, but similarly with the case of MPE, we have no reason to believe that in general there is a unique oblivious equilibrium. [sent-95, score-1.313]

46 4 Asymptotic Results In this section, we establish asymptotic results that provide conditions under which oblivious equilibria offer close approximations to MPE as the number of agents, n, grow. [sent-96, score-0.748]

47 We consider a sequence of systems indexed by the one period profit parameter m and we assume that the number of agents in system m is given by n(m) = am, for some a > 0. [sent-97, score-0.368]

48 Recall that m represents, for example, the total pie to be divided by the agents so it is reasonable to increase n(m) and m at the same rate. [sent-98, score-0.263]

49 From this point onward we let µ(m) denote an oblivious equilibrium for system m. [sent-100, score-0.943]

50 ˜ ˜ Let V (m) and V (m) represent the value function and oblivious value function, respectively, when the system is m. [sent-101, score-0.651]

51 The random variable st denotes the system state ˜ ˜ ˜˜ at time t when every agent uses strategy µ(m) . [sent-103, score-0.631]

52 Hence, st is a stationary process; st is distributed (m) (m) according to q (m) for all t ≥ 0. [sent-106, score-0.22]

53 It will be helpful to decompose st according to st = (m) (m) (m) ft n , where ft is the random vector that represents the fraction of agents in each (m) ˜ state. [sent-107, score-0.589]

54 Similarly, let f (m) ≡ E[ft ] denote the expected fraction of agents in each state. [sent-108, score-0.29]

55 Our aim is to establish that, under certain conditions, oblivious equilibria well-approximate MPE as m grows. [sent-112, score-0.722]

56 A sequence µ(m) ∈ M possesses the asymptotic Markov equilibrium ˜ (AME) property if for all x ∈ N, lim Eµ(m) ˜ m→∞ (m) sup V (m) (x, st µ ∈M (m) |µ , µ(m) ) − V (m) (x, st ˜ |˜(m) ) = 0 . [sent-116, score-0.608]

57 However, recall that each agent state reflects its competitive advantage and if there are agents that are too “dominant” this is not necessarily the case. [sent-120, score-0.66]

58 To make this idea more concrete, let us go back to our industry example where firms invest in quality. [sent-121, score-0.337]

59 (y,f,n) Note that d ln πm(x) is the semi-elasticity of one period profits with respect to the fraction df of agents in state x. [sent-124, score-0.48]

60 df (x) For each x, g(x) is the maximum rate of relative change of any agent’s single-period profit that could result from a small change in the fraction of agents at state x. [sent-126, score-0.392]

61 Since larger competitors tend to have greater influence on agent profits, g(x) typically increases with x, and can be unbounded. [sent-127, score-0.382]

62 x(m) can be interpreted as the is a random variable with probability mass function f ˜ state of an agent that is randomly sampled from among all agents while the system state is distributed according to its invariant distribution. [sent-130, score-0.832]

63 Put simply, the light tail condition requires that states where a small change in the fraction of agents has a large impact on the profits of other agents, must have a small probability under the invariant distribution. [sent-135, score-0.36]

64 In the previous example of an industry where firms invest in quality this typically means that very large firms (and hence high concentration) rarely occur under the invariant distribution. [sent-136, score-0.417]

65 1 and some other regularity conditions1 , the sequence µ(m) of oblivious equilibria possesses the AME property. [sent-140, score-0.724]

66 ˜ 5 Error Bounds While the asymptotic results from Section 4 provide conditions under which the approximation will work well as the number of agents grows, in practice one would also like to know how the approximation performs for a particular system. [sent-141, score-0.431]

67 For that purpose we derive performance bounds on the approximation error that are simple to compute via simulation and can be used to asses the accuracy of the approximation for a particular problem instance. [sent-142, score-0.224]

68 We will quantify approximation error at each agent state x ∈ N by ˜ E supµ ∈M V (x, st |µ , µ) − V (x, st |˜) . [sent-145, score-0.733]

69 Recall that s ˜ is the long run expected state in oblivious equilibrium (E[st ]). [sent-148, score-1.066]

70 Let ax (y) be the expected discounted sum of an indicator of visits to state y for an agent starting at state x that uses strategy µ . [sent-149, score-0.652]

