nips nips2008 nips2008-33 nips2008-33-reference knowledge-graph by maker-knowledge-mining
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Author: Debajyoti Ray, Brooks King-casas, P. R. Montague, Peter Dayan
Abstract: Classical game theoretic approaches that make strong rationality assumptions have difficulty modeling human behaviour in economic games. We investigate the role of finite levels of iterated reasoning and non-selfish utility functions in a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process model that incorporates game theoretic notions of interactivity. Our generative model captures a broad class of characteristic behaviours in a multi-round Investor-Trustee game. We invert the generative process for a recognition model that is used to classify 200 subjects playing this game against randomly matched opponents. 1
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