71 For any oblivious equilibrium µ and state x ∈ N, ˜ (5. [sent-152, score-1.008]

72 1) E [∆V ] ≤ 1 E[∆π(st )] + 1−β ax (y) (π(y, s) − E [π(y, st )]) , ˜ y∈N 1 In particular, we require that the single period profit function is “smooth” as a function of its arguments. [sent-153, score-0.218]

73 where ∆V = supµ ∈M V (x, st |µ , µ) − V (x, st |˜) ˜ µ maxy∈N (π(y, s) − π(y, s)). [sent-155, score-0.22]

74 [1] (hereafter EP) introduced an approach to modeling industry dynamics. [sent-160, score-0.267]

75 In this section we use our method to expand the set of dynamic industries that can be analyzed computationally. [sent-163, score-0.223]

76 We consider a model of a single-good industry with quality differentiation. [sent-165, score-0.308]

77 The agents are firms that can invest to improve the quality of their product over time. [sent-166, score-0.349]

78 First, we propose an algorithm to compute oblivious equilibrium [5]. [sent-174, score-0.917]

79 In practice the parameters would either be estimated using data from a particular industry or chosen to reflect an industry under study. [sent-180, score-0.551]

80 For each set of parameters, we use the approximation error bound to compute an upper E[supµ ∈M V (x,s|µ ,˜ )−V (x,s|˜ )] µ µ bound on the percentage error in the value function, , where E[V (x,s|˜ )]] µ µ is the OE strategy and the expectations are taken with respect to s. [sent-183, score-0.373]

81 We compute the previously mentioned percentage approximation error bound for different market sizes m and number of firms n(m) . [sent-185, score-0.286]

82 As the market size increases, the number of firms increases and the approximation error bound decreases. [sent-186, score-0.257]

83 These results show that the approximation error bound may sometimes be small (<2%) in these cases, though this would depend on the model and parameter values for the industry under study. [sent-193, score-0.456]

84 To shed light on this issue we compare long-run statistics for the same industry primitives under oblivious equilibrium and MPE strategies. [sent-195, score-1.168]

85 We compare the average values of several economic statistics of interest under the oblivious equilibrium and the MPE invariant distributions. [sent-197, score-1.021]

86 keeping track of the industry state (the actual difference E[V (x,s|˜ )]] µ Note that the the latter quantity should always be smaller than the approximation error bound. [sent-200, score-0.497]

87 When the bound is less than 1% the long-run quantities estimated under oblivious equilibrium and MPE strategies are very close. [sent-202, score-1.078]

88 Performance of the approximation depends on the richness of the equilibrium investment process. [sent-204, score-0.52]

89 Industries with a relatively low cost of investment tend to have a symmetric average distribution over quality levels reflecting a rich investment process. [sent-205, score-0.364]

90 In this cases, when the bound is between 1-20%, the long-run quantities estimated under oblivious equilibrium and MPE strategies are still quite close. [sent-206, score-1.062]

91 In industries with high investment cost the industry (system) state tends to be skewed, reflecting low levels of investment. [sent-207, score-0.623]

92 The previous results suggest that MPE dynamics are well-approximated by oblivious equilibrium strategies when the approximation error bound is small (less than 1-2% and in some cases even up to 20 %). [sent-212, score-1.17]

93 Our results demonstrate that the oblivious equilibrium approximation significantly expands the range of applied problems that can be analyzed computationally. [sent-213, score-1.045]

94 As an alternative, we proposed a method for approximating MPE behavior using an oblivious equilibrium, where agents make decisions only based on their own state and the long run average system state. [sent-216, score-1.103]

95 We also introduced a simple algorithm to compute an oblivious equilibrium. [sent-218, score-0.609]

96 To facilitate using oblivious equilibrium in practice, we derived approximation error bounds that indicate how good the approximation is in any particular problem under study. [sent-219, score-1.125]

97 We use our methods to analyze dynamic industry models of imperfect competition and showed that oblivious equilibrium often yields a good approximation of MPE behavior for industries with a couple hundred firms, and sometimes even with just tens of firms. [sent-221, score-1.538]

98 We have considered very simple strategies that are functions only of an agent’s own state and the long run average system state. [sent-222, score-0.272]

99 Solving for equilibria of this type would be more difficult than solving for oblivious equilibria, but is still likely to be computationally feasible. [sent-225, score-0.704]

100 Foundations of Markov-perfect industry dynamics: Existence, purification, and multiplicity. [sent-248, score-0.267]


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The first is the initiation set, I ⊂ S, the subset of states in which the option can be started. The second component of an option is its policy, π : S × A ⇒ [0, 1], specifying how the agent behaves when 1 Although the options framework includes rewards, we omit them here because we are concerned only with prediction, not control. following the option. Finally, a termination function, β : S × A ⇒ [0, 1], specifies how the option ends: β(s) denotes the probability of terminating when in state s. The option is thus completely and formally defined by the 3-tuple (I, π, β). 2 Conventional TD networks In this section we briefly present the details of the structure and the learning algorithm comprising TD networks as introduced by Sutton and Tanner (2005). TD networks address a prediction problem in which the agent may not have direct access to the state of the environment. Instead, at each time step the agent receives an observation ot ∈ O dependent on the state. The experience stream thus consists of a sequence of alternating actions and observations, o1 , a1 , o2 , a2 , o3 · · ·. The TD network consists of a set of nodes, each representing a single scalar prediction, interlinked by the question and answer networks as suggested previously. For a network 1 n of n nodes, the vector of all predictions at time step t is denoted yt = (yt , . . . , yt )T . The predictions are estimates of the expected value of some scalar quantity, typically of a bit, in which case they can be interpreted as estimates of probabilities. The predictions are updated at each time step according to a vector-valued function u with modifiable parameter W, which is often taken to be of a linear form: yt = u(yt−1 , at−1 , ot , Wt ) = σ(Wt xt ), (1) where xt ∈ m is an m-vector of features created from (yt−1 , at−1 , ot ), Wt is an n × m matrix (whose elements are sometimes referred to as weights), and σ is the n-vector 1 form of either the identity function or the S-shaped logistic function σ(s) = 1+e−s . The feature vector is an arbitrary vector-valued function of yt−1 , at−1 , and ot . For example, in the simplest case the feature vector is a unit basis vector with the location of the one communicating the current state. In a partially observable environment, the feature vector may be a combination of the agent’s action, observations, and predictions from the previous time step. The overall update u defines the answer network. The question network consists of a set of target functions, z i : O × n → , and condition i y functions, ci : A× n → [0, 1]n . We define zt = z i (ot+1 , ˜t+1 ) as the target for prediction i 2 i i yt . Similarly, we define ct = c (at , yt ) as the condition at time t. The learning algorithm ij for each component wt of Wt can then be written ij ij i i wt+1 = wt + α zt − yt ci t i ∂yt , (2) ij ∂wt where α is a positive step-size parameter. Note that the targets here are functions of the observation and predictions exactly one time step later, and that the conditions are functions of a single primitive action. This is what makes this algorithm suitable only for learning about one-step TD relationships. By chaining together multiple nodes, Sutton and Tanner (2005) used it to predict k steps ahead, for various particular values of k, and to predict the outcome of specific action sequences (as in PSRs, e.g., Littman et al., 2002; Singh et al., 2004). Now we consider the extension to temporally abstract actions. 3 Option-extended TD networks In this section we present our intra-option learning algorithm for TD networks with options and eligibility traces. As suggested earlier, each node’s outgoing link in the question 2 The quantity ˜ is almost the same as y, and we encourage the reader to think of them as identical y here. The difference is that ˜ is calculated by weights that are one step out of date as compared to y, y i.e., ˜t = u(yt−1 , at−1 , ot , Wt−1 ) (cf. equation 1). y network will now correspond to an option applying over possibly many steps. The policy of the ith node’s option corresponds to the condition function ci , which we think of as a recognizer for the option. It inspects each action taken to assess whether the option is being followed: ci = 1 if the agent is acting consistently with the option policy and ci = 0 othert t wise (intermediate values are also possible). When an agent ceases to act consistently with the option policy, we say that the option has diverged. The possibility of recognizing more than one action as consistent with the option is a significant generalization of the original idea of options. If no actions are recognized as acceptable in a state, then the option cannot be followed and thus cannot be initiated. Here we take the set of states with at least one recognized action to be the initiation set of the option. The option-termination function β generalizes naturally to TD networks. Each node i is i given a corresponding termination function, β i : O× n → [0, 1], where βt = β i (ot+1 , yt ) i is the probability of terminating at time t.3 βt = 1 indicates that the option has terminated i at time t; βt = 0 indicates that it has not, and intermediate values of β correspond to soft i or stochastic termination conditions. If an option terminates, then zt acts as the target, but if the option is ongoing without termination, then the node’s own next value, yt+1 , should ˜i be the target. The termination function specifies which of the two targets (or mixture of the two targets) is used to produce a form of TD error for each node i: i i i i i i δt = βt zt + (1 − βt )˜t+1 − yt . y (3) Our option-extended algorithm incorporates eligibility traces (see Sutton & Barto, 1998) as short-term memory variables organized in an n × m matrix E, paralleling the weight matrix. The traces are a record of the effect that each weight could have had on each node’s prediction during the time the agent has been acting consistently with the node’s option. The components eij of the eligibility matrix are updated by i eij = ci λeij (1 − βt ) + t t t−1 i ∂yt ij ∂wt , (4) where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is the trace-decay parameter familiar from the TD(λ) learning algorithm. Because of the ci factor, all of a node’s traces will be immediately reset to zero whenever t the agent deviates from the node’s option’s policy. If the agent follows the policy and the option does not terminate, then the trace decays by λ and increments by the gradient in the way typical of eligibility traces. If the policy is followed and the option does terminate, then the trace will be reset to zero on the immediately following time step, and a new trace will start building. Finally, our algorithm updates the weights on each time step by ij ij i wt+1 = wt + α δt eij . t 4 (5) Fully observable experiment This experiment was designed to test the correctness of the algorithm in a simple gridworld where the environmental state is observable. We applied an options-extended TD network to the problem of learning to predict observations from interaction with the gridworld environment shown on the left in Figure 1. Empty squares indicate spaces where the agent can move freely, and colored squares (shown shaded in the figure) indicate walls. The agent is egocentric. At each time step the agent receives from the environment six bits representing the color it is facing (red, green, blue, orange, yellow, or white). In this first experiment we also provided 6 × 6 × 4 = 144 other bits directly indicating the complete state of the environment (square and orientation). 3 The fact that the option depends only on the current predictions, action, and observation means that we are considering only Markov options. Figure 1: The test world (left) and the question network (right) used in the experiments. The triangle in the world indicates the location and orientation of the agent. The walls are labeled R, O, Y, G, and B representing the colors red, orange, yellow, green and blue. Note that the left wall is mostly blue but partly green. The right diagram shows in full the portion of the question network corresponding to the red bit. This structure is repeated, but not shown, for the other four (non-white) colors. L, R, and F are primitive actions, and Forward and Wander are options. There are three possible actions: A ={F, R, L}. Actions were selected according to a fixed stochastic policy independent of the state. The probability of the F, L, and R actions were 0.5, 0.25, and 0.25 respectively. L and R cause the agent to rotate 90 degrees to the left or right. F causes the agent to move ahead one square with probability 1 − p and to stay in the same square with probability p. The probability p is called the slipping probability. If the forward movement would cause the agent to move into a wall, then the agent does not move. In this experiment, we used p = 0, p = 0.1, and p = 0.5. In addition to these primitive actions, we provided two temporally abstract options, Forward and Wander. The Forward option takes the action F in every state and terminates when the agent senses a wall (color) in front of it. The policy of the Wander option is the same as that actually followed by the agent. Wander terminates with probability 1 when a wall is sensed, and spontaneously with probability 0.5 otherwise. We used the question network shown on the right in Figure 1. The predictions of nodes 1, 2, and 3 are estimates of the probability that the red bit would be observed if the corresponding primitive action were taken. Node 4 is a prediction of whether the agent will see the red bit upon termination of the Wander option if it were taken. Node 5 predicts the probability of observing the red bit given that the Forward option is followed until termination. Nodes 6 and 7 represent predictions of the outcome of a primitive action followed by the Forward option. Nodes 8 and 9 take this one step further: they represent predictions of the red bit if the Forward option were followed to termination, then a primitive action were taken, and then the Forward option were followed again to termination. We applied our algorithm to learn the parameter W of the answer network for this question network. The step-size parameter α was 1.0, and the trace-decay parameter λ was 0.9. The initial W0 , E0 , and y0 were all 0. Each run began with the agent in the state indicated in Figure 1 (left). In this experiment σ(·) was the identity function. For each value of p, we ran 50 runs of 20,000 time steps. On each time step, the root-meansquared (RMS) error in each node’s prediction was computed and then averaged over all the nodes. The nodes corresponding to the Wander option were not included in the average because of the difficulty of calculating their correct predictions. This average was then 0.4 Fully Observable 0.4 RMS Error RMS Error p=0 0 0 Partially Observable p = 0.1 5000 p = 0.5 10000 15000 20000 Steps 0 0 100000 200000 Steps 300000 Figure 2: Learning curves in the fully-observable experiment for each slippage probability (left) and in the partially-observable experiment (right). itself averaged over the 50 runs and bins of 1,000 time steps to produce the learning curves shown on the left in Figure 2. For all slippage probabilities, the error in all predictions fell almost to zero. After approximately 12,000 trials, the agent made almost perfect predictions in all cases. Not surprisingly, learning was slower at the higher slippage probabilities. These results show that our augmented TD network is able to make a complete temporally-abstract model of this world. 5 Partially observable experiment In our second experiment, only the six color observation bits were available to the agent. This experiment provides a more challenging test of our algorithm. To model the environment well, the TD network must construct a representation of state from very sparse information. In fact, completely accurate prediction is not possible in this problem with our question network. In this experiment the input vector consisted of three groups of 46 components each, 138 in total. If the action was R, the first 46 components were set to the 40 node values and the six observation bits, and the other components were 0. If the action was L, the next group of 46 components was filled in in the same way, and the first and third groups were zero. If the action was F, the third group was filled. This technique enables the answer network as function approximator to represent a wider class of functions in a linear form than would otherwise be possible. In this experiment, σ(·) was the S-shaped logistic function. The slippage probability was p = 0.1. As our performance measure we used the RMS error, as in the first experiment, except that the predictions for the primitive actions (nodes 1-3) were not included. These predictions can never become completely accurate because the agent can’t tell in detail where it is located in the open space. As before, we averaged RMS error over 50 runs and 1,000 time step bins, to produce the learning curve shown on the right in Figure 2. As before, the RMS error approached zero. Node 5 in Figure 1 holds the prediction of red if the agent were to march forward to the wall ahead of it. Corresponding nodes in the other subnetworks hold the predictions of the other colors upon Forward. To make these predictions accurately, the agent must keep track of which wall it is facing, even if it is many steps away from it. It has to learn a sort of compass that it can keep updated as it turns in the middle of the space. Figure 3 is a demonstration of the compass learned after a representative run of 200,000 time steps. At the end of the run, the agent was driven manually to the state shown in the first row (relative time index t = 1). On steps 1-25 the agent was spun clockwise in place. The third column shows the prediction for node 5 in each portion of the question network. That is, the predictions shown are for each color-observation bit at termination of the Forward option. At t = 1, the agent is facing the orange wall and it predicts that the Forward option would result in seeing the orange bit and none other. Over steps 2-5 we see that the predictions are maintained accurately as the agent spins despite the fact that its observation bits remain the same. Even after spinning for 25 steps the agent knows exactly which way it is facing. While spinning, the agent correctly never predicts seeing the green bit (after Forward), but if it is driven up and turned, as in the last row of the figure, the green bit is accurately predicted. The fourth column shows the prediction for node 8 in each portion of the question network. Recall that these nodes correspond to the sequence Forward, L, Forward. At time t = 1, the agent accurately predicts that Forward will bring it to orange (third column) and also predicts that Forward, L, Forward will bring it to green. The predictions made for node 8 at each subsequent step of the sequence are also correct. These results show that the agent is able to accurately maintain its long term predictions without directly encountering sensory verification. How much larger would the TD network have to be to handle a 100x100 gridworld? The answer is not at all. The same question network applies to any size problem. If the layout of the colored walls remain the same, then even the answer network transfers across worlds of widely varying sizes. In other experiments, training on successively larger problems, we have shown that the same TD network as used here can learn to make all the long-term predictions correctly on a 100x100 version of the 6x6 gridworld used here. t y5 t st y8 t 1 1 O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG O Y R BG 2 3 4 5 25 29 Figure 3: An illustration of part of what the agent learns in the partially observable environment. The second column is a sequence of states with (relative) time index as given by the first column. The sequence was generated by controlling the agent manually. On steps 1-25 the agent was spun clockwise in place, and the trajectory after that is shown by the line in the last state diagram. The third and fourth columns show the values of the nodes corresponding to 5 and 8 in Figure 1, one for each color-observation bit. 6 Conclusion Our experiments show that option-extended TD networks can learn effectively. They can learn facts about their environments that are not representable in conventional TD networks or in any other method for learning models of the world. One concern is that our intra-option learning algorithm is an off-policy learning method incorporating function approximation and bootstrapping (learning from predictions). The combination of these three is known to produce convergence problems for some methods (see Sutton & Barto, 1998), and they may arise here. A sound solution may require modifications to incorporate importance sampling (see Precup, Sutton & Dasgupta, 2001). In this paper we have considered only intra-option eligibility traces—traces extending over the time span within an option but not persisting across options. Tanner and Sutton (2005) have proposed a method for inter-option traces that could perhaps be combined with our intra-option traces. The primary contribution of this paper is the introduction of a new learning algorithm for TD networks that incorporates options and eligibility traces. Our experiments are small and do little more than exercise the learning algorithm, showing that it does not break immediately. More significant is the greater representational power of option-extended TD networks. Options are a general framework for temporal abstraction, predictive state representations are a promising strategy for state abstraction, and TD networks are able to represent compositional questions. The combination of these three is potentially very powerful and worthy of further study. Acknowledgments The authors gratefully acknowledge the ideas and encouragement they have received in this work from Mark Ring, Brian Tanner, Satinder Singh, Doina Precup, and all the members of the rlai.net group. References Jaeger, H. (2000). Observable operator models for discrete stochastic time series. Neural Computation, 12(6):1371-1398. MIT Press. Littman, M., Sutton, R. S., & Singh, S. (2002). Predictive representations of state. In T. G. Dietterich, S. Becker and Z. Ghahramani (eds.), Advances In Neural Information Processing Systems 14, pp. 1555-1561. MIT Press. Precup, D., Sutton, R. S., & Dasgupta, S. (2001). Off-policy temporal-difference learning with function approximation. In C. E. Brodley, A. P. Danyluk (eds.), Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on Machine Learning, pp. 417-424. San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann. Rafols, E. J., Ring, M., Sutton, R.S., & Tanner, B. (2005). Using predictive representations to improve generalization in reinforcement learning. To appear in Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Rivest, R. L., & Schapire, R. E. (1987). Diversity-based inference of finite automata. In Proceedings of the Twenty Eighth Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, (pp. 78–87). IEEE Computer Society. Singh, S., James, M. R., & Rudary, M. R. (2004). Predictive state representations: A new theory for modeling dynamical systems. In Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence: Proceedings of the Twentieth Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, (pp. 512–519). AUAI Press. Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement learning: An introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sutton, R. S., Precup, D., Singh, S. (1999). Between MDPs and semi-MDPs: A framework for temporal abstraction in reinforcement learning. Artificial Intelligence, 112, pp. 181-211. Sutton, R. S., & Tanner, B. (2005). Conference 17. Temporal-difference networks. To appear in Neural Information Processing Systems Tanner, B., Sutton, R. S. (2005) Temporal-difference networks with history. To appear in Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.

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